

SPECIAL NO. 4

ASYLUM MIGRATION INTEGRATION

similar challenges, different patterns

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2016

Supported by

Robert Bosch **Stiftung**

MEMORANDUM – UNITY IN DIVERSITY

EPRIE 2016 engaged with a particularly topical issue: asylum, migration and integration - similar challenges, different patterns. With refugees continuing to try to enter Europe, the program was appropriately held in Poland, Germany and France where we visited organizations and institutions involved in helping refugees and governing migration, discussed with experts in the field, and compared attitudes and policies with those in East Asia.

The topic felt relevant and personal to us, not merely because we engage with it in our studies or professional lives, but because many of the participants had personal experiences of migration and the challenges of integrating into a new country. In spite of the personal nature of our experiences, the complexity of the topic and the fact that we come from six different countries, we had largely similar opinions about the current state of migration governance, as well as similar ideas about how to improve it.

This memorandum lays out some of those ideas. First, it describes the current state of affairs by detailing regional attitudes towards migrants in China, Japan, Korea and Europe. Next, it highlights the importance of cooperation and networking between those regions in general before moving on to suggesting that cooperation is best achieved through shifting power away from the nation-state, both to a global and a local level. Finally, the memorandum delves deeper into the special importance of local initiatives for successful integration. We conclude with a call for cooperation and a continuing exchange of ideas.

REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS

Immigration policies in China, Japan and Korea are decided at the nation-state level. The European Union (EU) has a common asylum system, however EU member states have their own policies on issues such as migration and integration. Generally speaking, the immigration policies of China, Japan, Korea and Europe are similar in that all four regions encourage migration of the highly skilled and are wary of low-skilled migrants. Regarding other forms of migration, there are some differences, for example, marriage migration is actively encouraged in Korea but discouraged in Europe. Further, China, Japan and Korea are more reluctant than Europe to take in refugees, however it should be noted that the willingness to do so varies between European countries.

China is experiencing mass internal rural-urban migration due to industrial development, increasing urbanization and labor imbalances between east and west. Generally speaking, the Chinese government has not acted to legislate for refugee settlement until now, despite the presence of many refugees in China from Vietnam, Myanmar, Syria and various African countries. The Chinese government has worked together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and temporarily accepted refugees according to the »Exit-Entry Administration Law« that it enacted after signing the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982. Despite this, an effective integration policy is still pending in China. As the second-largest global economy, China must play a more important role in solving refugee crises in the future.

Similarly, in Japan, there is no official immigration policy to encourage migrants to integrate into Japanese society. However, at the community level, there have been many attempts by local governments to support migrants through integration policies. Hamamatsu City, which has one of the largest populations of migrants, particularly Latin American Nikkei, is an example of such a local-level attempt. The city declared itself part of a global network...

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2016

ASYLUM, MIGRATION, AND INTEGRATION

– SIMILAR CHALLENGES, DIFFERENT PATTERNS

For five years now, EPRIE has offered young people from Europe and East Asia the opportunity to intensively discuss and exchange ideas about current problems that have historic roots during a ten to twelve-day seminar. Topics considered so far have concerned reconciliation in each region, nation building at the beginning of modernization, and national identities, among others. In EPRIE 2016 we focused on the prevailing and crucial topic of migration and integration. This topic is highly controversial within the EU and has already led to substantial changes in cooperation between EU member states. While migration and integration are also the subject of controversial discussion in East Asian countries, they address these issues in different ways.

In the seminar we discussed several aspects of migration with a number of experts, and recognized that we only could cover some aspects of the topic. In this issue, we did not want to repeat what experts have already widely discussed. Rather, we have focused on new thoughts and ideas and on critical perspectives of integration. As a consequence, integration has to involve both the minority and the majority populations of a society. We want to give a forum to refugees and migrants who actively fight for their rights and needs. We also want to provide a forum for specialists and experts working with them in the field.

The opinion of the participants expertise is reflected in the memorandum, an excerpt of the ideas and thoughts shared during the seminar, which all twenty participants of EPRIE 2016 agreed upon at the end of the program. They argue that the nation-state has failed to handle the challenges of migration and opt for a shift in power to a global and local level.

After the »summer of migration« in 2015, Germans policy has changed a great deal. Since the arrangement with Turkey was put into effect, the dominant debate has focused on the question »Who can come?«, as Sina Arnold phrases it in her critical essay. She believes this question is inappropriate, and she opts for asking different questions like »Who is coming?« or »What do they need?« Asking these alternate questions would have concrete consequences and also shed light on the needs of all people in a pluralistic and »post-migratory« society.

Albert Denk criticizes current approaches to integration which lead to a polarization of society. In his article »Beyond Integration« he shows a new approach toward strengthening social cohesion, especially in times of increased global migration. For him the core of the concept is that everybody takes part in the social negotiation process. This is also linked with a power shift from the nation-state level to civil society and global institutions.

Kien Nghi Ha examines how coercive integration is linked to colonial discourses and Euro-centrist thoughts. In his article he focuses

on Germany's Integration Law from a postcolonial perspective, and criticizes that the »Regulation on Integration Courses for Foreigners« does not prescribe the right, but rather the obligation, to take part in a controlled language and orientation course. The restrictive policies of the integration course system are applied mainly to Muslim immigrants from Third World countries.

The current state of Migration Policies in Korea is reflected by Kim Sagang. She examines immigration and integration policies and shows how those policies have been implemented for different groups of migrants. Among long-term migrants in Korea, the proportion of marriage migration is very high because it was supported by governmental institutions as a solution to low fertility rates and low marriage rates, especially in rural areas.

Kim You Gene reflects on the odyssey of North Korean Defectors. She focuses on their different situations, especially between South Korea and the USA, and discusses issues of their migration and identity.

Civil society activities are presented by two writers: Kato Jotaro sheds light on the problem of undocumented residents in Japan and introduces the onsite support work of the civil society organization Asian People's Friendship Society (APFS). Thilo Körting introduces »Women in Exile«, an initiative of refugee women in Brandenburg State in Germany, which was founded by refugee women. In his article refugee women talk about their troubles and hopes.

The EPRIE 2016 Program gives insights into the various expert talks, topics discussed, and institutions visited. At the end of each years program former participants can join in. Martha Jaworska presents a summary of the Alumni Meeting 2016. Last but not least, we present the EPRIE 2016 memorandum translated into the participants' respective languages (Chinese, French, German, Japanese, Korean, and Polish).

New concepts of migration and integration will also be discussed in EPRIE 2017 in East Asia. We look forward to obtaining a broader understanding of the situation in China, Japan, and Korea.

We are very grateful for the generous support we have received from our cooperation partner the Robert Bosch Stiftung which has supported EPRIE from the very beginning. We would not have been able to organize EPRIE without their help. We are also very thankful for the various local institutions that give us additional support, like the Japan office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, East Asian Foundation and many others.

Han Nataly Jung-Hwa & Rita Zobel

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2016

3 **Editorial**

6 **Memorandum – Unity in Diversity**
by EPRIE 2016 participants

MIGRATION IN EUROPE

10 **Who can come?**
Sina ARNOLD

14 **Beyond Integration - Toward Social Cohesion in Times of Global Migration Flows**
Albert DENK

18 **Germanys Integration Law for Postcolonial Immigrants**
Kien Nghi HA

21 **»Women in Exile« – Refugee women talk about their troubles and hopes**
Thilo KÖRTING

MIGRATION IN EAST ASIA

22 **Migration Policies of Korea: Integration and Exclusion**
KIM Sagang

27 **The odyssey of North Korean Defectors: Issues of their migration and identity**
KIM You Gene

32 **Undocumented Residents Support in Japan – on site support work by NGO/NPO**
KATO Jotaro

34	Program
42	Alumni Meeting 2016 <i>Martha JAWORSKA</i>

MEMORANDUM

44	Memorandum in Chinese
49	Memorandum in French
54	Memorandum in German
59	Memorandum in Japanese
64	Memorandum in Korean
68	Memorandum in Polish

75	Imprint
----	----------------



MEMORANDUM – UNITY IN DIVERSITY

by EPRIE 2016 participants

INTRODUCTION

EPRIE 2016 engaged with a particularly topical issue: asylum, migration and integration - similar challenges, different patterns. With refugees continuing to try to enter Europe, the program was appropriately held in Poland, Germany and France where we visited organizations and institutions involved in helping refugees and governing migration, discussed with experts in the field, and compared attitudes and policies with those in East Asia.

The topic felt relevant and personal to us, not merely because we engage with it in our studies or professional lives, but because many of the participants had personal experiences of migration and the challenges of integrating into a new country. In spite of the personal nature of our experiences, the complexity of the topic and the fact that we come from six different countries, we had largely similar opinions about the current state of migration governance, as well as similar ideas about how to improve it.

This memorandum lays out some of those ideas. First, it describes the current state of affairs by detailing regional attitudes towards migrants in China, Japan, Korea and Europe. Next, it highlights the importance of cooperation and networking between those regions in general before moving on to suggesting that cooperation is best achieved through shifting power away from the nation-state, both to a global and a local level. Finally, the memorandum delves deeper into the special importance of local initiatives for successful integration. We conclude with a call for cooperation and a continuing exchange of ideas.

REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS

Immigration policies in China, Japan and Korea are decided at the nation-state level. The European Union (EU) has a common asylum system, however EU member states have their own policies on issues such as migration and integration. Generally speaking, the immigration policies of China, Japan, Korea and Europe are similar in that all four regions encourage migration of the highly skilled and are wary of low-skilled migrants. Regarding other forms of migration, there are some

differences, for example, marriage migration is actively encouraged in Korea but discouraged in Europe. Further, China, Japan and Korea are more reluctant than Europe to take in refugees, however it should be noted that the willingness to do so varies between European countries.

China is experiencing mass internal rural-urban migration due to industrial development, increasing urbanization and labor imbalances between east and west. Generally speaking, the Chinese government has not acted to legislate for refugee settlement until now, despite the presence of many refugees in China from Vietnam, Myanmar, Syria and various African countries. The Chinese government has worked together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and temporarily accepted refugees according to the ›Exit-Entry Administration Law‹ that it enacted after signing the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982. Despite this, an effective integration policy is still pending in China. As the second-largest global economy, China must play a more important role in solving refugee crises in the future.

Similarly, in Japan, there is no official immigration policy to encourage migrants to integrate into Japanese society. However, at the community level, there have been many attempts by local governments to support migrants through integration policies. Hamamatsu City, which has one of the largest populations of migrants, particularly Latin American Nikkei, is an example of such a local-level attempt. The city declared itself part of a global network of inclusive ›Intercultural Cities‹, a program developed by the Council of Europe in which cultural diversity brought by foreigners is regarded as a source of city vitality rather than a threat. Hamamatsu City uses its reputation for diversity to attract tourists from overseas and develop markets by providing information on ethnic businesses. Moreover, they assist in employment matching for migrants in new fields, such as nursing care and agriculture, to expand their working range and also to activate the city.

Korea enacted the Refugee Act in 2013 and became the first Asian country to have an independent law for refugee protection. However, the percentage of refugees and asylum seekers accepted to South Korea has been very low, much lower than other countries in the

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Large numbers of migrant workers come to South Korea under the temporary migrant worker scheme which permits them to stay four years and ten months, initially with the possibility to have their permit reissued for the same period. Despite living in South Korea for up to ten years, they do not have the possibility to settle permanently or bring their families. Furthermore, many female marriage migrants are encouraged to come to South Korea from Southeast Asian countries. Policies towards them mostly focus on their assimilation into society and demand that they fulfill their roles as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law.

In spite of the EU's Common European Asylum System which regulates asylum procedures and reception conditions, allocates responsibility for processing asylum claims, and lays out who qualifies for international protection, huge differences remain in implementation across member states. The ongoing so-called refugee «crisis» also highlights differences between member states, some of which take in much larger numbers of refugees than others. In spite of this intake of refugees, the EU's migration policy is, in fact, one of deterrence. Border patrols, fences, visa policies, carrier sanctions, deportation and similar measures are aimed at controlling who enters and who remains in the EU.

In addition to EU law, all member states have their own immigration laws, some of which, for example in Germany, were recently amended to discourage further migration. Interestingly, Germany is a country still feeling the effects of past policies - or rather the lack thereof - especially with regard to integration. West Germany relied on migration without the settlement to fill labor market shortages. Germany recruited workers from Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, former Yugoslavia, Morocco, and Tunisia in the 1950s and 60s. Many workers were joined by their families and stayed in Germany permanently. However, until the end of the 1990s, the government policies were aimed at reducing the number of newcomers rather than integrating them. Many asylum seekers and late repatriates came to Germany during the 1990s and were still

asked to assimilate into the majority society. It took Germany more than 50 years to accept the reality that it is a country dependent on immigration and it has yet to discuss the meaning and consequences of this belated insight. Only as recently as 2007 did the government begin to develop policies on integration. This omission has led, for example, to second and third generation migrants being less likely to reach higher education and professional jobs, but also to ongoing discrimination against »migrants« even if they hold German citizenship. A few years ago, Germany had a debate about integration versus inclusion and also about a »culture of welcome«. Step by step, the idea

has grown that integration does not mean assimilation and that it is not a one-way street.

COOPERATION AND NETWORKING

Parts of the above immigration policies suggest that history repeats itself; China, Korea, and Japan are about to commit the same mistakes Germany made over half a century ago. At the same time, there are experiences which are worth repeating; Europe, for example, can learn lessons from East Asian countries regarding integration. This section explores how cooperation and networking between Europe and Asia can help avoid making the same mistakes twice and how the current refugee »crisis« in Europe might be better approached.

China, Japan, and Korea can learn from the German experience that integrating foreign workers is more beneficial both for the workers and for the host society. Workers who are integrated and are allowed to remain

permanently will contribute to the long-term economic development of their host country and become valuable members of civil society. Significantly, Germany and other Europe countries, in general, can also learn from the East Asian experience of integrating migrants. Those migrants who are allowed to reside permanently and to integrate into Korea and Japan do so easily due to a shared appearance and culture. Migrants in Korea and Japan are mainly from other Asian countries due to »internal regional migration«, while in Europe there are mostly »external regional migrants« whose culture and religion are different from that of the local population. Nevertheless, the East



Asian experience shows that familiarity with each other's cultures is the key to creating an understanding between different groups of people. Thus, integration cannot be a one-sided process but must aim at inclusion, such as a situation in which newcomers and the local population learn from each other. The host society must also change and become more inclusive. This is an important finding in light of the rising anti-refugee sentiment accompanying the current European refugee »crisis«. The intercultural opening can help cut down barriers and challenge policies and cultures which create discrimination and prevent migrants from equal participation in society. Inclusion is based on the universal value of human dignity and emphasizes being part of the society.

Cooperation and networking between East Asia and Europe is important for an exchange of experiences, ideas and best-practice in the treatment and management of migration. Learning lessons from each other prevents mistakes and presents new approaches.

DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER

As the above sections show, migration policy is a matter almost exclusively decided at the nation-state level. Nation-states are often reluctant to admit and integrate migrants, even if a long-term commitment to doing so might be beneficial to both the host country and the migrants themselves. However, it might be possible to achieve a decentralization of power in the area of migration, both by taking cooperation between nation-states to the next - the global - level and by shifting power to local communities.

Europe is facing a highly polarized debate about current refugee/migrant movements, which are mistakenly called a »migration crisis«. The more suitable term is »governance crisis«, due to the nation-states' inability to meet the resulting challenges. On the one hand, the nation-state is the actor primarily responsible who possesses most power regarding border protection and implementation of the Dublin regulation¹ as well as national asylum and integration laws. On the other hand, the concept of the nation-state blatantly conflicts with meeting global refugee/migrant flows in an adequate manner. In particular, the EU-Turkey Agreement underscores the dangers of an imbalance of power in favor of the nation-state. Instead of provisioning safe flight routes by plane, this political agreement leads to a variety of violations of human rights and forces refugees once again

to choose more dangerous routes via the Mediterranean sea, a route which has claimed more than 22,000 lives since the year 2000.² Out of this contradiction between the possession of power and political failure arises a need for a power shift from the nation-state to the local and global level.

At the global level, international institutions can more credibly represent the value of global solidarity than nation-states whose self-interest clashes with these values. Therefore, the allocation of refugees should be defined and monitored at the global level, for instance, under the auspices of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. Based on this power shift, the governance crisis could be solved by providing safe flight routes via planes, not only to Europe but also to other regions including Asia.

At the local level, a particular role is attributed to cities and the civil society. For instance, the majors of Barcelona, Lesbos and Lampedusa adopted an agreement of direct relief for refugees in order to circumvent the bureaucratic machinery of national treaties. While nation-states hide behind the Dublin regulation and shirk their responsibilities, cities have to take over this responsibility and obtain the direct support of global funds. If a local council decides to accommodate a certain number of refugees, there may be no national law to prevent it. Civil society actors must be integrated, for instance, into the mediation process for a decentralized accommodation. Civil society actors work as a link between refugees and the state to enhance the situation of refugees in diverse ways. In addition, civil society can represent the voices of refugees which is crucial for related policies made by the state. For example, where civil society recognizes that mass accommodation cannot be reconciled with human rights, civil society actors advocate the importance of refugees' human rights and persuade the state to shed light on these issues which eventually influences policy making. Thus, there is a need to include civil society actors and refugees in decision-making processes in a substantive way. The interaction of cities and civil society actors encourages the empowerment of refugees. In order to enable the cities and civil society actors to take their roles and maximize their capacities, more power and financial support should be shifted to them.

INTEGRATION FROM THE BOTTOM UP: SELF-EMPOWERMENT!

Shifting support and power to civil society and local organizations can also improve the process of integration. Since integration is a

1

The Dublin regulation determines the EU Member State responsible for examining an application for asylum. Most often, this will be the Member State of »first entry«, which puts greater obligations on states on the EU's outer borders, such as Italy and Greece.

2

See International Organisation for Migration, »Fatal Journeys (IOM 2014)« available at <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fatal-journeys_countingtheuncounted.pdf> 12.

multi-layered process, multiple organizations and approaches are needed to respond to the diverse needs of different migrants.

As we visited many organizations which dealt with these topics and attended several events regarding integration during the program, we felt that we also needed to address the concept of ›self-empowerment‹ in order to enhance our understanding of integration, EPRIE's topic this year. Besides educating the host society, integration can be achieved through cooperation among different actors and by providing adequate bottom-up approaches towards integration, for example by empowering self-organized groups. However, these approaches are often overlooked, and there is a lack of awareness that they exist.

One example of a self-organized group we visited was ›Women in Exile‹, an initiative of refugee women founded in Brandenburg in 2002 by refugee women to fight for their rights. From their experience, refugee women are doubly discriminated against: not only by racist laws and discriminatory refugee laws in general, but also as women qua women. This non-government organization (NGO) then formed ›Women in Exile & Friends‹ in 2011, expanding their network to include those with no refugee background standing in solidarity with refugee women. Together they conduct a campaign entitled »No Lager for Women! Abolish all Lagers!«. In concrete policy terms, they focus on the abolition of all laws discriminating against asylum seekers and migrants and on the interconnections between racism and sexism. They focus on empowering and helping refugee women to obtain more information regarding their legal status, job options, health care, etc. to improve their current situation and at the same time to educate the public about the inhumane living conditions of refugee women. The NGO targets the specific difficulties refugee women are facing, which are often neglected, and thus provides assistance tailored to the needs of these women.

There are several other organizations and initiatives which focus on improving the conditions for adapting to a new society. Empowering self-organized groups, which in turn empower refugees and migrants, is another bottom-up approach, improving policies and shaping them. Furthermore, these groups can play a role as a mediator between the government, intergovernmental organizations and the public. Empowerment itself is based on the idea that providing more information, skills, resources, authority, opportunities and motivation to the appropriate actors, as well as holding them responsible and accountable for outcomes of their actions, will contribute to helping them make their own decisions, solve problems and improve their situation. In short, it means increasing people's and communities' autonomy and self-determination in order to enable them to represent their interests in a responsible and self-determined way, acting on their own authority. Empowerment as action refers both to the process of self-empowerment

and the professional support of people, which enables them to overcome their sense of powerlessness and lack of influence and to recognize and eventually to use their resources and chances.

Even though bottom-up initiatives are important, they cannot provide all the necessary protection, especially in emergency situations and therefore some top-down programs are also necessary. One such program is the ›Blue Dot Hubs‹ initiative, launched by the UNHCR and United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to boost protection for children and families on the move across Europe. Twenty ›Child and Family Support Hubs‹, to be known as ›Blue Dots‹, will provide a safe space for children and their families, vital services, play, protection and counseling in a single location. The hubs aim to support vulnerable families on the move, especially the many unaccompanied or separated children at risk of illness, trauma, violence, exploitation and trafficking. The hubs will be located at selected strategic sites, border entry/exit points, registration sites, some strategic urban centers, as well as through mobile/outreach teams. The services include restoring family links, family reunification, providing child-friendly spaces and dedicated mother and baby/toddler spaces, counseling, psychosocial first aid, legal counseling, outreach social workers and information desks with Wi-Fi connectivity.

Overall, support of self-organized groups which enhance the empowerment of refugees and migrants plays an essential part in the process of integration. However, there are many difficulties yet to overcome and rethink. How do we reach decision-makers at the top? How do we overcome rigid bureaucracy? How can self-organized groups find funding? How do we raise awareness in the host society? The questions don't stop here. One thing, however, is certain: we need to take action for change and promote it. In our global society, the responsibility of the citizen is growing. Everyone can promote civic engagement and encourage civil society to achieve our goals of living in a tolerant society.

CONCLUSION

The governance of asylum and migration and the implementation of integration and inclusion must be a collaborative effort. During EPRIE 2016, young professionals from six countries exchanged ideas to develop new approaches. We have learned a lot from each other, and this valuable exchange has shown us that solving problems is a matter of communication and cooperation. Approached in this manner, the challenges posed by asylum, migration and integration seem manageable, and new patterns emerge to be tested in the future.

WHO CAN COME?

ONE YEAR AFTER THE ›LONG SUMMER OF MIGRATION‹

Sina ARNOLD

The ›long summer of migration‹, which kept Europe and Germany on tenterhooks in 2015, has reached its one-year anniversary. Over a million people fled Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Western Balkans and other war-torn countries and regions in crisis – by foot and by train, with children and babies in tow, they crossed the Mediterranean, climbed over border fences, and journeyed across Europe in search of a better life. These events were framed on one side by attacks on refugee shelters in Saxony's Heidenau and elsewhere – averaging more than one per day last year – and by the explosive growth of right wing anti-immigrant groups like the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) and the PEGIDA movement. This has brought back memories of the early 1990s – of the pogroms in Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen, and the arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen. At the other extreme, and vastly different from this earlier era, last year we saw surprising images at train stations in Frankfurt, Munich and elsewhere: Refugees warmly welcomed with tea, food, stuffed animals and balloons. Thousands of volunteers helped out with emergency housing, gave language lessons, and distributed food. Even the ›Bild‹ tabloid newspaper, generally known for stereotypical reporting on the issue of immigration, decorated itself with the hashtag #refugeeswelcome.

Yet the summer of migration soon drew to its climatic end in two senses: Not only did winter set in, but the social climate also changed – the euphoria has evaporated. The Christian Democratic Union party (CDU) which initially reacted with great flexibility, for instance Angela Merkel's short-term suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees last August, has now shifted to calling for tightening up regarding laws, deportations, border closings and transit zones. The deal with Turkey meant the decisive end of openness in foreign policy. And the incidents on New Year's Eve in Cologne kicked off an incipient poisoning of public discourse on refugees. The administration was profoundly overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands of unprocessed applications for asylum – many of which are still pending. And although in many places the open arms of volunteers have transitioned into long-term civil support for refugees, and many are overburdened by the fact that they will have to permanently take

on tasks that are actually the state's responsibility. To this day, many refugees continue to endure mass housing while they wait for their applications to be processed or merely for an appointment to submit them in the first place – often for weeks and months.

The question that has been brought up again and again over the past year is: ›Who can come?‹ What reasons for fleeing are legitimate? Who should be deported? How many refugees can ›we‹ take in? The last question is rarely answered with an unreserved ›all of them‹. In spite of the diversity of answers, they all have one thing in common, namely that they inevitably entail a selection process, usually according to security, legitimacy and usefulness. European outcry was especially great following the death of the 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi who had fled Syria with his parents and drowned during the crossing into Greece from the Turkish holiday resort of Bodrum. The young child found dead on the coast last September embodied the image of the innocent victim. At the opposite end of the spectrum were Ahmad Almohammad and Mohammed al-Mahmod, two of the suspected assassins behind the Paris attacks who probably left Syria and entered the EU via Greece just like the refugees associated with attacks such as those in Würzburg and Ansbach in the following months. Public discourse contrasts the cliché of the highly trained Syrian doctor with the supposed ›economic refugees‹ from the Balkans. Utilitarian thinking also dominates the political discussion, interspersed with humanitarian considerations: Over the past few years, demands have been made time and again that Germany needs a points-based immigration system, similar to that of Canada, in order to counter the lack of nursing staff and other skilled workers as well as to deal with a demographically aging society. The economic sector and corporations have also been interested in the new arrivals, especially to fill unoccupied training positions, and were supported by numerous online services like the website www.workeer.de. At the European Commission meeting in November 2015, Federal Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble emphasized the opportunity for growth presented by the influx of refugees, adding that whoever takes in refugees was not only lending humanitarian support, but was also helping economic growth. That line of argument is true, just as

desires for safety from terrorism are legitimate. Yet both harbor pitfalls.

I will instead argue that the question »Who can come?« cannot be addressed by quotas, contingents or security checks, but rather through a much more basic change in attitude, which will in turn bring about political change. Moreover, the question itself is wrong – to find better solutions, we first need better questions.

A glance at history shows us that migration has always been a normal occurrence, even in Germany. Five million Germans departed for the United States between the mid 19th and early 20th century, migrants who wanted to leave the confinement and poverty of the German Empire. Many of them were what some today would call »economic migrants«. During the great wave of immigration at the turn of the 20th century, roughly 600,000 arrived in the USA annually over the course of 40 years. In the collective memory they are regarded as adventurers, courageous pioneers or poor souls searching for a better life. At the end of World War II approximately 12 to 15 million people with German citizenship came from Central and Eastern Europe into the region that now comprises the German Federal Republic within just a few years. The stories and memories of these »displaced persons« are etched into the memories of most German families. A study we conducted at Humboldt University in 2014 entitled »Postmigrant Germany: Society, religion, identity« found that 35% of Germany's inhabitants are tied to migration stories through family relationships: They themselves, their parents or grandparents or wives, cousins, uncle-in-laws came – voluntarily or involuntarily – from another country. One thing is clear: No one leaves his or her home, children, parents and friends and uses all of his savings for a potentially fatal journey into the unknown without compelling reasons. Some flee from persecution, others from hunger, poverty or lack of future prospects. Thus the necessity to flee and migrate not only affects »the others«; it is more a question of timing and happenstance as to whether and when it will also affect »us«. Recognizing this reality means a change in perspective which would benefit everyone, not just today's refugees.

The utilitarian economic thinking that frequently underpins discussions about refugees and the question »Who can come?« also has negative effects on all of us. Danger lurks in this thinking: What if the economy no longer needs highly qualified people? Is a human being



Photo: Lim Suna

of less value because they lack certain economically valuable skills? Attitudes and policies being tested on refugees also affect everyone else, not least because they are the potential citizens of tomorrow. When the president of one of Germany's leading economic think tanks Hans-Werner Sinn calls for the minimum wage to be lowered for refugees, he calls into question political achievements that are already fragile to begin with. When CDU Bundestag member Martin Patzelt calls for a »paradigm shift« towards private involvement in refugee work, it can be interpreted as praise for the overwhelmed volunteers. However, it is also a step towards further dismantling public services the government is actually responsible for. If we also do not wish to be sorted along the lines of useful/useless, then we should not apply these criteria to others – regardless of citizenship.

The »welcoming atmosphere« created by countless volunteer initiatives works both ways too: Although there is likely paternalism among German volunteers, it is precisely these kinds of encounters that work to break down stereotypes. They turn the fact that Germany is a country of immigrants into an accepted and lived reality. This »postmigrant« reality may occasionally be unsettling, as it challenges supposedly stable identities and social affiliations. Yet who would want to forego the enrichment migrants have brought with them in terms of lifestyle, cuisine, and culture, like Peking duck, cappuccino, pizza or doner kebab, the writing of Rafik Schami, Saša Stanišić or Wladimir Kaminer, the comedy of Fatih Cevikkollu or Serdar Somuncu, the films of Fatih Akin and Sibel Kekilli, the theater productions of Shermin Langhoff or the soccer talents of Mesut Özil or Lukas Podolski? In an interview last summer even German President Joachim Gauck appealed for us to »say goodbye to the notion of a nation that is very



Photo: Lim Suna

homogenous, in which nearly everyone speaks German as their native language, is primarily Christian and light-skinned... The actual reality of life in this country is already considerably more diverse.«

Acknowledging such societal change can also be associated with desires for travel, mobility and freedom of movement. For migration does not only affect refugees: in 2011 two out of three immigrants to Germany came from EU member states. Many of us will go to a new place during our lives: out of curiosity to start a farm in Australia, move to Italy out of boredom, acquire an M.A. in the USA to improve career opportunities, move to Kenya for love, become a carpenter in Sweden for financial reasons, retire in Thailand or Mallorca due to poverty, or »return« to Turkey because after 40 years Germany is still pervaded by a sense of rejection and foreignness. Many of us have already had these experiences, will have them or will wish our children, friends, grandchildren and colleagues luck on their way. In today's society, we are all potential migrants. We have long accepted the removal of some borders – few people find it strange that border controls no longer exist when driving from Germany to Austria, Denmark, or Poland. Yet only 20 years have passed since border controls were eliminated by the Schengen Agreement – and the agreement is fragile, as evidenced by Germany reinstating selective controls on its border with Austria in September 2015, Germany's call for Italy to control

the Brenner Pass, or Sweden's reinstatement of passport controls on ferries and bridges last November. Nevertheless, Schengen also demonstrates that it is possible to diminish the impact of national borders and to guarantee freedom of movement. Many studies show that this has positive economic effects worldwide. More importantly perhaps, and challenging the economic logic, is that migration is acknowledged as a normal human condition and freedom of movement as a human right. The lack of freedom to travel in the German Democratic Republic is often criticized as one of the most repressive aspects of the East German regime. Unlike today, the human traffickers from that era were called »escape agents« and celebrated as heroes. Yet they too usually took money,

just like today's rubber dinghy operators on the Mediterranean. If we want to travel to other countries with our passport, if we want the freedom to leave if the security situation grows serious, then the only conclusion we can draw is to concede this freedom to others. Solidarity and humanity do not mean that one has to like the other person; not all immigrants necessarily share one's own preferences. It means rather conceding to others what one would want for oneself: protection while fleeing from persecution and poverty for oneself and loved ones. The question »Who can come?« then becomes obsolete.

Beyond the normative aspects, we are talking not about a utopian demand, but implementation of a political project which would benefit refugees and society alike. One that is absolutely attainable if the political and social will is there. Obviously, a successful welcoming atmosphere requires more than a gesture, and after their arrival is applauded and the balloons and stuffed animals are distributed, everyday life awaits: everyday life in tents and refugee centers in the middle of nowhere, the boredom and waiting, a partial ban on employment and precarious conditions of stay. Thus, such gestures must be joined by law: Refugees need faster access to the workforce, elimination of in kind benefits, access to universities so students can return to their studies, easier family reunions, rapid re-assignment out of overflowing emergency housing to apartments, and expansion of

German language classes. The medical, psychological and social care of ill and traumatized refugees must be guaranteed as well as good legal counsel. Some of this runs contrary to current developments.

Although in comparison to other member countries of the EU Germany is taking in the most refugees in terms of absolute numbers, when measured proportionally – according to number of inhabitants Germany is in midfield. A global perspective puts the numbers into even greater perspective when we consider the number of refugees in Turkey, Iran and in numerous African countries. Lebanon, a country with 4 million inhabitants, has taken in approximately 1 million Syrian refugees – for Germany that would translate to 20 million new arrivals. If there is not enough housing in large cities, that in no way delegitimizes the human right to live somewhere – no one would tell a student from Augsburg who recently arrived in Hamburg that she has to leave because there's not enough housing for her. Instead, discussion would center on building affordable housing or new dormitories, and flats would be more densely shared. If no room is available, then room has to be made – through movement across Europe and across Germany.

At the same time, we can learn from the mistakes of the flawed integration policy from the era of the so-called »guest workers« during the 1950s to 70s, a policy which failed to establish a sustained welcoming atmosphere. The difficult access to citizenship in particular sent a message of very conditional »welcome«, as recognition of full civil rights was consistently denied. Refugees need secure resident status which eliminates the constant fear of deportation. In a second step, they need the prospect that an appropriate passport will allow them to become part of German society. The refugees' calls of »Germany, Germany« and the pictures of Angela Merkel they carried made it absolutely clear that they wanted to come to this country. Yet people will only get involved with and feel a part of a society if they are secure in the knowledge that the path to German citizenship is not hopeless. Finally, for integration to be successful, ultimately it is also necessary that government agencies and civil society fight racist movements. Effective anti-discrimination measures and combating right-wing structures are essential signals that new arrivals will be safe here.

The question »Who can come?« is inevitably posed by someone who can grant this permission. This is de facto the German government and German society. Yet maybe the question is being asked incorrectly, maybe we should rather accept that people will come. The question would then be »Who is coming?«, »What are they like?« and above all »What do they need?« This would not be mere philosophical or ethical speculation, but rather have concrete consequences: Change is taking place in German society, and it makes sense to learn what the new people living in this country expect from it. It would form

the starting point for negotiating what the various people in our pluralistic, »postmigrant« society need for their idea of the good life. Last year's gestures from civil society can teach us something: The self-organized refugee initiatives remind us that we are dealing with responsible people and political actors with their own dreams and immense emotional resources. The volunteer refugee-aid initiatives of self-organized groups and NGOs illustrate »from below« how a post-national European effort can succeed.

This article was first published in German in a slightly modified form as: »Wer darf kommen? Nach dem langen Sommer der Migration.« In: das baugerüst - Zeitschrift für Jugend- und Bildungsarbeit, 1/2016.



Dr. Sina ARNOLD is Scientific Managing Director and a post-Doctoral Researcher at the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research, Humboldt University of Berlin. She holds a PhD from the Center for Research on Antisemitism, Technical University of Berlin.

Her research covers theories of antisemitism, antisemitism in social movements and postmigrant societies, Muslims in Germany, comparative research on prejudice, as well as logistics and migrant digitalities. She participated in research projects such as »Young Islam-Related Topics in Germany« and »Hybrid European-Muslim Identity Models« at Humboldt University. Currently, Dr. Arnold is an organizer of the KOSMOS Summer University »Investigating Logistics: Lifestyles, Migration, the Common(s)«.

BEYOND INTEGRATION

TOWARD SOCIAL COHESION IN TIMES OF GLOBAL MIGRATION FLOWS

Albert DENK

According to the United Nations¹, currently 0.9% of the world population has been forcibly displaced. During 2015, the number of refugees who fled to the European Union amounted to 0.5% of the EU population. In spite of these small proportions, European societies are conducting a highly polarized debate about the so-called ›migration crisis‹ with particular focus on the concept of ›integration‹. Under the influence of a reinvigorated Right and the national egoism of the member-states, a differentiation between the concepts of ›We‹ and ›the Other‹ is jeopardizing social cohesion. European politicians distinguish between proactive and reactive migration as well as between safe and unsafe countries of origin. As an alternative approach, this article examines a concept called ›beyond integration‹. It aims at strengthening social cohesion in diverse societies based on a shared sense of ownership in which everybody constantly has to contribute one's share to social togetherness.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS SCRUTINIZED

The concept of ›integration‹ is based on assumptions that need to be reconsidered. It fails in two regards: the belief in an individual sense of ownership and the limited idea of the immutability of societies.

First of all, a receiving society cannot claim integration from migrants, nor vice versa. Nobody can lay claim to being the owner of ›the one and only‹ civilized mode of behavior. Education, for instance, is a universal human right, therefore it belongs to both the receiving society and the migrants. So-called ›integration classes‹ need substantial revision. If a certain level of education is demanded, then it must be required of all people equally. A one-sided obligation for (primarily non-Western) migrants to pass language and orientation courses leads to an imbalance in power and to a split in society.

The same applies to an individual sense of ownership in terms of territorial occupation and the rule of law, especially in cases of nation-states that are based on expulsion, arbitrary drawing of boundaries or war crimes. Historical and structural causes of frontiers and statehood show that citizenship is based on coincidence and transience. Subsequently the mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando², demands of the European

Union the abolition of residence permits for migrants in order to strengthen the freedom of movement of people, much like the free circulation of capital and goods in a globalized world. An individual sense of ownership illustrates a dispersion of humans instead of the strengthening of social cohesion.

Secondly, societies are always in a state of flux – nothing remains as it is. Hence, social norms, the standard of living as well as the sense of security are precarious and have to be renegotiated on a permanent basis. Even the concept of ›inclusive integration‹ fails due to the constant transformation of societies which demands continuous adjustment of their members. It is impossible to include somebody in something that is constantly re-shaping. Of course the renegotiation processes have to acknowledge good practice like democratic institutions, but it requires new bodies and new forms of political participation in order to reclaim democracy. For instance, Mary Kaldor³, Professor of Global Governance, uses this term to underscore the need for ›more democracy at local levels, in cities and regions where institutions are closer to the citizens, and where the nation-state can be bypassed to some extent.‹ Consequently, social cohesion relies on a constant renegotiation process, which includes all actors, especially at the local level.

KEY ELEMENTS OF ›BEYOND INTEGRATION‹

The concept of ›beyond integration‹ is based on three key elements: Firstly, the analysis of underlying causes of polarization and a split in societies. Secondly, the creation of new dialogue forms and fora to renegotiate basic social values. Thirdly, a transformation of power configurations – in particular a power shift from the nation-state to the local level as well as the global.

1. FIGHTING THE CAUSES OF POLARIZATION

The concept of ›integration‹ serves as the pretext for a highly polarized debate, and politicians and citizens of the European Union are currently discussing ways to repress migrant populations. The German Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière⁴, for example, has demanded greater police forces, stricter laws and more



surveillance. This creates the impression of a threat from dangerous intruders which leads to discrimination and a general suspicion of humans who differ in their appearance. This subsequently leads to generalization, and a labeling of ›otherness‹ takes place. Hence the concept of ›integration‹ embodies a shift from entrenched causes to populist approaches, to solutions. In contrast, the concept of ›beyond integration‹ addresses profound causes like social inequality, exclusion, disability and a lack of prospects.

The societal polarization is based on normative descriptions that are mostly based on fury, fear and the feeling of having been treated unfairly. People fear a social decline linked to worry about their jobs, criticism of their life style and loss of associated privileges. Instead of looking for structural causes of inequality, overly simplistic explanation attempts are chosen and (historically) the weakest groups in society become defamed on account of their different appearance and cultural behavior (particularly due to their religious affiliations). The principal cause of global inequality lies in the complex societal system of global capitalism. Oxfam International⁵ highlights that »the richest 1% now have more wealth than the rest of the world combined [...] A global network of tax havens further enables the richest individuals to hide \$7.6 trillion.« This extreme picture represents an increasing bottom-up

shift in wealth. People will lose their jobs, have to re-organize their life styles, and their privileges will decrease. Global migration flow will not be the cause, however. Instead, the change will arise from a societal system in which the masses will be left far behind.

In the current global (dis-)order, Europe simultaneously represents a pocket of affluence and an unscalable fortress. Those who ›live within the walls‹ profit from an economic model in which all negative consequences of consumption and production are outsourced to poorer world regions. Evi Hartmann⁶, Professor of Supply Chain Management, calculated that the average person in Germany keeps about 60 human slaves by maintaining an average consumer behavior. The ›World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)⁷ criticizes that »all of the 27 European Union (EU) countries are [...] relying heavily on the natural resources of other countries [...] if everyone on the planet lived the average lifestyle of a resident of the European Union, humanity would need 2.6 earths to sustain our demand on nature«. Another point includes the entanglement of arms exports by predominantly European private corporations. According to the ›Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)⁸, world military expenditure amounted to \$1676 billion in the year 2015. Thus, economic profit is generated by enabling civil wars and armed conflicts. Each of these three aspects

show structural causes of global migration flows, such as extreme poverty, extreme weather events, and, increasingly, fragile states. The contradictions of a predominantly Western ›externalization-society‹ must be addressed instead of blaming the most vulnerable.

2. NEW FORMS OF PARTICIPATION

At the core of ›beyond integration‹ is the understanding that everybody takes part in the social negotiation process. Living together means taking a stand for togetherness, making compromises and seeing oneself as part of a global community. New bodies and new forms of civic participation are needed in order to exchange opinions and to create a basis for mutual learning combined with the development of less biased opinions (for instance by critical whiteness workshops). People want to discuss politics and they want to have a say in political decisions, but the current opportunities to participate are out of date, as demonstrated by political apathy during elections and the turn away from major parties. At the same time, nearly all realms of society are becoming politicized, especially with regard to the issue of migrant populations. Therefore, social transformation is necessary on the spatial level as well as the temporal level in order to make politics accessible to people on a local scale.

On a spatial level, new hubs of exchange must be created on location, but also in the virtual sphere in order to facilitate the exchange of opinion on a global scale. While nowadays downtown areas in big cities all around the world are predominantly used for economic purposes, a re-shift to non-commercial meeting places for people is required in order to encourage dialogue. This shift would require the creation of places where people can freely exchange ideas, like civil centers, venues for public debates and social services providers such as schools and kindergartens. Within these places, humans can discuss and create new ideas about how to live together which they have gained from experience.

At the temporal level, there is need for places outside of the systemic fast pace of society. In order to take part in politics, people must have time for it. Free spaces for political discussion must be created irrespective of self-interested thinking and actions and a blind faith in economic growth. These two notions are based on the ›concept of convivialism‹⁹ which has been developed and cosigned by a series of social scientists all around the globe like Axel Honneth, Eva Illouz and Serge Latouche. In this concept, these intellectuals demand a growth-independent society in which labor, social security, democracy and self-realization are not dependent on economic growth. According to these scholars, it requires an unconditional basic income, a reduction of working hours, a strengthening of civil society and turning a critical eye on the current globalization processes, with particular focus on

destructive consumption and production patterns to facilitate political participation. Hence, systemic dependencies must be reduced in order for people to be able to fulfill their duty of participating in social transformation.

New forms of participation are based on social urban development and on ›being time wealthy‹. If both of these preconditions are given, all parts of society can be incorporated into the discussion process. This includes every individual's constant duty to contribute to the discussion about renegotiating basic social values. Currently, the concept of ›integration‹ only obliges migrants to adhere to the social norms of their new country. Hence, there is a need to overcome this notion of ›integration‹ in order to establish a constant attitude of mutual learning in society as a whole.

3. POWER SHIFTS

The Memorandum of EPRIE 2016¹⁰ contains a fundamental critique of the inability of nation-states to meet the challenges of current global migration flows. In addition, the document points to a decentralization of power from the nation-state to the local as well as to the global level. Besides the previously mentioned suggestions, the concept of ›beyond integration‹ underscores the necessity for a new participative form of living together.

An interconnected, globalized world needs a global governance that is capable of being democratic and just. Hence, there is a need to strengthen the legal capacity of the United Nations, particularly the ›United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)‹ and the ›International Organization for Migration (IOM)‹. Thus, the ›UNHCR‹, for instance, developed a strategy called ›Beyond Detention‹¹¹ that intends to ›end the detention of asylum seekers and refugees worldwide«. According to the authors, mass accommodation should only be allowed in cases ›where detention is necessary and unavoidable«. In Germany, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like ›Pro Asyl‹, ›Women in Exile‹ and ›Flüchtlinge Willkommen‹ (Refugees Welcome) are campaigning against the detention of refugees in camps. Without any financial support from the nation-state, these NGOs organize decentralized forms of living together. By way of example, the latter provides an online-platform which brings refugees and locals together in existing forms of living, such as shared flats or family homes. These civil society organizations demonstrate that a social transformation is possible. Furthermore, they highlight that actual state-driven policies like the EU-Turkey Agreement¹² are actually preventing a broader implementation of the ›Geneva Convention on Refugees‹ due to exclusionary immigration policies. Therefore, there is a need to transfer power from the nation-state to the United Nations, especially with regard to a just and progressive

allocation of migrants to destination countries as well as to guarantee safe flight routes. Moreover, nation-states have to enable and support civil society actors in developing a society in which humans from different backgrounds live together in the same region either from birth, for decades or as a new situation.

CONCLUSION

In the summer of 2016, the international exchange program ›EPRIE‹ examined the issue of »asylum, migration, and integration - similar challenges, different patterns«. Twenty young professionals from East Asia and Europe exchanged their ideas and shared their experiences. Close to the end of the program, one participant coined the phrase »making integration invisible«. The concept of ›beyond integration‹ illustrates a grounding of this notion. While current approaches to ›integration‹ lead to a polarization of society, this article shows a new approach toward strengthening social cohesion in times of increased global migration flows. This approach includes new forms of participation as well as a power shift from the nation-state to civil society actors and global institutions.



Albert DENK is a PhD candidate at the ›Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München‹, Germany. His research focuses on sustainable development and the reduction of global inequalities. Moreover, he works for the organization ›Flüchtlinge Willkommen‹ (Refugees Welcome). Albert participated in EPRIE 2016 and is a proponent of global solidarity.

REFERENCE LIST:

- 1 UNHCR (2016): *Global forced displacement hits record high - UNHCR Global Trends report finds 65.3 million people, or one person in 113, were displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution in 2015.* <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html> (last access on 7th August 2016)
- 2 Città di Palermo (2015): *Internationale Freizügigkeit von Menschen, Charta von Palermo 2015. German Translation by Roman Maruhn, Goethe-Institut Palermo.* <http://www.linksfraktion-hamburg.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/PDF-CARTA-DI-PALERMO-GER.pdf> (last access on 16th August 2016)
- 3 Kaldor, Mary (2016): *Our global institutions are not fit for purpose. It's time for reform.* World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/our-global-institutions-are-not-fit-for-purpose-it-s-time-for-reform> (last access on 16th August 2016)
- 4 Zeit Online (2016): *Innenminister wollen Sicherheitsgesetze verschärfen - Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft erschweren, Burkas verbieten, Polizisten aufrüsten: Der Bundesinnenminister und seine Unionskollegen in den Ländern planen neue Maßnahmen.* <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-08/thomas-de-maiziere-sicherheitspaket-massnahmen-union-anti-terror> (last access on 22nd August 2016)
- 5 Oxfam International (2016): *An Economy For the 1%: How privilege and power in the economy drive extreme inequality and how this can be stopped* <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/economy-1> (last access on 24th August 2016)
- 6 Evi Hartmann (2016): *Wie viele Sklaven halten Sie? Über Globalisierung und Moral.* Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- 7 World Wide Fund For Nature (2014): *Living Planet Report 2014 - Species and spaces, people and places.* Brussels: WWF.
- 8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016): *Trends in world military expenditure, 2015.* SIPRI: Stockholm.
- 9 Les Convivialistes (2014): *Das konvivialistische Manifest - Für eine neue Kunst des Zusammenlebens.* Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
- 10 Korea Verband (2016): *Korea Forum Special No. 4. Memorandum.* Berlin: Korea Verband.
- 11 UNHCR (2016): *Beyond Detention - A Global Strategy to support governments to end the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees – 2014-2019. Progress Report mid-2016.* Geneva: Division of International Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- 12 European Commission (2016): *Fact Sheet EU-Turkey Agreement - Questions and Answers.* http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_de.htm (last access on 29th August 2016)

GERMANY'S INTEGRATION LAW FOR POSTCOLONIAL IMMIGRANTS

Kien Nghi HA

In 2005, the German federal cabinet passed the ›Regulation on Integration Courses for Foreigners‹. Put into effect at the same time as the new Immigration Act, this law, in its essence, prescribes not so much the right, but the obligation to take part in a rigorously controlled language and orientation course. This analysis is informed by postcolonial theory with its understanding of colonial modernity and racialization as founding principles of Western liberal societies. This approach is a starting point in order to search for a critical understanding of the uncanny and sometimes also hidden side of modern power structures, especially when it comes to dealing with migration, communities of Muslims and People of Colour. My analysis of the German integration politics and its discursive settings aims to comprehend how this pedagogical practice functions as an ideological project of nationalization and cultural homogenization. As a repressive form of integration it enables a full range of disciplinary sanctions which are targeted specifically at People of Colour and post-colonial immigrants with Muslim backgrounds, while echoing colonial world views and hierarchies.

INTEGRATION AND COLONIAL EDUCATION

Pedagogical practices, engaging with a civilizing project, were intrinsic to most European colonial ambitions of cultural and political expansion. Historically, the idea and practice of teaching the racialised Other provided a widely accepted legitimization to build powerful educational and disciplinary institutions for that purpose. As classical education implies a binary hierarchy between teachers and subordinates, it is not an accident that one trait of cultural colonialisation relied upon this pedagogic role model to spread Western power to determine the worth and validity of knowledge, ethics, culture and identity. Therefore, colonial education was significant in the attempt to fabricate an ideological and cultural consent between colonial authority and its colonised subjects. On the other hand, it contributed to reinforcing the cultural, economic and political hegemony of the colonial power. By promoting racist stereotypes and colonial objectives, pedagogy as a modern cultural control technique of the self in the Foucauldian sense effectively helped to shape colonial societies within a world system, where Eurocentrism was regarded in a teleological sense as a necessary civilising mission.

I wish to address how elements of colonial fantasies and discourses re-emerged in political debates around ›integration‹. These debates are coupled with a range of political measures, transported into pedagogy. I am not simply arguing that old colonial practices are exactly reproduced in the current integration policies, but that awareness and critique of ideological similarities and discursive analogies are crucial to understand the power of coloniality. I suggest analysing the integration courses as institutions of power imposed on People of Colour. The pedagogy model supporting these institutions relies on colonial paradigms. The integration courses as well as colonial education promise to transplant the superior Western rational knowledge, its more valuable culture and ultimately the enlightenment of liberal freedom to People of Colour who are subjected to this knowledge transfer process. The recent legal and administrative intensification of Germany's views on integration is cause for a critical discussion on the debate. In view of the rising integration industry, there is a pressing need to question the ideas and practices associated with the term ›integration‹ from a post-colonial perspective. Yet in the face of the recurrent demand for integration, I think it is important (a) to analyse their repressive effects in terms of economic appropriation, cultural stigmatisation and legal discrimination; (b) to understand the new paradigm of repressive integration as an ideological discourse and political practice which is embedded in Germany's internal colonial history of Germanisation, Anti-Semitism and racist immigration policies; and (c) to recognise the relationship between Germanophile integrative programmes, Euro-centric hierarchies and racist practices of colonial education as a relevant topic.

THE PROBLEM WITH INTEGRATION EDUCATION

Although I will focus on the current German integration courses in this article, it is important to note that compulsory integration policies with repressive sanctions are also established in other European countries like France, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands.

Like the German integration course system, most of these restrictive policies are selectively applied to post-colonial and Muslim immigrants, usually from Third World countries. This trend is disturbing since

the effects of guided cultural assimilation, political examination and legal discrimination are inscribed in forceful integration laws. Therefore, it is necessary to look at their ideological presuppositions, logic and effects in order to examine how coercive integration is linked to colonial discourses and Euro-centrist thought patterns.

On December 1, 2004, the social-democratic green federal cabinet passed the ›Regulation on Integration Courses for Foreigners‹. Put into effect at the same time as the new Immigration Act, the Regulation on Integration Courses (IntV), as defined by § 44a of the new Residence Act, in its essence prescribes not so much the right, but the obligation to take part in a rigorously controlled language and orientation course. By the middle of 2015, more than 1.2 million new and already settled immigrants participated in integration courses. This huge education system with more than 1,350 local co-operation partners is certified and centrally controlled by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. With the implementation of the National Integration Plan (NIP) in 2008, the number of courses increased to 945 hours. The Regulation on Integration Courses describes the aim of the integration courses as »the acquisition of adequate German language proficiency«; they are further aimed at »familiarising participants with everyday knowledge, the legal system, culture and history of Germany. In particular, immigrants should learn more about the democratic state system, the principles of the rule of law, equal rights, tolerance, and freedom of religion.« (§3 IntV). Thus within the Federal Republic's official political view, supervised integration functions as a national-pedagogical instrument, designed to teach immigrants German culture and value systems. After the successful completion of their exams, they obtain the ›Zertifikat Deutsch‹ language diploma, designed by the Goethe Institute, while their political views are scrutinised in the standard Federal Orientation Course test. The yearly national budget to support this integration industry is approximately 264 million Euros in addition to the fees of the participants, who should pay nearly 40 percent of the course costs.

REPRESSIVE INTEGRATION

First of all it is important to consider that the integration courses are only obligatory for migrants from non-Western countries. European Citizens of the European Union living in Germany are at liberty to decide whether they want to attend. While citizens of the EU are granted privileges within the social, economic and political landscape, all other immigrants have to prove themselves worthy of a residence permit by actively displaying their integrative abilities. Citizens of the EU also do not have to fear any sanctions should they fail to pass the tests of the integration courses. EU citizens are in a position to decide whether these courses meet their self-defined interests and needs. Non-compulsory courses depend on a situation of negotiation and

freedom of choice, where immigrants have to be treated as potential clients and not as inmates or objects of the administration. Due to this law design, the repressive forms of integration affect mainly People of Color from the post-colonial states of Africa, Asia and Latin America, especially Muslim communities with Turkish or Arabic backgrounds. Consequently, the regulation of integration and the restrictions of immigration, which are both executed by the predominantly white German administration, are shaped not only by economic and political arguments, but also by cultural-religious and ethnicising views.

Instead of offering optional courses, the politics of integration requirements choose a different approach: To legitimise the repressive character, these politics need to make the claim that enforcement is necessary to prevent or to control socio-cultural and political threats to Germany. In this case, compulsory integration is strongly based on the collective constructions of negative stereotypes of non-EU immigrants from the dominant perspective of white German lawmakers. The integration law defines a set of cultural and political criteria for different immigrant groups and specifies the need to meet them, for example, to extend the resident permit. For the first time, certain immigrant groups, especially those with a postcolonial non-EU and Muslim background, are now subjected to specific regulations of the Residence Act (the former Aliens Act). Therefore, I suggest analysing the obligation of integration as a national-pedagogical instrument of power to re-educate immigrants with non-EU backgrounds. In my analysis I want to point to the central function of the integration courses that serve to a certain degree as cultural and political correction centers on an administrative level for the purpose of selecting between those who are regarded as »willing to integrate« (integrationswillig) and those who are regarded as not able to integrate (nicht integrationsfähig) into German mainstream society.

The integration courses prescribe that for those ›in need of integration‹, the right to exist within Germany is dependent on their successful performance in the official examination of integrative capacities. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees plays an important role in the organisation, execution and surveillance of this administered integration, functioning as a co-ordinator and director, particularly on regional and local levels. Due to the phenomena of »subtle registration system« and a »bureaucracy gone out of hand«, political commentators, such as the well-known journalist Heribert Prantl, once coined the term »integration monstrosity«. The integration regime now has the power to use far-reaching measures of punishment on those willful migrants who do not obediently conform to the German course of integration. Negative sanctions can not only be evoked by a refusal to take part in integration courses, but also by insufficient test results. The punishment can take different shapes, from a refusal of citizenship to a cut in social benefits (§ 44a paragraph 3 AufenthG) up to

restrictions in the right of residence (§ 8 paragraph 3 AufenthaltG), culminating in an order of eviction. The need for integration is turned into a juridical category of criminal law.

EUROCENTRISM AND SANCTIONS FOR COMMUNITIES OF MUSLIMS AND PEOPLE OF COLOUR

The differential distribution of rights and obligations – such as is manifested in the Residence Act and the Employment Promotion Act – further expands and reinforces the EU-centric and racial-centric hierarchy amongst immigrants. Since the measures of re-education are aimed specifically at migrants with post-colonial backgrounds, it is important to consider colonial contexts, analogies and configurations when analysing the concept of the regulation of integration. Both People of Colour and post-colonial migrants are frequently in contact with formerly colonised geographical regions or peripheral spheres and are confronted with a tradition of racist-colonial stereotypes and a history of Western orientalism and Islamophobia. Therefore, integration as a mass-effective sovereign act of political control, cultural surveillance and legal certification raises a host of questions, examining both the politics of identity instrumentalised by the dominant German culture in its strategies of self assurance, and the post-/colonial power relations articulated by the selective policies of migration and integration. Such asymmetric structures need to be analysed as to their effects. This will enable us to look for possible connections between migration, integration and the nation-state within the context of its historical development and post-/colonial embedding.

The regulation of integration assumes that postcolonial and Muslim migrants – in contrast to the enlightened and fully civilised Germans – are not, or insufficiently, familiar with the principles of democracy, constitutional legality, equality, tolerance and freedom of religion. Working with such negative collective characteristics, integration politics suspect that all migrants have world views and behaviour which are authoritarian, sexist and fundamentalist. These politics obviously work with a concept of migrants as aliens and enemies, therefore providing acceptance for traditional racist and Orientalist-Islamophobe stereotypes. As a result, immigrants undergo two levels of devaluation: On the one hand, their cultural competence is negatively connoted, on the other hand the raging political accusations of extremism and religious fundamentalism are legitimised and generalised as a basis for governmental actions. The general suspicion is also evident by the plans for ›belated integration‹ for long-established migrants. As objects of the dominant discourse about national interests, they are supposed to be available for arbitrary political notions. The objectifying language alone suggests that this form of integration does not aim at a politics of recognition and equality. The officially certified ›need for integration‹ takes these negative signs of ›Otherness‹ for granted. Migrants seem to

have more need for integration, the more they are perceived as being culturally backward and threatening. However, the authoritarian and paternalistic threat of help can turn into an equally strict imperative of deportation as soon as an undefined limit of tolerability is crossed. In terms of laws and policies it is the Western nation-state that defines the rules and methods of how to treat immigrants. Instead of making it the priority to dismantle the structural dynamics of discrimination and to establish long-term equality, the political framework of rigid integration corroborates racist practices.

Within the structure of the integration course, apparently suspicious migrants find themselves in a protracted condition of systematic examination and questioning. Since integration is based on accusation, and not on society's willingness to accept diversity and legal-political equality, these involuntary integrative courses can turn into temporary detentions lasting 945 hours. The integration course can be understood as the reaction of the white German state to manage the risk as migration is perceived as a source of danger, which is affecting both global and national politics. In a time ruled by so-called anti-terror measures, by permanent security warnings and diffuse fears – of shapeless ›sleepers‹, for example – in a time when civil liberties and constitutional principles (such as the presumption of innocence) are successively dismantled, the impervious, and sometimes imposed foreignness on the ethnicised and orientalist Other is stigmatised by dragnet investigations and general suspicion. Therefore, certain cultural-religious differences undergo a political instrumentalisation: As soon as the dominant Western discourse of the recent years regards these differences as ›Islamic‹ or ›fundamentalist‹, Muslims are defined as security risks and are handed over to an enlightening process of intelligence gathering.



Kien Nghi HA, Fellow of the Institute for Postcolonial and Transcultural Studies (INPUTS) of the University of Bremen and independent curator, received a Ph.D. in Cultural Studies and a Diploma in Political Sciences. He has held research positions at universities in New York, Heidelberg, Tübingen and Bayreuth. His research focuses on postcolonial criticism, racism, migration, and Asian Diasporic Studies. His work has received grants from the German Research Foundation, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the Carl-Duisberg-Society and the FAZIT-Foundation and was awarded the Augsburger Science Prize for Intercultural Studies 2011.

»WOMEN IN EXILE« – REFUGEE WOMEN TALK ABOUT THEIR TROUBLES AND HOPES

Thilo KÖRTING



Refugee Women bus tour 2016 Foto: Women in Exile

They sleep with their headscarf on because many refugee houses offer no privacy. The activists at »Women in Exile« are calling attention to the difficult situation of refugee women in Germany. Their overriding goal: a self-determined life. They are travelling throughout Germany on this mission – yesterday they were in Cologne.

It is raining in Cologne. Nevertheless, 20 refugee helpers crowd under an improvised shelter at Rudolfplatz. They are waiting for the activists from Women in Exile to arrive. They have hung up posters demanding equal rights for all people, no matter what their skin color or gender. Shortly after 1 p.m., two dozen women flock onto the square. They have made their way here from the Cologne houses. The activists invited them out so that the women can tell them about their troubles. »House is bad, everything is bad. Sleeping, bed, headscarf. Sleep in headscarf, morning headscarf. Everything bad«

The women sleep in their headscarves because they live together in a large room with many strange men. They have no privacy at the moment. Then there is the noise which disturbs their children's sleep, illnesses, shortage of sanitary facilities. The women crowd around the

journalists to tell them about their problems. In doing so, they are accomplishing the motto of the initiative Women in Exile: »We are growing louder«.

The initiative began in 2002. The 59-year-old Kenyan Elisabeth Ngari launched it after she herself had lived years in a refugee house. When immigration picked up in 2014, the group struck out across the Republic for the first time. The primary goal is networking, the volunteer says. To talk about what they have experienced.

WORKSHOPS THAT EXPLAIN WOMEN'S RIGHTS

»Women are being sexually harassed. And we wanted to know what the situation is like all over Germany, not just in Berlin and Brandenburg. That's why we decided on this bus tour, to meet with the women and talk with them. We also want to let them know that they have rights here in Germany, they have rights as women.«

To this end, workshops are planned for the women in which they learn what rights they have and how they can demand them. The Women in Exile express harsh criticism for the fact that many of the women are housed in large facilities. »Get rid of all camps«, one sign demands. That's the only way integration will succeed, according to Ngari.

»I would want them to live in apartments like everyone else. To have the dignity of living in a place they can call their own. I mean, we have enough women's shelters, but that's the problem: We give them little rooms and they stay isolated, what we are talking about is integration, the opportunity to live with dignity, like everyone else.«

A self-determined life – that is the overriding goal, and the reason why the women around Elisabeth Ngari return to the streets over and over again.

MIGRATION POLICIES OF KOREA: INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION

KIM Sagang

INTRODUCTION

Korea transformed from a migrant-sending country to a migrant-receiving country in the late 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s, it sent coal miners and nurses to West Germany and construction workers to the Middle East. Yet, the formal labor export scheme had ended by the mid-1980s when Korea underwent rapid economic growth. The structural changes in the Korean economy and a demographic transition resulted in labor shortages in certain sectors of industry and a consequent demand for migrant labor. From the late 1980s, migrant workers started to come to Korea and from the mid-1990s, marriage migrants, most of whom were women, began to enter Korea.

At first, there was no formal labor migration system in Korea, let alone an official immigration policy. Migrant workers were considered temporary stayers rather than long-term settlers. Also, there was widespread concern that immigration would cause a social and economic burden on Korean society. For these reasons, when the government introduced a formal labor migration system, it designed the system as a short-term rotation under which long-term stay, family reunion, and settlement of migrant workers were not permitted. The social integration of migrant workers was not taken into account in the process of policy making.

However, the emergence of marriage migrants made the Korean government change its stance on immigration. Unlike migrant workers, marriage migrants and their children were considered to live in Korea permanently, thus their integration became an important policy issue. Consequently, the government decided to implement comprehensive immigration and integration policies. Yet, the policies were formulated to divide migrants into desirable and undesirable groups, and only welcome and integrate the former group while discriminating and excluding the latter.

In this article, I will briefly show the current state of migration to Korea. Then I will examine Korea's immigration and integration policies and look into how those policies have been implemented for different groups of migrants. In conclusion, I will argue for more humane and inclusive migration policies for all migrants.

CURRENT STATE OF MIGRATION TO KOREA

The number of foreigners staying in Korea has increased quite rapidly over 25 years. The number was less than 50,000 in 1990, but it reached over one million in 2007 and now it is almost 2 million, which accounts for 3.6 percent of Korea's total population (Figure 1). Excluding short-term visitors and counting long-term migrants¹ and naturalized immigrants puts the figure at 1.6 million, which is about three percent of the total population. The proportion is still small compared to other migrant-receiving countries, especially countries in Europe and North America, but it is relatively large for countries like Korea where a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity has been maintained as the national identity.

Most of the migrants come from neighboring Asian countries. As shown in Figure 2, more than 50 percent of all migrants are from China, with ethnic Koreans from China accounting for two-thirds of all Chinese migrants. Except for some of the developed countries, the top 20 countries with the most migrants are the countries that signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Korea to send their workers for unskilled jobs. As a result, about 30 percent of all migrants in Korea are unskilled workers with a work visa.

1

According to the Immigration Statistics of Korea, long-term migrants are defined as foreigners who have registered as a resident with the intention to stay in Korea more than three months.

KOREA'S MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES

The Korean government has three separate but related policies on migration, and those are labor migration policy, multicultural family support policy, and immigration policy. The target group of labor migration policy is unskilled migrant workers, and the policy deals with the recruitment, admission, employment, management, and protection of unskilled migrant workers. Labor migration policy is based on the Act on Foreign Workers' Employment, etc., and the Ministry of Labor holds the main responsibility for implementing the policy.

Multicultural family support policy is for marriage migrants and their families. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family is in charge of this policy. Based on this policy, Multicultural Family Support Centers have been founded in almost all municipalities in Korea to provide various services and programs for marriage migrants and their families. However, the legal definition of a multicultural family is a family composed of a marriage migrant and a Korean spouse and their children, according to the Multicultural Families Support Act. Therefore, families of a migrant couple cannot receive any support or services from the Multicultural Family Support Centers.

The need for a comprehensive immigration policy began to be discussed in the mid-2000s when Korea was expected to become a multicultural society through the growing number of migrants. Immigration policy was first established and implemented from 2008, aiming to integrate migrants into Korean society. According to the Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Justice is in charge of developing a master plan for immigration policy every five years. The first master plan was implemented from 2008 to 2012, and from 2013 till now the second master plan is being carried out.

There are five policy goals in the second basic plan. The first one is openness, that is, Korea should open its border to attract more migrants. Yet, the open border policy only applies to professionals, skilled workers, business persons, investors, international students, and tourists, while excluding unskilled workers, marriage migrants, and asylum seekers. The second goal is social integration. The official social integration program was implemented in 2009, and now there are more than 300 program-operating institutions around the country. According to the plan, social integration should include all migrants living in Korea, but in practice, only 'desirable' or 'fit' migrants are included. There are three other goals, such as human rights protection, public safety, and international cooperation, but the budgets allocated for those goals are relatively small compared to the first and second goals (Table 1).

POLICIES AROUND UNSKILLED MIGRANT WORKERS

When people started to come to Korea in search of a job in the late 1980s, there was no official labor migration policy. They entered the country on a tourist visa or other short-term visa and found a job and became a worker. Thus, most of them soon became undocumented or unauthorized migrant workers.


As the demand for migrant labor increased and the concerns about uncontrolled migration grew, the Korean government decided to introduce the Industrial Trainee System in 1993. Yet, as the title indicates, those who came under the system were not treated as workers but as trainees, which means they were not protected by labor laws. Their wages were very low, despite the fact that they had to pay a lot of brokerage fees to come to Korea. They were exploited and their rights were abused. For these reasons, many trainees ran away from their assigned job and became undocumented workers. As their stories came out and spread in the mid-1990s, migrant advocacy organizations began to spring up to support them. After that, trainees, undocumented workers, and their advocacy organizations all together fought against the Industrial Trainee System for over ten years.

Finally, in 2004, the Employment Permit System was introduced and the Industrial Trainee System was concurrently operated for three more years until it was completely abolished in 2007. The Employment System disallows brokers or private agencies to be involved in the recruitment and placement of migrant workers in order to reduce the cost of migration. It is a government-to-government system under which the Ministry of Labor of Korea and the equivalent government body in sending countries have signed a MoU to send and receive migrant workers. Most of all, it allows migrant workers to be fully protected by labor laws and grants them equal treatment as national workers.

In many aspects, the Employment Permit System is a much improved system compared to the Industrial Trainee System. However, the two systems have one thing in common: there is 'no settlement' rule. To prevent unskilled migrant workers from settling down in Korea, both systems have set the principles of temporary stay, rotation, and no family reunion. However, these principles have been challenged not only by migrant workers but also by their employers who want to keep experienced workers long term.

Consequently, the Employment Permit System has been changed to extend the period of stay for migrant workers. At first, migrant workers could only stay in Korea for three years, but now they have the opportunity to extend their contract for an additional one year and ten months as long as their employer agrees to keep employing them. Also, if they meet certain requirements, they can go home for

Figure 1. Number of Foreign Stayers in Korea



Source: Korea Immigration Service. »Immigration Statistics Yearbook, each year.

three months and then come back to Korea for another four years and ten months.² So technically, migrant workers can stay in Korea for nine years and eight months in total, which makes the principles of temporariness and rotation no longer valid. Also, migrant workers can attend the social integration program as long as they maintain their legal status. Nevertheless, there is little chance for them to obtain permanent residency or naturalization. As far as the Korean government is concerned, unskilled migrant workers are welcome to come and work but must leave when their contract is over.

POLICIES AROUND MARRIAGE MIGRANTS

Marriage migration of women used to be encouraged in Korea by both central and local governments, especially during the 2000s. Marriage migration was viewed as a solution to low fertility rates and low marriage rates, especially in rural areas. International marriage brokerage businesses flourished as the government deregulated their licensing system. Many local governments in rural areas provided a subsidy for local men who wanted to pursue international marriage. With this encouragement, the proportion of international marriages accounted for more than ten percent of all marriages between 2004 and 2010. In 2001, the number of marriage migrants was slightly over

30,000, but now the number has reached more than 260,000, which is over 15 percent of all long-term migrants in Korea.³

Unlike migrant workers, marriage migrants were supposed to become settlers or permanent members of the Korean society. Consequently, a discourse on multicultural society and social integration emerged in the mid-2000s. However, not all marriage migrants are able to secure their immigration status. In order to renew their visa or be eligible for permanent residency or naturalization, they have to stay married or raise their children with Korean nationality or take care of their parents-in-law. Otherwise, they are not allowed to stay in Korea.

Family conflicts, domestic violence, and fraudulent marriage brokers have been constant barriers for marriage migrants to secure their stay. Yet, instead of coming up with more protective measures, the Korean government decided to reduce the number of marriage migrants by tightening marriage visa screening for potential marriage migrants. It established language criteria for migrant spouses and financial capability criteria for Korean spouses. The government justified its new measure by saying that the cost of integration would decrease if it only admitted migrants who were already fit and only allowed Koreans who were financially stable to get married to migrants.


POLICIES AROUND ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES

²

The Employment Permit System only allows unskilled migrant workers to stay in Korea for less than five years at a time in order to prevent them from qualifying for permanent resident status which can be acquired after five consecutive years of residence.

³

The number 260,000 is the combined number of marriage visa holders (151,608) and naturalized marriage migrants (108,526) as of December 2015.



Source: Korea Immigration Service. »Immigration Statistics Yearbook«, 2015.

Although the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees are very small in Korea, they are becoming more and more important in the policy-making process. Korea ratified the UN Refugee Convention in 1992 and began to receive refugee applications in 1994. Yet, no one had been approved as a refugee until 2000. It was 2001 when Korea recognized its first refugee, who was an Ethiopian man. In 2013, the Korean government enforced the independent Refugee Act to guarantee a minimum level of social protection for refugees in accordance with the UN Refugee Convention.

Ironically, however, there are not many people who can be protected by the Refugee Act because the government, the Ministry of Justice to be precise, has been very restrictive in granting refugee status to asylum seekers. From 1994 to June 2016, more than 18,000 asylum seekers had applied for refugee status, but less than 600 were granted refugee status (Table 2). In order to be recognized as a refugee, asylum seekers should be able to prove that they have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Other than these five grounds, stipulated in the UN Refugee Convention, no one can be granted refugee status in Korea. Therefore, those who have fled from war, like Syrians, cannot get refugee status. Instead, they can obtain humanitarian status.⁴ The Korean government is complimenting itself for enacting the Refugee Act for the first time in Asia, protecting refugees and providing

assistance for asylum seekers. Yet, it seems that the government is trying to maintain its restrictive approach towards asylum seekers. By virtue of the Refugee Act, asylum seekers can apply for refugee status at the port of entry, but in reality, those who request an application upon arrival are locked up in a repatriation waiting room in airports until the authorities decide whether to let them enter Korea and process their application or to deport them back to their country of origin. Due to this practice, many asylum seekers do not even have a chance to submit their application before they are sent back.

In addition, the government has openly expressed its concern about accepting refugees who seem hard to be integrated into Korean society. On one hand, it has been turning down many refugee applications from Muslim asylum seekers. On the other hand, it started a refugee resettlement program in 2015 to accept Myanmar refugees from refugee camps in Thailand. The Ministry of Justice explained in a press release that it decided to accept Myanmar refugees because they look similar to Koreans and have the Buddhist religion, like many Koreans, and are therefore easy to integrate into Korean society.

FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION

The current migration and integration policies of Korea are very exclusive. In particular, they classify migrants into desirable and undesirable groups and give greater preference to the former. For example, they prefer skilled or professional migrant workers over unskilled ones, prefer marriage migrants who are mothers or care givers over those who are not, and prefer Buddhist asylum seekers

4

According to the 2015 Immigration Statistics Yearbook, Syrians account for 70 percent of all 910 humanitarian status holders in Korea.

Table 1. Budget Allocation for the 2nd Master Plan of Immigration Policy

POLICY GOALS	OPENNESS	SOCIAL INTEGRATION	HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION	PUBLIC SAFETY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Budget in Billion KRW	627.5 (41.6%)	546.5 (36.3%)	193.7 (12.9%)	77.9 (5.2%)	61.2 (4.1%)

Source: Immigration Policy Commission. ›The Second Basic Plan for Immigration Policy‹, 2012.

Table 2. Refugee Statistics

YEAR	APPLICANTS	APPROVED	HUMANITARIAN STATUS
1994~2009	2,492	171	85
2010	423	47	35
2011	1,011	42	20
2012	1,143	60	31
2013	1,574	57	6
2014	2,896	94	539
2015	5,711	105	194
2016 (January~June)	3,604	22	45
Total	18,854	598	955

Source: Korea Immigration Service. ›Monthly Immigration Statistics‹, June 2016.

over Muslim asylum seekers. As a consequence, undesirable migrants are often excluded from settling down in Korea or from integration into Korean society. Hence, the migration and integration policies of Korea not only fail to address the reality of migrants and limit the human rights of migrants, but also hinder the social integration of migrants by reinforcing prejudice and discrimination against them. In opposition to the current government policies, migrant advocacy organizations started to get together to make their own master plan for immigration and integration policies and to propose their plan as an alternative to the government's master plan. The ground rules of the alternative plan will be ›no discrimination‹ and ›equal treatment‹, not only between migrants and nationals but also among different migrant groups. Specifically, the alternative plan will argue that although government can have admission criteria for migrants, once admitted, migrants should be given equal and fair access to stable stay, permanent residency or naturalization. Also, it will argue that migrants should be encouraged to develop themselves and make a contribution to society through more comprehensive, more inclusive, and more practical social integration programs.



Dr. KIM Sagang is a research fellow at the Migration and Human Rights Institute, an affiliated research institute of a migrant advocacy NGO called ›Solidarity with Migrants‹ in Busan, Korea. As a researcher and a human rights activist, she is engaged in activities criticizing and making suggestions about the immigration policies of Korea. She has been particularly interested in the protection and promotion of human rights of vulnerable migrant groups, such as migrant seafarers, migrant farm workers, and undocumented migrants and their children.

THE ODYSSEY OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS: ISSUES OF THEIR MIGRATION AND IDENTITY

KIM You Gene

INTRODUCTION

The world is now facing an unprecedented problem as a consequence of human migration. In particular, Europe is undergoing this grave situation due to the surging influx of the refugees from the Middle East and Africa. So far, much has been talked about the »refugee crises« taking place in Europe. Yet, the world should also pay attention to the North Korean refugee problems happening on the other side of the globe. It is noteworthy that the number of North Korean defectors has increased in recent years. Compared with the past, more and more elite members of North Korean society are seeking to escape to the South (The Korea Herald, 7 Sept. 2016).

Today, a great number of North Koreans are willing to cross the border to China, and more than 300,000 North Korean defectors are living clandestinely in China, waiting for the chance to move to South Korea or other countries. In China, North Korean defectors (escapees) constantly suffer from the threat of being arrested and deported by the Chinese authorities. Obviously, the Chinese government, despite its commitment to UNHCR, has never granted refugee status to North Korean defectors because of its geopolitical hegemony in Northeast Asia and its desire to maintain positive diplomatic relations with North Korea.

After the end of the Korean Civil War, a relatively small number of North Koreans attempted to flee to South Korea, Europe or North America for economic, political, and religious reasons. Then, during the 1980s, the number of defectors sharply increased due to the failure of the North Korean economy. Furthermore, in the 1990s North Korea was confronted with the »Great Famine« which spurred a mass exodus to China. The chronic food shortage, political repression, and continuing weakness of the economy of North Korea have driven a number of North Koreans to cross the rivers into adjacent Northeastern Provinces of China (Chang et al. 2008). China merely serves as a transit

route to the defectors' final destination. After temporarily staying in China, many of the defectors intend to make one more stopover in Southeast Asia such as Burma, Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam so as to arrive in Thailand where they potentially can secure asylum. »Most of the defectors want to settle in South Korea, though young and better educated defectors have a great inclination for the United States as a final destination« (Chang et al. 2008: 1). After all, North Korean defectors have to go through intolerable hardships until they make it to their final destination. Even after the resettlement, they still have to cope with the difficulties of adjustment to their new life and their distinctive identity crisis.

In this article I explore the main migration issues arising on the route from North Korea to the final destination. In the latter part, I will deal with the identity issues during the course of their resettlement in South Korea and the United States. The issues are based on the challenges which the North Koreans experience in integrating to a new society. In particular, I tried to review the issues and problems in a comparative way between the North Koreans in South Korea and the U.S.

THE MIGRATION OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS

Motivation to Defect

As Chang et al. who contributed the working paper to Peterson Institute for International Economics indicate, »Refugees consider leaving their homeland for diverse reasons, some having to do with the »push factors« others having to do with »pull factors« based on opportunities in the target countries« (Chang et al. 2008:5). Overall, hunger and searching for food are major push factors for North Korean defection. However, a Human Rights Report indicates hunger is only a small part of the motivation for flight. Political factors such as persecution based on family history, loss of status, frustration over lack of opportunities, and desire to experience freedom outside of North Korea

are greater motivating factors for escape and defection. Under these circumstances, mass migration could occur as a result of a collapsed North Korea (O 2011).

Refugee Status of North Korean Defectors in China

The Chinese government policy towards North Korean defectors is based on the assumption that all the North Korean defectors cross the border only for economic reasons. Thus, border crossers are treated as illegal migrants and are subject to arrest and deportation. As a consequence, North Korean defectors caught by the authorities in China have to face repatriation back to North Korea. »China cites North Korean refugees as »economic migrants« thereby ignoring their commitment to the 1951 Convention of Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which was signed in 1982. Their policy on repatriation of refugees belies their claims that it is a country that follows international law« (Robinson 2010: 10).

»China does not usually allow North Koreans to apply for political asylum. Moreover, China indicates it is obliged under a bilateral 1986 repatriation agreement with North Korea to return all border crossers« (Margesson et al. 2007: CRS 11). Even though North Koreans defect due to economic factors, political reasons cannot be separated from the primary reason to defect. According to UNHCR, even those who arrive in search of food may have a claim for refugee status »Sur Place« because they would be at risk of persecution if they are returned. Accordingly, most North Korean defectors in China deserve to be treated as refugees on the grounds that they will be punished or executed by the North Korean regime if they are deported back to North Korea.

The Process of Entry into South Korea

China refuses to grant refugee status to North Korean defectors and considers them illegal economic migrants. Most of the North Koreans in China wish to move to South Korea. However, only a small number of defectors are able to fulfill their wishes. This begs the question, »How can defectors successfully find a route to enter South Korea?« In general, there are two ways to enter South Korea, both of which are full of difficulties and risks. The first and most obvious route is to visit the South Korean embassy and consulate offices in China and simply ask for asylum. Although visiting the South Korean diplomatic agencies is accessible, the agencies in China are virtually of no help. North Koreans who request help from South Korean officials in China become frustrated and disappointed at their cold and neutral gestures. As an inevitable alternative, many of them choose moving to a third country where a South Korean embassy is located. This is an »Underground Railway (Seoul Train)« which is full of perils and hardships. They have to cross through jungles and rivers, hiding themselves from border patrols in Southeast Asian countries. Wherever

they may stay, their lives are full of the fear of getting arrested until they safely land at a South Korean airport.

The Arrival of North Korean Refugees in the United States

After escaping from North Korea, the defectors stay in China with the hope of moving to their final destination. Presumably, most of them want to go to South Korea because of linguistic and cultural familiarity as well as resettlement benefits from the South Korean government. However, as Cohen, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings indicates, »Some like to go to the U.S. because of its varied economic and educational opportunities« (Cohen 2001: 2). Others may simply wish to get away from the discrimination which North Koreans inevitably confront in South Korea.

In general, North Korean defectors take the route to a third country in Southeast Asia where they have a chance to ask the U.S. government for asylum. Unfortunately, they have to be on a waiting list usually for more than six months to get the approval of refugee status from the local U.S. embassy. Alternatively, they have but to choose to go to South Korea. After going through the hardship of a long wait, just a few North Korean defectors finally arrive in the United States host country. Once they arrive in the U.S., the refugees enjoy a short period of settlement during which they find housing, take care of medical needs, make connections with the local Korean community, and take English classes. Most of the North Korean refugees eventually end up living in Korean communities scattered throughout the United States. This is not surprising since the linguistic and cultural affinity with the Korean immigrants is more than enough to attract them into the Korean communities (The Bush Institute, U.S.-Based North Korean Refugees – A Qualitative Study. P. 13-14) .

RESETTLEMENT ISSUES AND IDENTITY OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS

The plight of North Korean Defectors in China

The life of North Korean defectors in China is desperate and plagued with economic and psychological problems. Once they arrive on Chinese territory, their plight begins. Their difficulties start as soon as they set foot in China, as they are immediately at risk of arrest and deportation. First and foremost, their primary concern on arrival is finding food and shelter. Most refugees begin their lives in China by begging for food and shelter. »Typically they begin by contacting the local Korean-Chinese who, in many cases, are willing to help, although not for long« (Chung et al. 2004: 85). However, they are always vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination owing to their lack of legal status. As a matter of fact, females compose the majority of the North Korean population in China, and marriage is an instrument for making a living in China as North Korean women. It is also noteworthy that many of the female North Korean defectors are likely



trafficked into forced marriages or channeled into the sex industry in China. »Women are particularly subject to exploitation« (Smith 2002: 125). Aside from economic problems, North Korean defectors suffer from various psychological problems. One of these problems arises from the status of being a defector which forces them to live in constant fear of arrest and repatriation. »They say that if they were sent back to North Korea, they would be humiliated, tortured, sent to prison camp or even executed in public« (Ibid., 88-89).

Resettlement and Challenges to Integration in South Korea

After a long and treacherous journey, North Korean defectors finally arrive at their destination, South Korea, the Promised Land for North Koreans. Yet, before they are released into South Korean society, they are required to take several steps. »Immediately following their arrival at the airport, they are taken to a facility for investigation and accommodation operated by an intelligence service under the Ministry of Defense« (International Crisis Group 2006: 26).

Following the one-month stay at the investigation facility, North Korean defectors are transferred to a resettlement education center known as »Hanawon«, meaning house of unity. »The program focuses on social adjustment education, on-site medical care, professional counseling and some basic daily life skills like driving, computer, and vocational training« (Ibid., 27). At the end of the education and training at »Hanawon«, the defectors are permitted to decide where they choose to live and get assistance through the networks of private and public institutions. Lankov points out in his article »Bitter Taste

of Paradise« that »from the time forward, the defector is almost completely his or her own and begins to face challenges of adjustment to a new life« (Lankov 2006: 61). However, there are various kinds of support from the South Korean government for the defectors once they resettle at their destinations.

Even with so many kinds of support from the South Korean government, North Koreans tend to feel marginalized and isolated in the new society of South Korea. As a consequence, »assimilation of North Koreans into South Korean society has proved especially challenging« (O. 2011: 158). More than anything else, North Koreans in South Korea are confronted with differences in attitude and value system. »North Korean defectors perceive South Korean policies, economy, society, and culture in terms of their basic knowledge and perceptions gained while living in the North« (Suh 2002: 76). As they had been taught to value equality in the communist society, defectors have difficulty understanding the capitalist system. Thus, they fail to understand the fact that responsibility ultimately rests with them. They think that a liberal democracy is anarchistic and that in a capitalist society, money is everything (Ibid.,) »Many North Koreans also face prejudice from South Koreans, who perceive the defectors as socialists who are dependent, passive, lazy, and selfish« (O. 2011: 161).

Problems of Adaptation of North Korean Refugees in the U.S.

In recent years, more and more North Korean defectors are coming to the U.S. rather than South Korea. Kyung-hwa Song in her survey indicates that 1,194 North Koreans chose the U.S. and European

countries as their final destination for refugee status or exile, while 2,376 chose South Korea. (Song 2012). In fact, the United States has emerged as the main destination of North Korean defectors since 2006. However, the adaptation of North Koreans to the new environment of the U.S. can be even harder than that of South Korea. Some young North Korean defectors often come out in the media or talk shows to share their successful life stories in the U.S. Yet, there are some other negative stories that do not get much publicity. »North Koreans who are resettled in the U.S. mostly struggle to adjust to a new language and culture« (GAO Report. 2010: 44). In the U.S. they have to face even higher language barriers, not to mention the cultural differences. What's more, many North Koreans in the U.S. face physical health problems and psychological distress along with socioeconomic problems more severely than in South Korea. Some of them arrive in the United States in poor health and have suffered from traumatic and stressful experiences (Ibid.)

In addition to those problems, they also have negative feelings related to working in Korean communities in major U.S. cities. North Koreans are discriminated against in Korean ethnic communities because of their own low socioeconomic and occupational status. Most South Korean immigrants in the U.S. do not show interest in North Koreans, and employers tend to treat North Koreans merely as manual laborers under these circumstances, North Koreans cannot fully join the Korean ethnic community, not to mention American mainstream.

IDENTITY ISSUES AND CONCLUSION

During the resettlement process, North Koreans face various challenges in South Korea. Their integration into South Korean society has become a critical issue and the identity of North Koreans raised the question of »Who are North Korean defectors?« As North Koreans bring with them a complex set of attitudes and values into South Korean society, it is hard for them to establish their new identity which will fit in the new environment of South Korea. Thus, the identity formation of North Korean defectors in South Korea undergoes a complex process because of the remnants of North Koreaness which were shaped under the communist ideology. As O indicates, »North Koreans are products of their environment, they bring with them a complex set of attitudes and values from North Korea« (O. 2012: 158). The hybridization of North Korean identity in South Korea eventually acts as a barrier in adapting to their new life. »Even though upon arrival North Korean defectors automatically become citizens of South Korea, such status falls short of conferring a full membership into South Korean society. North Korean defectors are often regarded as strangers and they often disguise their identity (Park and Kim. 2014: 372). Under these circumstances, North Korean defectors for the most part fail to set up their positive identity in South Korea. Their sense of isolation

leads them to develop a negative identity among the cold shoulders of their South Korean brethren. In a way, they hide themselves from mainstream Korean society.

In the mean time, North Koreans in the United States have shown somewhat different identity issues compared with those of South Korea. Some of the North Koreans come to the U.S. as refugees while others come as twice migrants from South Korea. As a consequence, the identity issues of North Koreans in the U.S. show more complex aspects than those in South Korea. In a way, the identity of North Koreans in the U.S. is somehow mixed with their North Koreaness, South Koreaness, and even Korean-Americaness. Griffiths argues that over time, refugees undergo a complicated process of identity reformation as a result of displacement (Burnett 2013; Griffiths 2001). All in all, North Koreans in the U.S. almost always have to go through an identity crisis until they form a positive identity as North-Korean-Americans.

No one can predict what will happen in North Korea. The debate over North Korea's collapse is emerging everywhere (O. 2012). There are various scenarios among the North Korean experts that North Korea as an outcast will sooner or later disappear in this cosmopolitan world. In that case, the new wave of mass migration will bring up the complex issues in China, South Korea and the U.S. as well as the free countries in the world. To this end, international community should pay more attention to the prospect of North Korean migration. According to a report from the Wall Street Journal, North Korea has »The sure capability to attack in an overall and practical way the Americans in the Pacific operation theater« (Wall Street Journal, 2016). Under these circumstances, more and more high-ranking North Koreans are now seeking asylum in South Korea. This is undoubtedly a sign that North Korea has come close to collapse. Even today, somewhere along the Chinese border, North Koreans are crossing the Tumen River in search of freedom and a better life.



KIM You Gene is a PhD student of Asia Pacific Studies at Waseda University in Tokyo. Her major research subjects are related to the issues and prospects of North Korean defectors and Korean-Chinese migration in Japan and the United States. She conducts participant observations and in-depth interviews with Korean-Chinese migrants where she mainly puts the focus on their identity formation, ethnic networking, and the perspectives for their children's education.

END NOTES

- 1
UNHCR: The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It is also Known as UN Refugee Agency and is mandated to protect and support refugees at the request of a government or the UN itself.
- 2
Korean Civil War: Conflict between North Korea and South Korea progressed from 1950 To 1953. It evolved to international war between communist countries and free countries. It devastated the two Koreas with huge casualties. It is also called the "Forgotten War" in world history.
- 3
Great Famine: The natural disaster from floods and droughts which ruined North Korean arable land in 1995. It ravaged the North Korean social and economic infrastructure which mainly caused North Korean defection.
- 4
Human Rights Report: It is under the U.S. Department of State and its purpose is to safeguard civilian security, democracy, and human rights. It also deals with the issues of North Koreans' human rights.
- 5
1951 Convention: The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees is the key legal framework of the states. It was convened under the auspices of UNHCR.
- 6
Underground Railway: This is a metaphor to explain the North Korean defectors' arduous journey from China to South Korea by comparing the slave liberation movement before the Civil War in the United States.
- 7
Hanawon: It was established by the Ministry of Unification (MOU) which helps North Korean defectors to get training and education for their resettlement for 3 months in a concentrated facility. They teach various kinds of skills for North Koreans to use in their real life.
- 8
Twice Migrant: Twice migrants here refer to those who migrate from a temporary stay to their permanent destination. North Koreans stay in China for a while and move to South Korea or other free countries.
- 9
Tumen River: It is the northwestern boundary between China and North Korea. It became the major route for North Koreans to flee to China. Defectors usually wade across the river clandestinely at night or walk over the ice in the winter.

REFERENCES

- Burnett, Kari. 2013. "Feeling like an outsider: a case study of refugee identity in the Czech Republic", UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency). Research Paper No. 251 p.1-p.30
- Chang, Yoonok, Stephan Heggard and Marcus Noland. 2008. "Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence from China." Working Paper Series 8 (4): 1-26.
- Chung, Kieseon, Ko Sung Ho, and Oh Yoo-seok. 2004. "North Korean Defectors." Asian Perspective 28 (2): 65-99.
- Cohen, Roberta. 2011. "Admitting North Korean Refugees to the United States: Obstacles and Opportunities." Retrieved 30 November 2013. (<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/admitting-north-korean-refugees-to-the-united-states-obstacles-and-opportunities/>)
- Cohen, Roberta 2014. "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure." International Journal of Korean Studies 1-20.
- Cohen, Roberta 2013. Human Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges." International Journal of Korean Unification Studies. 22 (2): 29-62.
- GAO (US Government Accountability Office). 2010. "Status of North Korea Refugee Resettlement and Asylum in the United States." Humanitarian Assistance GAO-10-691: 1-55.
- Griffiths, P. 2001. Counseling asylum seekers and refugees: a study of Kurds in early and later stages of exile. European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counseling & Health 4 (2): 293-313
- International Crisis Group. 2006. "Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Korea in China and Beyond." Asia Report N 122: 1-43.
- Lankov, Adnrei. 2006. "Bitter taste of paradise: North Korean refugees in South Korea. Journal of East Asian Studies 1-26.
- Margesson, Rhoda., Emma Chanlett-Avey and Andorra Bruno. 2007. "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options." Congressional Research Service RL 34189: 1-37.
- O, Tara. 2011. "The Integration of North Korean Defectors in South Korea: Problems and Prospects." International Journal of Korean Studies 14 (2): 151-166.
- Park Hyewon and Kim Junghwan. 2014. Identity Formation among North Korean Defectors in South Korea: Implications from a Socio-Cultural Learning Theritical Lens. Adult Education Research Conference. Paper 64. P.372-377
- Robinson, Courtland. "The Korea Project: Planning for the Long Term." USC Korean Studies Institutes proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference of the CSIS-USC Korea Project, 20-21 August 2010. California. 1-16: Print.
- Smith, Hazel. 2012 "North Koreans in China: Defining the Problems and Offering Some Solutions", University of Warwick
- Song, Kyung-hwa. 2012. "North Korea Defectors' American Dream." Retrieved 5 March 2015. (http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/515806.html). 97.
- Suh, Jae-jean. 2002. "North Korean Defectors: Their Adaptation and Resettlement." East Asian Review 14 (3): 67-86.
- The Bush Institute at George Bush Presidential Center. "U.S.-Based North Korean Refugees, A Qualitative Studies", October 2014
- The Korea Herald, 2016. "Number of NK defectors up 15% on-year in first 8 months of this year", The Korea Herald, 7 Sept. 2016 <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?Ud=20160907000272>
- The Wall Street Journal, 2016. "North Korean Missile Launch Portends Growing Capabilities" 22 June 2016

UNDOCUMENTED RESIDENT SUPPORT IN JAPAN

– ON-SITE SUPPORT WORK BY NGO/NPO –

KATO Jotaro

SITUATIONS OF UNDOCUMENTED RESIDENTS IN JAPAN

There are more than 214 million immigrants in the world, of which 10-15 per cent are said to be undocumented immigrants (UN 2013). However, none of them want to be »undocumented«. These people are created by circumstances such as world economic and social inequality which impede their future prospects.

There are more than 60 thousand undocumented residents in Japan (Ministry of Justice 2016). They include children who become »undocumented« from the moment they are born and residents who cannot imagine staying undocumented for a long time without being recognized as refugees. Moreover, undocumented residents are not protected by the anti-hate speech law enacted in 2016, which means they doubly exposed to discrimination.

ACTIVITIES OF ASIAN PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY (APFS)

We at APFS provide consultation to the undocumented residents and help to find a way to normalize their status. Occasionally, they are hampered by Japanese-language barriers and are lacking information. We give information to them in order to prevent them from growing hopeless about their problems. We also put effort into gathering local residents who live nearby and asking them to support the undocumented residents and create support activities.

The problems can never be solved if society does not know the problems from which the undocumented residents suffer. We are also trying to make the problems known through the mass media, lectures in high schools and universities, workshops and publication of books. What is more, we regularly make requests to the concerned government ministries and the members of the Diet. Japan the Minister of Justice has the power to normalize undocumented residents with the »special residence permission«. In the past, the »special residence permission« was hidden in a black box, but we have made the officials disclose the cases of permission and non-permission and guidelines of the special residence permission.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ASIAN PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY (APFS)

In 1999, when we did not know if undocumented families would get »special residence permission«, we conducted en masse appearance activity and won 42 special residence permissions. In 2009-2010, we got the authorities to reevaluate the change in conditions of 44 persons from the undocumented resident families who had been issued written deportation orders and then received special residence permission. In 2014, we were successful in obtaining permission for an Iranian student who had said that she could not apply for a public high school entrance examination because of her undocumented status, just one month before the application deadline. It was a result of gathering the school master, parents of classmates, a member of the local assembly, etc. The student is now in the second year of the high school and came 7th in her year on a test. In 2015, we made an opportunity for the undocumented children to make an appeal about their hardships to a member of the House of Representatives. We alerted nearly 10 million people to the existence of undocumented residents through articles in The Asahi Shimbun (one of biggest quality papers in Japan), a front-page article in The Japan Times (English news in Japan), and so on. We managed to elicit a promise that the Ministry of Justice would grant permission to several children.

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND LEGAL STATUS

Legal status is quite important for children to consider their identity positively. In the process of obtaining special residence permission, undocumented children tend to show how they are assimilated into Japanese society but they do not know their country of origin at all. The Iranian girl above had said in elementary school, »I want to change my face like a Japanese citizen.« We can see that a kind of power exists between the Japanese nation and undocumented children.

Another Filipino girl had said »I do not want to speak Tagalog. I do not eat Filipino food at all. The Philippines smells bad. I do not want to go there. I just want to stay in Japan.« By denying her country of origin, she had tried to justify staying in Japan. Fortunately, the Filipino girl received the special residence permission. After getting it, she visited the Philippines with her family for the first time. After

she mingled with relatives in the Philippines, she got to understand there were relatives who loved her very much. She is currently a college student in Japan. She is trying to study Tagalog to communicate better with her relatives in the Philippines. She lives in Japan but also knows where she comes from. She looks much more stable now than when she was rejecting everything related to the Philippines. If she had not received legal status in Japan, she might not have had a chance to understand her identity. Legal status is very vital for ones' ethnic identity.

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

At the present, the officials say that they can give the special residence permission only to children under the condition that their parents would go back to their native countries. However, those parents have sustained the bottom of the Japanese economy, and they have brought up their children in harsh circumstances in Japan. The children say that they want to repay their parents for raising them in Japan. The parents and children are inseparable. We at APFS hope the Japanese society understands the parents also have the right to stay in Japan because they have contributed to the Japanese economy.

Now, increasing numbers of foreign students and technical intern trainees are falling into the status of being undocumented in Japan. We need to have officials and society understand that the economical social structures are creating these problems.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

The number of undocumented residents are expected to increase. We are going to continue our support on the front line. In addition



Eight undocumented children working with APFS petition the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau on October 22, 2015, calling for special permission to live in Japan.
Photo by Satoko KAWASAKI, The Japan Times

to support for the individual cases, we are going to put efforts into communicating the situation of undocumented residents to the society. The lack of an immigration policy keeps creating problems for undocumented residents. We will convey to the government and society the need for an immigration policy that regards the foreigners as residents with whom we live, not just using them as workers, like robots. It is also important for foreign residents to keep their own ethnic identity in Japan.

REFERENCE

ASIAN PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY website. <http://apfs.jp/eng/> (August 30, 2016 access)

The Japan Times. Japan's so-called visa over-stayers tell of life in legal limbo. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/23/national/crime-legal/japans-called-visa-overstayers-tell-life-legal-limbo/> (August 30, 2016 access)

Ministry of Justice website. http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00058.html (August 30, 2016 access)

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS POPULATION DIVISION (2013) "International Migration Policies Government Views and Priorities"



KATO Jotaro is the representative of the Asian People's Friendship Society (APFS) NGO/NPO which supports undocumented residents since 1987. His interest is ethnicity and family unification of migrants. He lectures on «Comparative Culture» at the University of Sacred Heart as a visiting lecturer. He participated in EPRIE 2016.

JUNE 24 TO JULY 6, 2016 – POLAND, GERMANY AND FRANCE

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2016

POLAND / KRZYZOWA

FRIDAY, JUNE 24

Seminar introduction

Aims, self-introduction

HAN Nataly Jung-Hwa and Dr. Rita ZOBEL

SATURDAY, JUNE 25

Pre-seminar

Cultural flower

Change of perspectives

Anti-bias

Trust-building

Working group formation

SUNDAY, JUNE 26

City tour in Wrocław

Travel by ›culture train‹ from Wrocław to Berlin



GERMANY / POTSDAM

MONDAY, JUNE 27

Welcome and information about Robert Bosch Stiftung

Julian HERMANN, *Robert Bosch Stiftung*

Introduction into the expert seminar

Terms, definitions, trends

Dr. Gudrun WACKER, *German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin*

Reflection on Migration in History – Europe

Prof. Dr. Christian JOPPKE, *University of Bern / Expert Advice Council on Migration and Integration*

Reflection on Migration in History and Today – China

Dr. Gudrun WACKER, *SWP, Berlin*

TUESDAY, JUNE 28

Migration policies of Korea: integration and exclusion

Sagang KIM, *Solidarity with Migrants, Busan*

Migration to Japan

Prof. LIU-FARRER Gracia, *Waseda University, Tokyo*

European migration policies and the EU

Prof. Dr. Christian JOPPKE, *University of Bern*



WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29

Integration of ethnic minorities in European countries

Prof. Dr. Christian JOPPKE, *University of Bern*

Seminar at Robert Bosch Stiftung, Berlin Representative Office

Migration and inclusion - civil society activities in Germany

Julia SONNTAG, *Robert Bosch Stiftung*

Anti-discrimination politics in Germany

Olaf BRUHN, *Anti-discrimination Agency*

Public Panel Discussion at taz-café

Migration, and integration in East Asia and Europe – same, same, but different

Christian JAKOB, *taz, Berlin*

Sagang KIM, *Solidarity with Migrants, Busan*

Ndieg Marius TRESOR, *Activist, Berlin*

Chair: Dr. Gudrun WACKER, *SWP, Berlin*



THURSDAY, JUNE 30

Germany as a ›postmigrant‹ society: belonging and identity

Dr. Sina ARNOLD, *Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BIM) at the Humboldt University of Berlin*

Visit of NGO ›Women in Exile‹ in the House of Brandenburg Refugee Council

Situation for Women in Refugee Camps

Talk with founder Ms. Elizabeth NGARI

Movie: »Becoming German« (»Werden Sie Deutscher«)

Documentary from Britt BEYER

Discussion with Sunju CHOI, *korientation, Berlin*

FRIDAY, JULY 1

Plenum on Integration policy

Guided city tour on »Refugees in historical perspective«

by Tobias ALLERS

SATURDAY, JULY 2

Visit to Marienfelde Refugee Center Museum

Testimonial of a refugee from East- to West-Germany

FRANCE / STRASBOURG

Alumni only seminar from July 1 to 3

Joint seminar of participants and alumni, July 3 to 6

FRIDAY, JULY 1

Alumni only

Introduction of alumni seminar with joint dinner

SATURDAY, JULY 2

Alumni only

Introduction and self-introductions

Lucia CHAUVET, Yann Werner PRELL

Alumni Morning Session

Moderator: Damien PELADAN / Minutes: Shio OHTOMO

Reconciliation Prospects in Northeast Asia: Elite Narratives and Agency

Ingvild BODE

The brief history of modern money

KATSUMATA Yu

Alumni Afternoon Session I

Moderator: Bora KIM / Minutes: Marta JAWORSKA

Writing back from the Center: Japanese Intellectuals in the United States of America, ca. 1900

Mathias RAETHER

Media representation of refugees

SUH Hanna

Alumni Afternoon Session II

Staying in touch, EPRIE Alumni Efforts and Bosch Alumni Center

Yann Werner PRELL

Staying in touch (Moderator: Yann Werner PRELL)

Publishing our work (Moderator: Mathias RAETHER)

Wrap-Up: Group Presentations

SUNDAY, JULY 3

Alumni only

Alumni Morning Session

Moderator: Anna-Sophie KIEPE

Refugees in China: Jewish refugees in Shanghai 1938-41 in comparison to the present situation in the PRC

Peter KESSELBURG

Religious persecution as a cause of flight: Immigration of Yazidi Kurds to Germany

Ali ÖZDAKAK

Visit to Lieu d'Europe

Meeting of Alumni and participants

Self-introductions and joint dinner with participants and alumni

MONDAY, JULY 4

Joint seminar of participants and alumni

Plenum with introduction of joint seminar

Nationality and Citizenship - Voting rights in France

Catherine de WENDEN, *Sciences Po, The National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)*

Visit to the Council of Europe**Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons**

Ms. Penelope DENU, *Deputy to the Head of the Secretariat*

Intercultural Cities Program (ICC)

Ivana D'ALESSANDRO, *Project Officer*

TUESDAY, JULY 5

Joint seminar of participants and alumni

Visit to the European Parliament

Listen to the debate on BREXIT**European responses to the current refugee situation-Joint European migration policy?**

Talk with MEP Sylvia-Yvonne KAUFMANN, *Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats*

Visit to ARTE

Talk about Migration and integration in Europe - Germany, Poland, France

Talk with Mr. Uwe Lothar MÜLLER, *Editor*

WEDNESDAY, JULY 6

Evaluation

Plenum

Farewell Lunch

ORGANIZER



Contact: EPRIE, c/o KOREA VERBAND
Rostocker Str. 33, 10553 Berlin / Germany
Telephone: (0049) 30 39 83 72 98
www.eprie.net, info@eprie.net

COOPERATION WITH



FURTHER SUPPORT



ASYLUM MIGRATION INTEGRATION

similar challenges, different patterns

Exchange Program for Regional Integration
in East Asia and Europe

EPRIE 2016



Photo: Lim Suna





Photo: Lim Suna



REPORT ON EPRIE 2016 ALUMNI MEETING

STRASBOURG, 1 – 6 JULY 2016



Photo: Lim Suna

During the EPRIE 2016 Program conducted in Europe, an annual Alumni seminar took place in Strasbourg, France. Fourteen alumni who participated in the program consecutively since it began in 2012 met on 1 July in Centre Culturel Saint Thomas in Strasbourg. Before the participants joined in on 3 July, six alumni presented their research results and discussed them with their colleagues. Together with this year's participants, they discussed the topic ›Asylum, migration, and integration – similar challenges, different patterns‹ and also established an inter-year networking opportunity. On 6 July, the Alumni meeting and EPRIE 2016 were adjourned.

THE ALUMNI MEETING

During the first two and a half days, the Alumni from EPRIE 2012 (three persons), 2013 (two persons), 2014 (four persons), and 2015 (five persons) presented their research in three sessions with two presenters each. In the first session Dr. Ingvild Bode discussed some

of the results of her study on ›Reconciliation Prospects in Northeast Asia: Elite Narratives and Agency‹, conducted in Germany and Japan along with her fellow colleague at the University of Kent. The second speaker was Katsumata Yu who lectured about ›The Brief History of Modern Money‹, bringing some interesting facts and thoughts into the contemporary approach to economy and money itself.

In the second session, Mathias Raether introduced his doctoral thesis on how Japan was shown in the West by the Japanese themselves in his presentation entitled: ›Writing back from the Center: Japanese Intellectuals

in the United States of America, ca. 1900‹. This talk was followed by one from Suh Hannah who discussed the ›Media Representation of Refugees‹. She focused especially on media appearances by North Korean refugees in South Korean media.

The third session contained a presentation by Peter Kesselburg about the situation of refugees in China. He showed a glimpse of the Chinese refugee policy using the history of the ›Jewish refugees in Shanghai 1938-1941 in comparison to the present situation in the People's Republic of China‹. Lastly, Ali Oezdakak presented research on the topic ›Religious persecution as a cause of flight: Immigration of Yazidi Kurds to Germany‹. He showed the interesting history of Yazidi Kurds and discussed some of the reasons for their immigration/escape from their own country.

The Alumni session also contained a presentation by Yann Werner Prell on the ›Alumni Efforts‹ and the establishment of the Bosch

Alumni Center in Berlin by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. The alumni concluded with the session ›Staying in touch‹ and with future plans for the Alumni Association. New regional representatives were chosen as ambassadors who will organize smaller regional meetings by the next annual meeting in 2017. Additionally, Katsumata Yu was congratulated since he organized the most regional meetings of the alumni in Tokyo over the course of the past year.

The meeting was also a wonderful opportunity to see old friends and meet new ones and to spend some quality time outside the lectures. The EURO Cup 2016 in France was a nice reminder for some of EPRIE 2014 alumni since the World Cup was underway in Brazil during the 2014 meeting.

ALUMNI MEETING PARTICIPANTS

On July 3, the alumni and the participants of EPRIE 2016 finally met. This was a joyful meeting, a joint dinner concluded the evening and first impressions were developed into an even broader network of connections around the world. On the following two days, both groups held meetings and discussions with experts on the topic of Asylum, migration and integration, with Rita Zobel and Han Nataly Jung-Hwa as the organizers of the program.

The first lecture was conducted with professor Catherine Withol de Wenden (The National Center for Scientific Research, Sciences Po) who presented the history of ›Nationality and Citizenship – Voting rights in France‹ which was greatly enjoyed and welcomed with a number of questions from the European participants. The Asian participants in particular drew comparisons to the policies in South-East Asian countries. In a following visit to the Council of Europe, strategies for developing diverse cities were discussed with officials from the Intercultural Cities (ICC) program and the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons. Particularly the ICC program was met with great interest as a tool for integrating migrants into new communities in cities around the world.

On the 5 July, EPRIE 2016 visited the European Parliament and got a glimpse of the discussion on BREXIT, followed by a meeting with Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament) who, together with the participants, discussed the result of the British referendum and the joint European migration policy. The talk with her showed how complex the current situation of migrants and refugees and the policy of the European Union is and how difficult it is to find joint solutions. The last afternoon of the program contained a visit to the ARTE studio in Strasbourg where the participants were able to gain insight into the journalistic trade in Germany and France by watching

a documentary about the situation of refugees in the ›Jungle‹ of Calais, a camp at the major ferry port in northern France, and had a discussion about the media's role in the debate over refugees and migration.

CONCLUSION

During the last day of the program, both the participants and alumni joined for the evaluation part at Centre Culturel Saint Thomas. They summarized the program, the participants discussed their ›Memorandum‹ and were able to listen to the outcomes of the Alumni Meeting. All of the participants were welcomed to join the Alumni Association, the contact list and invitations to regional meetings in Europe and Asia, according to their places of residence.

The connection network was renewed not only with the newest members of EPRIE ›family‹ but also with the new meetings of the alumni from previous EPRIE programs who were able to get to know each other and extend their connections, as well as plans for the future events, like conferences, joint publications or exchange of ideas and thoughts. With the next Alumni Meeting in Asia during EPRIE 2017 on the horizon, hopes are high that there will be an even bigger alumni group and better understanding and cooperation between the representatives of the six participant countries. EPRIE program will be reaching out to make a change while discussing each topic, starting with nations, nationalism, identity, asylum, migration and integration issues with the decision-making agents at local and higher governmental levels.



Marta JAWORSKA is a PhD student in the Department of History at the University of Gdansk in Poland. She is a graduate of cultural anthropology and archeology at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, specializing in Japanese culture, particularly traditional customs and rituals, funeral rites and the cult of the dead. Currently she is preparing a dissertation connecting the issue of nationalism in Japan and its markers visible in cultivating traditions. She participated in EPRIE 2014 and took part in the alumni meeting in Seoul 2015 and in Strasbourg 2016.

MEMORANDUM

in Chinese

备忘录——差异性中的共性

导言

EPRIE 2016年的主题是：庇护，移民和融合——同样的挑战，不同的模式。由于难民持续地进入欧洲，本届项目选择在波兰、德国和法国进行。在这里，我们参观了一些帮助难民和管理移民的组织和机构，和这个领域的专家进行讨论，并且对比了欧洲和东亚国家在难民和移民问题上的态度和政策。

这个主题与我们参与者自身也有关，不仅因为我们本身的学习和工作，更是因为许多参与者本身有移民的经历，面临过融入一个新国家的挑战。尽管所讨论的主题十分复杂，而且参与者来自六个不同的国家，每个人有着不同的经历，我们仍然对移民管理的现状和如何去改善现状存在相似的观点。

本篇备忘录记录了这些观点。首先，详细介绍中国、日本、韩国和欧洲对待移民的态度的现状。第二，强调这些国家和区域之间合作和交流的重要性。第三，我们建议这种合作最好是通过把权力从国家层次转向全球和地方层次。最后，本篇备忘录进一步探讨地方自主性对融合政策的成功的重要性。由此我们得出的结论是，要呼吁区域合作和继续交换观念。

各地区对待移民的态度

中国、日本和韩国的移民政策是国家层面决定的。虽然欧盟有统一的庇护系统，然而各成员国对于移民和融合也有各自的政策。总体来说，中国、日本、韩国和欧洲这四个地区移民政策的相似点是鼓励高技能人才移民，对低技能人才移民持谨慎态度。对于其他形式的移民政策有所不同，比如说韩国鼓励婚姻移民，然而在欧洲则相反。另外，中日韩三国接收难民的态度不如欧洲积极，但是欧洲各国接收难民的意愿也参差不齐。

随着工业化、城市化的进程，因为中国东西部劳动力不均衡，中国正在经历规模庞大的内部移民。总体来说，中国政府至今还没有就难民安置进行立法，尽管目前有很多来自越南、缅甸、叙利亚和非洲国家的难民正生活在中国。中国政府和联合国难民署共同协作，根据1982年签署难民地位公约后落实的“出入境条例”临时接收了许多难民。尽管如此，目前在中国依然没有有效的融合政策。作为世界第二大经济体，在未来中国必须在解决难民危机扮演更重要的决策。同样在日本也没有官方的移民政策来鼓励移民融入日本社会。然而，在社区层面，地方政府已经尝试了很多融合政策来支持移民，滨松市就是一个很好的例子。滨松市是日本移民人口最多的城市之一，特别是拉丁美洲的移民。市政府加入了“跨文化城市”的全球网络，“跨文化城市”项目由欧洲理事会组织，认为外国人带来的文化多样性是城市的资源而不是威胁。滨松市利用其文化多样性来吸引海外的游客并且提供商业合作的信息。而且，政府帮助移民在新领域择业来扩大工作范围和激活城市，比如护理和农业。

韩国2013年通过了难民法案，成为了亚洲第一个拥有难民保护法案的国家。然而，韩国接收难民和庇护的比例依然很低，远低于经合组织的其他国家。大量的移民在临时工作移民框架下来到韩国，只允许工作四年十个月，更新许可后有可能再获得同样的工作时间。尽管有的移民已经居住韩国十年，但是他们不可能定居下来并且带家人团聚。另一方面，政府鼓励来自东南亚的女性婚姻移民，对于她们的政策主要关注在融入社会，并扮演好作为妻子、母亲和儿媳的角色。

尽管欧盟的的庇护系统统一规定了庇护程序和接收条件，明确了处理庇护的责任和满足国际保护的条件，但是各成员国落实政策存在很大不同。当下的难民危机更凸显了各成员国的差异，有的成员国相比其他国家接收了大量难民。尽管接收了一些难民，然后实际上欧盟的政策是限制难民。边境巡逻、围栏、签证政策、制裁、驱逐出境等一系列措施都旨在控制进入和留住欧盟的难民。

除了欧盟法律，所有成员国都有各自的移民法律，比如德国在近期修



正法案不鼓励进一步移民。有趣的是，德国过去的政策对于其所缺乏的融合政策做出了许多努力。西德曾依赖没有定居下来的移民来弥补劳动市场的短缺。在上世纪五六十年代，德国雇佣了大量来自意大利、土耳其、希腊、西班牙、葡萄牙、前南斯拉夫、摩洛哥和突尼斯的工人。许多工人带来了家庭并永久留在了德国。然而，直到上世纪九十年代末，政府政策都旨在减少新来的劳动力人口而不是融合他们。许多在九十年代来到德国寻求庇护者和被遣返者至今仍然被要求融入主流社会。德国用了五十年时间才接收了其依赖移民的事实，目前仍要讨论这迟来的认识的意义和后果。最近一次是在2007年政府开始发展融合政策。这个疏忽导致第二代第三代移民很难获得高等教育和高技能职位，并且导致目前对于已经持有德国公民身份移民的歧视。几年前，德国曾辩论过融合和包含以及“欢迎文化”。逐步人们意识到融合并不意味着同化，融合也并非单向。

地区间合作与交流

上述移民政策的一部分表明，历史也会重演；韩国，中国和日本很可能犯下德国半个多世纪前所犯的一样错误。同时也有值得重复应用

的经验；比如欧洲在民族融合这一点上，就有可以借鉴东亚国家的经验。本节将探讨如何加强欧洲和亚洲国家之间的合作和交流，以避免错误的历史重演，以及尝试寻找解决目前的欧洲难民“危机”的更好的着手点。

中国、日本和韩国可以借鉴德国的经验，妥善接收外国工人同时有益于被接收的外国工人以及其接收社会。外国工人被接收并被允许永久停留，将有助于他们为东道国的长期经济发展做贡献，成为市民社会的宝贵成员。很显然，德国和其他欧洲国家，在民族融合方面也可以借鉴东亚国家的经验。来自其它亚洲国家的移民由于拥有相似的文化和外形而很容易被韩国和日本社会所接受并包容，他们被称为“地区内部移民”。而当前的欧洲移民问题主要是由“区域外部移民”造成的，他们的文化和宗教与本地居民是非常不同的。当地的人口。东亚的经验表明，熟悉对方的文化是创造一个不同群体之间的相互理解的关键。因此，整合不能只是一个片面的过程，而必须着眼于包容，比如新移民和当地人之间的相互学习等。东道国社会也必须做出改变，变得更具包容性。在如今欧洲难民“危机”不断升温，反难民情绪高涨的背景之下，这是一个重要的发现。跨文化的开放可

ASYLUM MIGRATION INTEGRATION

similar challenges, different patterns



以帮助减少文化间隔阂和政策性挑战，以创建一个没有歧视和保证移民平等参与的社会。包容是基于人的尊严的普遍价值，它强调每个人都能成为社会的平等的一部分。

在移民的接受和管理问题上，东亚和欧洲之间的合作与交流是彼此的经验、想法和探讨最佳措施的重要交换过程，想法和最佳实践的处理和管理的迁移。从彼此身上学习经验与教训，有助于我们防止错误并提出新的解决方法。

权力的分散

正如前文所述，当前的移民政策几乎都是由国家来制定的。承认并接受移民，长期来说对国家和移民可能都有好处，但即便如此，国家经常对移民采取排斥的态度。然而，通过加强国家与国际社会的协作，以及赋予地方社区更多的权力，可以分散国家的权力，从而改变现状。

在当前的难民或移民问题上的讨论，欧洲内部面临着极大的分裂。这个问题被错误地称为“难民危机”，但是将其称为“治理危机”更为合适，因为民族国家缺乏解决这个挑战的能力。一方面，民族国家是保卫边境，执行都柏林协定¹与国际法，同时也是执行国内难民庇护和移民融合法律的主要力量。另一方面，民族国家又很明显的难以恰当地解决全球难民或移民问题。尤其是，欧盟—土耳其协议更显示出了民族国家占据主导性权力的危险。这个协议迫使难民选择危险的地中海通道——从2000年之后有超过20000名难民死在这里²——而不是通过飞机等更安全的途径，因此在多方面践踏了人权。国家掌握权力却在处理问题上出现政治失败，故有必要把权力从国家层面转换到地方以及全球层面上。

在全球层面上，国际组织比民族国家更能代表全球合作的价值，因为民族国家的利益与这些价值相冲突。因此，难民的安置应该在全球层面决策与执行，比如在国际移民组织（IOM）和联合国难民署（UNHCR）

的监督指导下。在这种权力转移下，治理危机可以通过提供安全的飞机飞行路线解决，不仅在欧洲如此，在其他地区包括亚洲也是如此。在地方层面上，城市与公民社会起着特殊的作用。比如说，巴塞罗那，莱斯博斯和蓝佩杜萨的市长就达成了一个直接救济难民的协议，从而避开了国家的官僚干涉。当国家倚靠都柏林协定来推卸责任的时候，城市必须承担起这个责任并且直接得到国际资金的援助。如果当地议会决定收容一定数量的难民的话，国家法律应是无法禁止的。公民社会行为体必须参与如难民的分散等协商议程。具体地说，公民社会行为体可以充当难民与国家的桥梁，以此来通过各种方式去达到改善难民状况的目的。此外，他们可以把难民的声音反映给国家，从而帮助国家制定政策。举例来说，当大量集中住宿带来难民的人权问题时，公民社会活动者们可以主张保护难民的人权，然后说服国家关注这个问题，并影响其最终决策。因此，很有必要把公民社会行为体与难民加入到决策过程中。城市与公民社会行为体的互动将给予难民更多的力量。为了使城市与公民社会行为体能够发挥更重要的作用，需要给他们更多的权力和经济支持。

自下而上的融合：自我赋权

把支持和权力转移到市民社会和地方性组织可以促进移民融合的进程。因为融合是一个多层面的进程，需要用多种不同的组织和方法去应对不同类型的移民的不同需要。

在本次项目中，我们参观了许多跟移民相关的组织，还参加了几次与移民融合相关的活动。在这个过程中，我们需要去理解“自我赋权”这个概念，从而加深对融合，以及对今年EPRIE项目主题的理解。除了教育接收国的社会民众以外，融合也可以通过不同行为体之间的合作和提供充分的自下而上的方式，如赋予自我组织的群体权力来实现。可是，这些方式通常都被忽视，缺乏对它们的关注度。

我们拜访了一个自我组织的群体“流亡的妇女”，它是女性难民2002年在勃兰登堡建立的，致力于为女性难民争取权利的组织。从这些女性难民的经历中可以看出，女性难民受到双重歧视，除了来自种族主义和对难民的一般性歧视外，她们还受到性别歧视。这个非政府组织在2011年建立“流亡的妇女&朋友”，以此来扩大他们与那些没有难民背景但是坚决地支持女性难民的人的网络。他们一起发起一个名为“没有提供给女性的营地！就废除所有的营地！”（No Lager for Women! Abolish all Lagers!）的活动。在现实的政策中，他

¹ 都柏林协定规定了欧盟国家审查寻求庇护者的责任。多数情况下，负责审查的都是寻求庇护者进入的第一个国家，因此也就给了像意大利和希腊等欧盟边境国家更多的责任。

² 参考国际移民组织“Fatal Journeys (IOM 2014)” <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf> 12.

们致力于废除所有关于歧视庇护寻求者和移民的法律，废除和种族主义和性别歧视相关的法律。他们还致力于赋予女性难民权力，通过帮助她们获得更多关于获取合法地位，工作机会，健康等的信息，以此来改善她们的现状。同时还告知大众，女性难民生活在不人道的环境下。这个非政府组织还致力于解决那些经常被忽略，但尤其是女性难民会遭遇的困难，从而为这些女性难民提供她们所需要的特定帮助。还有其他一些这样的组织和倡议，都是为了改善移民或难民融合新社会的情况。自我组织的群体，通过自下而上的方式让移民或难民获得权力，去改善和制定政策。更进一步，这些群体可以作为政府、政府间组织和大众之间的中介。赋予权力的概念基于以下理念：给对应的行为体提供更多信息，技术，资源，权威，机会和积极性，同时让他们对自身的行为负责，这样有助于他们自己去做决定、解决困难和改善自己的状况。简单而言，它增强了人们和团体的自主性和自决权，从而让他们根据自身的意愿，以一种负责任和自决的方式去代表自己的利益。赋权作为一种行动，指的是自我赋权和获得人们的专业支持的过程，帮助他们消除无力感和增加影响力，让他们认识到现有的资源和机会并最终使用它。

尽管自下而上的倡议很重要，但是他们无法提供所有的保护，尤其是在紧急情况时。因此，一些自上而下的项目也同样是必要的。例如，由联合国难民署（UNHCR）发起，联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）倡导的，保护在欧洲流动的儿童和家庭的“蓝点基地”（Blue Dot Hubs）项目。为这些基地提供支持的21个孩子和他们的家庭被称为“蓝点”（Blue Dots），他们为移民或难民儿童和他们的家庭提供一个安全的环境，在这个地点里包括必要的生活设施，儿童玩耍的场地，保护

和提供咨询。这些基地旨在为那些在移动中比较脆弱的家庭提供保护，尤其是许多无人看管或者与家人分开的小孩，他们面临着疾病，心理创伤，暴力，被剥削和拐卖的危险。这些基地位于具有地理战略意义的位置，比如出入境地点，登记处，一些城市的中心，同时也有一些流动的基地。这些服务包括重建家庭的联系，家庭团聚，提供儿童空间和母婴室，心理帮助，法律咨询，还有社会工作者和可连接无线网络的信息台。

总而言之，对赋权给难民和移民的自我组织群体的支持，是在融合的进程中不可或缺的角色。但是，还有许多的困难需要克服和重新思考。我们如何可以影响上层决策者？我们如何克服严格的官僚体系？如何资助那些自我组织的群体？我们如何才能引起接收国的社会对移民或难民的关注？问题远不止这些，但可以确定的是，我们需要采取行动去改变和改善现状。在全球社会中，市民的责任正在上升，每个人都可以促进市民社会的参与，鼓励市民社会去达到我们的目标，一起建立一个更具包容性的社会。

结论

庇护和移民的管理，以及融合政策的实施必须要有共同的努力。在EPRIE2016年的项目中，来自六个不同国家的年轻的专业人士在交流中探讨出新的方法。我们相互学习，这种宝贵的交流表明，解决问题需要交流与合作。由此看来，由庇护、移民和融合带来的挑战可以被管理好，所出现的新的模式会在未来得到检验。



Photo: Lim Suna



MEMORANDUM

in French

MÉMORANDUM – UNITÉ DANS LA DIVERSITÉ

INTRODUCTION

EPRIE 2016 s'engage dans des problématiques spécifiques: asile, migration et l'intégration- défis similaires, modèles différents. Avec l'afflux constant de réfugiés en Europe, le programme s'est tenu d'abord en Pologne, puis en Allemagne et enfin en France; un séjour pendant lequel nous avons pu visiter des organisations et des institutions impliquées dans l'aide aux réfugiés et la gestion des migrations, discuté avec des experts à ce propos et comparé les attitudes avec ceux de l'Asie de l'Est.

Nous avons trouvé le sujet pertinent, non seulement parce que nous sommes engagés dans cette thématique dans nos études ou dans nos

vies professionnelles, mais aussi parce que beaucoup de participants ont eu une expérience personnelle sur le sujet et ont fait face à des problèmes d'intégration dans leur pays. Malgré la spécificité de nos expériences, la complexité du sujet et le fait que nous venions de six pays différents, nous avons en grande partie des avis similaires sur l'état actuel de gouvernance de migration, ainsi que des idées semblables sur les solutions à y apporter.

Ce mémorandum énonce certaines de ces idées. D'abord, il décrit l'état de fait actuel en détaillant les comportements envers les migrants en Chine, au Japon, en Corée et en Europe. Ensuite, il met en évidence l'importance de la coopération et le networking dans ces pays avant de suggérer l'idée que la coopération sera d'autant meilleure que le pouvoir de l'État-Nation est décentralisé, à la fois à une échelle mondiale et au niveau local. Enfin, le mémorandum porte une importance particulière envers des initiatives locales pour une intégration réussie. Nous concluons avec un appel à la coopération et un échange continu d'idées.

COMPORTEMENTS RÉGIONAUX VIS-À-VIS DES MIGRANTS

Les politiques d'immigration en Chine, au Japon et en Corée sont décidées au niveau de l'État-Nation. L'Union Européenne (UE) a un



système d'asile commun. Cependant, les États membres de l'Union mènent leurs propres politiques sur les sujets de migration et d'intégration. En général, les politiques d'immigration de la Chine, du Japon, de la Corée du Sud et de l'Europe sont semblables en ce que les quatre pays encouragent l'exode des cerveaux et se méfient de la migration peu qualifiée. On observe toutefois quelques différences quant à d'autres formes de migration comme par exemple la migration via le mariage qui est activement encouragée en Corée, mais découragée en Europe. De plus, la Chine, le Japon et la Corée du Sud sont plus réticents que l'Europe à accueillir des réfugiés, même s'il convient de reconnaître que la volonté de procéder ainsi varie fortement d'un pays européen à l'autre.

La Chine subit une migration interne massive de type « rurale-urbaine » en raison du développement industriel, entraînant ainsi un accroissement de la population urbaine et des déséquilibres entre l'est et l'ouest du pays. Jusqu'à présent, le gouvernement chinois n'a pas agi pour légiférer sur l'implantation de réfugiés, malgré la forte présence de populations provenant du Vietnam, du Myanmar, de la Syrie et des divers pays africains. Le gouvernement chinois a travaillé en collaboration avec le Haut Commissaire aux Réfugiés des Nations Unies (le HCNUR) et a temporairement accepté ceux-ci selon « la Loi d'Administration d'Entrée et de Sortie » qu'il a promulgué après la signature de la Convention touchant au Statut de Réfugiés en 1982. En dépit de cela, une politique d'intégration efficace est toujours en instance d'adoption en Chine. Étant la deuxième plus grande économie

mondiale, la Chine doit jouer un rôle plus important dans la résolution des crises des réfugiés dans le futur.

Il en va de même au Japon, où il n'existe aucune politique d'immigration officielle pour encourager les migrants à s'intégrer dans la société japonaise. Cependant, au niveau communautaire, plusieurs tentatives par des administrations locales ont vu le jour dans le but de soutenir les migrants via des politiques d'intégration. La ville de Hamamatsu, qui comprend une des plus grandes populations

de migrants, particulièrement d'origine latino-américaine, est un exemple d'une telle tentative au niveau local. La ville elle-même fait partie d'un réseau mondial d'inclusion appelé « Cités interculturelles », un programme développé par le Conseil de l'Europe dans lequel la diversité culturelle est considérée comme une source de vitalité plutôt qu'une menace. Hamamatsu utilise sa réputation de diversité sociale pour attirer des touristes du monde entier et développe ainsi des marchés en fournissant des informations sur des opportunités économiques liées à divers groupes ethniques. Ils aident de surcroît les migrants dans la recherche de postes dans de nouveaux domaines comme les soins infirmiers ou l'agriculture afin de diversifier leurs compétences, et à dynamiser la ville.

La Corée du Sud a adopté une loi sur les réfugiés en 2013 et est devenue le premier pays asiatique à avoir une loi indépendante pour la protection de ces derniers. Cependant, le pourcentage de réfugiés et de demandeurs d'asile acceptés en Corée du Sud a jusqu'à présent été très bas, bien plus que dans d'autres pays faisant partie de l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économique (OCDE). Un grand nombre de travailleurs migrants viennent en Corée du Sud sous la coupe du plan de travailleur migrant temporaire, où on leur permet dans un premier temps de rester quatre ans et dix mois avec la possibilité de faire rééditer leur permis pendant la même période. Bien que vivant en Corée du Sud depuis une dizaine d'années, ils n'ont pas la possibilité de s'installer ou d'amener leurs familles. En outre, la Corée du Sud encourage de nombreuses femmes d'Asie du

Sud-Est à venir s'établir dans le pays par voie de mariage. Les politiques vis-à-vis de celles-ci se focalisent surtout sur leur intégration dans la société et exigent d'elles d'accomplir leur rôle de femmes, de mères et de belles-filles.

Malgré le Système Commun d'Asile Européen qui régule les procédures d'asile et les conditions d'accueil, qui répartit la responsabilité de traiter des réclamations d'asile et qui détermine ceux qui sont qualifiés à recevoir la protection internationale, il reste des différences énormes au niveau de son application au sein des États membres de l'UE. La crise actuelle de réfugiés met aussi en évidence des inégalités entre les États membres, et ce, dans le fait que certains accueillent un nombre de réfugiés beaucoup plus grand que d'autres. En dépit de cette prise en charge des réfugiés, la politique de migration de l'UE est, en fait, plutôt dissuasive. Les patrouilles de frontière, les barrières, les politiques de visa, les sanctions de transporteurs, l'expulsion et autres mesures similaires visent à contrôler qui entre et qui reste dans l'UE.

Outre les lois de l'UE, chaque État membre possède sa propre législation en matière d'immigration, et certaines, comme par exemple en Allemagne, ont récemment été modifiées pour décourager de nouvelles migrations. Il est intéressant de noter que l'Allemagne est un pays qui ressent encore les effets des politiques passées - ou plutôt leur absence - particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'intégration. L'Allemagne de l'Ouest a compté sur la migration sans implantation pour palier au manque de son marché du travail. L'Allemagne a recruté des travailleurs d'Italie, de Turquie, de Grèce, d'Espagne, du Portugal, de l'ancienne Yougoslavie, du Maroc et de la Tunisie dans les années 1950 et 60. Beaucoup d'entre eux ont été rejoints par leurs familles pour s'installer en Allemagne de manière permanente. Cependant, jusqu'à la fin des années 1990, les politiques gouvernementales ont visé à réduire le nombre de nouveaux venus plutôt que de les intégrer. Il a pourtant été demandé à de nombreux demandeurs d'asile et rapatriés tardifs arrivés en Allemagne au cours des années 1990 de s'assimiler à la société majoritaire. Il a fallu plus de 50 ans à l'Allemagne pour accepter le fait que le pays dépend de l'immigration, et il lui en a encore à discuter de la signification et des conséquences de cette révélation tardive. Ce n'est qu'en 2007 que le gouvernement a commencé à élaborer des politiques en matière d'intégration. Cette omission a conduit, par exemple, à ce que les deuxièmes et troisièmes générations de migrants soit moins susceptibles d'atteindre l'enseignement supérieur et les emplois qualifiés, mais aussi à une discrimination permanente des «migrants» même s'ils détiennent la nationalité allemande. Il y a quelques années, l'Allemagne a eu un débat sur l'intégration face à l'inclusion mais aussi à propos d'une «culture d'accueil». Petit à petit se développe l'idée qu'intégration ne signifie pas assimilation et que ce n'est pas une voie à sens unique.

COOPÉRATION ET NETWORKING

Une partie des politiques d'immigration ci-dessus suggèrent que l'histoire se répète; La Chine, la Corée du Sud et le Japon sont sur le point de commettre les mêmes erreurs que l'Allemagne il y a un peu plus d'un demi-siècle. Toutefois, certaines expériences valent la peine d'être répétées; l'Europe peut par exemple tirer des enseignements des pays d'Asie du Sud en matière d'intégration. La présente section montre comment la coopération et la mise en réseau entre l'Europe et l'Asie peuvent aider à éviter de faire les mêmes erreurs une nouvelle fois et comment il serait possible de mieux aborder l'actuelle crise de réfugiés en Europe.

La Chine, le Japon et la Corée peuvent apprendre de l'expérience allemande que l'intégration de travailleurs étrangers est plus bénéfique à la fois pour les travailleurs et pour la société d'accueil. Les travailleurs qui sont intégrés et qui sont autorisés à rester en résidence, contribueront au développement économique à long terme de leur pays d'accueil et deviendront des membres précieux de la société civile. De manière significative, l'Allemagne, et d'autres pays d'Europe de manière plus générale, peuvent également apprendre de l'expérience asiatique de l'intégration des migrants. Les migrants qui sont autorisés à résider de façon permanente en Corée du Sud et au Japon peuvent s'adapter facilement en raison d'une apparence et une culture communes. Les migrants dans ces pays viennent principalement d'autres pays d'Asie, en raison de la «migration régionale interne», alors qu'en Europe, on trouve essentiellement des «migrants de régions externes», dont la culture et la religion sont différentes de celles de la population locale.

Néanmoins, l'expérience en Asie de l'Est montre que la familiarité avec la culture des autres est la clé de la création d'une compréhension entre les différents groupes de personnes. Ainsi, l'intégration ne peut pas être un processus à sens unique, mais doit viser l'inclusion, comme une situation dans laquelle les nouveaux arrivants et la population locale apprennent les uns des autres. La société d'accueil doit également changer et devenir plus inclusive. Cette constatation est importante compte tenu de la montée d'un sentiment anti-réfugié accompagnant la crise européenne actuelle. L'ouverture interculturelle peut aider à réduire les obstacles et défier les politiques et les cultures qui créent la discrimination et empêchent les migrants de prendre une part équitable au sein de la société. L'inclusion est basée sur la valeur universelle de la dignité humaine et souligne l'appartenance à la société.

La coopération et la mise en réseau entre l'Asie de l'Est et l'Europe est importante pour un échange d'expériences, d'idées et de meilleures pratiques dans le traitement et la gestion de la migration. Tirer les leçons les uns des autres permettrait d'éviter de commettre des erreurs et mais aussi de présenter de nouvelles approches.

DÉCENTRALISATION DU POUVOIR

Comme le démontrent les paragraphes précédents, la politique migratoire est presque exclusivement décidée au niveau de l'État-Nation. Les États-Nations sont souvent réticents à l'admission et à l'intégration des migrants, même si un engagement à long terme pourrait être bénéfique à la fois pour le pays d'accueil et les migrants eux-mêmes. Toutefois, il serait possible de parvenir à une décentralisation du pouvoir dans le domaine de la migration, en prenant compte la coopération entre les États-Nations d'un point de vue global et en transférant le pouvoir aux communautés locales.

L'Europe est confrontée à un débat très polarisé à propos des mouvements actuels des migrants / réfugiés, qu'ils ont nommé à tort une «crise migratoire». Le terme approprié est «crise de gouvernance» en raison de l'incapacité des États-Nations à relever les défis qui en découlent. L'État-Nation est, d'une part, l'acteur principal responsable qui possède le plus de pouvoir en matière de protection des frontières, la mise en œuvre du règlement de Dublin, ainsi que les lois nationales d'asile et d'intégration. D'autre part, le concept de l'État-Nation est manifestement en conflit avec le flux de réfugiés/migrants mondiaux d'une façon adéquate. Par exemple, l'accord UE-Turquie souligne les dangers d'un déséquilibre des forces en faveur de l'État-Nation. À défaut de fournir des transports aériens sécurisés, cet accord politique conduit à diverses violations des droits de l'homme et force les réfugiés à prendre une fois de plus les routes les plus dangereuses par la mer Méditerranée, au cours de laquelle, depuis l'an 2000, plus de 22 000 réfugiés ont connu la mort. De cette contradiction entre la possession du pouvoir et l'échec politique, il est nécessaire de décentraliser le pouvoir depuis l'État-Nation vers un niveau local aussi bien qu'au niveau global/mondial.

À l'échelle mondiale, les institutions internationales peuvent représenter de façon plus crédible les valeurs de la solidarité mondiale que les États-Nations, dont l'intérêt personnel va en l'encontre de ces dernières. Par conséquent, la répartition des réfugiés devrait être définie et contrôlée au niveau mondial, par exemple, sous les auspices de l'Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM) et du HCNUR. Sur la base de ce changement de puissance, la crise de la gouvernance pourrait être résolue en fournissant des itinéraires aériens sécurisés, non seulement en Europe mais aussi dans d'autres pays, notamment en Asie.

Au niveau local, un rôle particulier est attribué aux villes et à la société civile. Par exemple, les maires de Barcelone, Lesbos et Lampedusa ont adopté un accord d'assistance directe aux réfugiés afin de contourner la machinerie bureaucratique des traités nationaux. Alors que les États-Nations se cachent derrière le règlement de Dublin et fuient leurs responsabilités, les villes doivent assumer cette responsabilité

et obtenir le soutien direct des fonds mondiaux. Si un conseil local décide d'accueillir un certain nombre de réfugiés, il se peut qu'il n'y ait aucune loi nationale empêchant cela. Les acteurs de la société civile doivent être intégrés, par exemple, dans le processus de médiation pour des aides décentralisées.

Pour illustrer tout cela, les acteurs de la société civile travaillent en tant que médiateurs entre les réfugiés et l'État, étant donné qu'ils interagissent avec ce dernier en vue d'atteindre leurs objectifs d'améliorer la situation des réfugiés de diverses manières. En outre, la société civile peut représenter la voix des réfugiés qui est cruciale pour les politiques connexes déployées par l'État. Par exemple, lorsque la société civile reconnaît que les installations de masse ne sont pas conformes aux droits de l'homme, les acteurs de la société civile plaident l'importance des droits de l'homme des réfugiés et persuadent l'État de rendre justice sur ces questions qui influencent l'élaboration finale des politiques. Ainsi, il est nécessaire d'inclure des acteurs et des réfugiés de la société civile dans les processus de prise de décision d'une manière substantielle. L'interaction entre les villes et les acteurs des sociétés civiles encourage la responsabilisation des réfugiés. Afin de permettre aux villes et aux acteurs de la société civile d'accroître leurs rôles et maximiser leurs capacités d'agir, il est plus que nécessaire de leur attribuer plus de pouvoir et de soutien financier.

INTÉGRATION ASCENDANTE: AUTO-RESPONSABILISATION !

Donner plus de pouvoir et de soutien à la société civile et aux organisations locales peut améliorer le processus d'intégration de façon significative. Étant donné que l'intégration est un processus à plusieurs niveaux, les différentes approches de multiples organisations sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins des migrants dans leur diversité.

Durant notre visite aux nombreuses organisations traitant de ces sujets, étant donnée notre participation à plusieurs événements concernant l'intégration, nous avons éprouvé le besoin d'aborder le concept d'«auto-responsabilisation» dans le but d'améliorer la compréhension de l'intégration de façon générale ainsi que le sujet du séminaire EPRIE de cette année. Outre l'éducation de la population d'accueil, l'intégration peut être pleinement réalisée grâce à la coopération entre les différents acteurs ainsi qu'en fournissant des approches ascendantes adéquates de l'intégration, par exemple en donnant plus de responsabilité aux groupes « auto-organisés ». Cependant, ces approches sont souvent négligées et on fait face à un manque considérable de prise de conscience de leurs existences.

Un exemple d'un groupe d'auto-organisé que nous avons visité était «Les femmes en exil», une initiative fondée à Brandebourg en 2002 par des femmes réfugiées dans le but de se battre pour leurs droits. De

par leurs expériences, les femmes réfugiées sont doublement victimes de discrimination non seulement par les lois racistes et discriminatoires envers les réfugiés en général, mais aussi en tant que femmes vis-à-vis des femmes. Cette organisation non-gouvernementale (ONG) est devenue alors «Women in Exile & Friends» en 2011, en élargissant leur réseau aux non-refugiés solidaires avec d'autres femmes réfugiées. Ensemble, ils mènent une campagne intitulée «Pas de camps pour les femmes! Abolissez tous les camps! ». Concrètement, elles se focalisent sur l'abolition de toutes les lois discriminatoires envers les demandeurs d'asile et des migrants ainsi que sur les interconnexions entre le racisme et le sexisme. Elles se concentrent à responsabiliser et à aider les femmes réfugiées pour obtenir plus d'informations en ce qui concerne leur statut juridique, les opportunités d'emploi, de soins de santé, etc. pour améliorer leurs situations actuelles et en même temps pour sensibiliser le public sur les conditions de vie inhumaines des femmes réfugiées. L'ONG cible les difficultés spécifiques auxquelles les femmes réfugiées sont confrontées, souvent négligées, et fournit ainsi une assistance adaptée aux besoins de ces femmes.

Il existe plusieurs autres organisations et initiatives, qui mettent l'accent sur l'amélioration des conditions d'adaptation à une nouvelle société. Autonomiser les groupes auto-organisés, qui de ce fait habilite les réfugiés ou migrants, est une autre approche ascendante afin d'améliorer les politiques et leurs mises en forme. En outre, ces groupes peuvent jouer un rôle de médiateur entre le gouvernement, les organisations intergouvernementales et le public. La responsabilisation elle-même est basée sur l'idée de fournir plus d'informations, de compétences, de ressources, d'autorité, plus de possibilités et de motivation aux acteurs concernés. Le fait de les rendre responsables de leurs actions, contribuera de même à les aider à prendre leurs propres décisions, à la résolution de problèmes et à améliorer leurs situations. En bref, cela signifie accroître l'autonomie des personnes et des communautés et l'autodétermination, afin de leur permettre de défendre leurs intérêts d'une manière responsable et déterminée, et d'agir de leur propre autorité. La responsabilisation en tant qu'action se réfère à la fois au processus d'autonomisation et de soutien professionnel des personnes, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur sentiment d'impuissance et le manque d'influence, de reconnaître et, éventuellement, d'utiliser leurs ressources ainsi que leurs chances.

Même si les initiatives «ascendantes» sont importantes, elles ne peuvent pas fournir toute la protection nécessaire, en particulier dans les situations d'urgence, par conséquent certains programmes sont également nécessaires. Un tel programme «Blue Dot Hubs» est l'initiative lancée par le HCNUR et l'UNICEF pour renforcer la protection des enfants et des familles en déplacement à travers l'Europe. Vingt centres de soutien pour enfants et familles, communément appelée «Blue Dots», fourniront un espace sûr pour les enfants et leurs familles, les services

vitaux, des jeux, la protection et le conseil en un seul endroit. Les centres visent à soutenir les familles vulnérables en mouvement, en particulier les nombreux enfants non accompagnés ou séparés à risque (malades), traumatisés, violentés, ou ayant été victimes d'exploitation et de mauvais traitements. Les centres seront situés sur des sites stratégiques, les points d'entrée / sortie des frontières, des sites d'enregistrement, certains centres urbains stratégiques, mais aussi via des équipes mobiles. Les services comprennent : le rétablissement des liens familiaux, le regroupement familial, offrant des espaces adaptés aux enfants et aux bébés, des cellules de conseil, les premiers soins psycho-sociaux, des conseils juridiques, sensibiliser les travailleurs sociaux de proximité et un bureau d'information avec la connexion Wi-Fi.

Dans l'ensemble, le soutien de groupes auto-organisés qui améliorent l'autonomisation des réfugiés et des migrants, joue un rôle essentiel dans le processus d'intégration. Cependant, il y a encore beaucoup de difficultés à surmonter et de travail à fournir. Comment pouvons-nous atteindre les décideurs au sommet? Comment pouvons-nous surmonter la bureaucratie qualifiée de «rigide»? Qu'en est-il du financement des groupes auto-organisés? Comment pouvons-nous sensibiliser la société d'accueil? Les questions ne s'arrêtent pas là. Une chose, cependant, est certaine: nous avons besoin de prendre des mesures pour promouvoir et changer tout cela. Dans cette société mondiale, la responsabilité des citoyens augmente et tout le monde peut promouvoir l'engagement civique et encourager la société civile à atteindre nos objectifs en vue de construire tous ensemble une société plus tolérante.

CONCLUSION

La gouvernance de l'asile, de la migration, et la mise en œuvre de l'intégration et de l'inclusion doivent être synonymes d'un effort commun en terme de collaboration. Durant le séminaire EPRIE 2016, les jeunes professionnels issus de six pays ont échangé des idées pour développer de nouvelles approches. Nous avons beaucoup appris les uns des autres et ce précieux échange nous a montré que la résolution de problèmes est une question avant tout de communication et de coopération. Dans cette optique, les défis posés par l'asile, la migration et l'intégration deviennent plus gérables, et de nouveaux modèles émergents se révèlent être très prometteurs pour l'avenir.

MEMORANDUM

in German

MEMORANDUM – EINHEIT IN VIELFALT

EINLEITUNG

EPRIE 2016 hat sich mit einem besonders aktuellen Thema beschäftigt: Asyl, Migration und Integration – gemeinsame Herausforderungen, verschiedene Modelle. Da fortlaufend geflüchtete Menschen versuchen Europa zu erreichen und dort ankommen, hat das Programm passenderweise in Polen, Deutschland und Frankreich stattgefunden. Dort haben wir, die Teilnehmer*innen von EPRIE 2016, verschiedene Organisationen und Institutionen besucht, die Geflüchtete unterstützen und sich mit administrativen Tätigkeiten rund um Migration befassen. Des Weiteren haben wir mit Expert*innen aus der Praxis diskutiert, um europäische Standpunkte und politische Handhabungen mit denen in Ostasien zu vergleichen.

Das Thema ist für uns nicht nur aufgrund der aktuellen Situation von Bedeutung und der Tatsache, dass wir uns im Rahmen unserer Studiengänge und Berufe damit auseinandersetzen, sondern auch aufgrund persönlicher Migrationserfahrungen vieler Teilnehmer*innen und der damit verbundenen Herausforderung, sich in einem neuen Land zu integrieren. Trotz unserer persönlichen Erfahrungen, der Komplexität des Themas und der Tatsache, dass wir aus sechs verschiedenen Ländern kommen, hatten wir größtenteils übereinstimmende Meinungen bezüglich der aktuellen Migrationspolitik sowie ähnliche Ideen, wie diese verbessert werden kann.

Das vorliegende Memorandum stellt einige dieser Ideen vor. Hierfür werden zunächst die derzeit vorherrschenden Standpunkte zum Thema Migration in China, Japan, Korea und Europa in den Blick genommen. Als nächstes wird die Bedeutung von Zusammenarbeit und Vernetzung zwischen diesen Regionen betont, bevor dann in einem weiteren Schritt angeregt wird, dass Kooperation am besten gelingt, wenn die Entscheidungsmacht umverteilt wird – weg von den Nationalstaaten, auf eine globale und zeitgleich auch lokale Ebene. Zuletzt wird im Memorandum die besondere Bedeutung lokaler Initiativen für eine »erfolgreiche Integration« vertieft untersucht. Wir kommen mit dem Aufruf zur Zusammenarbeit und der Fortsetzung eines Ideenaustausches zum Schluss.

REGIONALE STANDPUNKTE ZU MIGRATION

Zuwanderungspolitik wird in China, Japan und Korea auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene entschieden. Die Europäische Union (EU) hat ein gemeinsames Asylsystem, allerdings verfolgen die Mitgliedsstaaten ihre eigene Migrations- und Integrationspolitik. Grundsätzlich ist die Einwanderungspolitik in China, Japan, Korea und Europa sehr ähnlich, da in allen vier Regionen die Migration Hochqualifizierter gefördert, und die Niedrigqualifizierter kritisch gesehen wird. Bezüglich anderer Formen von Migration bestehen Unterschiede, z.B. wird »Heiratsmigration« in Korea aktiv gefördert, während sie in Europa eher als problematisch angesehen wird. Außerdem sind China, Japan und Korea im Vergleich zu Europa mehr abgeneigt, Geflüchtete aufzunehmen, wobei jedoch betont werden muss, dass diese Bereitschaft auch innerhalb der EU sehr unterschiedlich ausgeprägt ist.

China erlebt eine gewaltige Bevölkerungsabwanderung aus ländlichen Gebieten in Städte aufgrund von industrieller Entwicklung, zunehmender Urbanisierung und einem Ungleichgewicht hinsichtlich vorhandener Arbeitskräfte zwischen dem Osten und dem Westen. Trotz vieler, in China lebender Geflüchteter aus Vietnam, Myanmar, Syrien und verschiedenen afrikanischen Ländern, hat die chinesische Regierung bislang nichts unternommen, die Aufnahme Geflüchteter rechtlich zu regeln. In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Hohen Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR) hat die chinesische Regierung vorübergehend Geflüchtete, gemäß des »Exit-Entry Administration Law«, anerkannt, welches nach der Ratifizierung der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention im Jahr 1982 in Kraft getreten ist. Ungeachtet dessen fehlt es bislang aber an einer wirksamen Integrationspolitik. Als die zweitgrößte Volkswirtschaft der Welt hätte China das Potential, zukünftig eine wichtigere Rolle bei der »Lösung von Flüchtlingskrisen« zu spielen.

Ähnlich ist es in Japan, wo es keine offizielle Zuwanderungspolitik gibt, die Migrant*innen dabei unterstützt, sich in die japanische Gesellschaft zu »integrieren«. Allerdings hat es auf kommunaler Ebene zahlreiche Versuche von Gemeinden gegeben, Migrant*innen durch Integrationspolitik zu unterstützen. Die Stadt Hamamatsu, die eine der größten Gemeinschaften an Migrant*innen zählt, insbesondere



lateinamerikanische Nikkei (Brasilianer*innen japanischer Herkunft), ist ein Beispiel für solch einen Versuch auf lokaler Ebene. Die Stadt hat sich selbst als Teil des globalen Netzwerkes inklusiver Intercultural Cities erklärt. Dies ist ein Programm des Europarates, in dem die kulturelle Vielfalt, die Migrant*innen mit sich bringen, als Quelle für die Vitalität einer Stadt, anstatt als Bedrohung verstanden wird. Die Stadt Hamamatsu ist für Vielfalt bekannt und nutzt dies, um Tourist*innen aus dem Ausland anzuziehen und neue Märkte zu erschließen. Darüber hinaus unterstützt die Stadt Migrant*innen bei der Arbeitsvermittlung in neue Bereiche, wie z.B. im Bereich der Pflege und der Landwirtschaft, um die Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten zu erweitern und die Stadt zu entwickeln.

Die Republik Korea hat im Jahr 2013 den »Refugee Act« verabschiedet und ist damit das erste asiatische Land, das ein eigenes Gesetz für den Schutz von Geflüchteten erlassen hat. Dennoch ist die Prozentzahl anerkannter Geflüchteter und »Asylbewerber*innen« in Korea sehr gering und insbesondere deutlich geringer im Vergleich zu anderen OECD-Staaten. Zahlreiche »Arbeitsmigrant*innen« kommen im Rahmen temporärer »Gastarbeiter«-programme nach Korea, wo sie zunächst eine Aufenthaltserlaubnis für vier Jahre und zehn Monate mit der Option auf eine Verlängerung um denselben Zeitraum erhalten.

Trotzdem sie bereits bis zu zehn Jahre in Südkorea gelebt haben, besteht für sie keine Möglichkeit sich dauerhaft niederzulassen oder ihre Familien nachzuholen. Weiterhin werden viele weibliche »Heiratsmigrantinnen« aus Südostasien ermutigt nach Korea zu kommen. Die Politik fokussiert sich hauptsächlich auf ihre gesellschaftliche Anpassung und dass sie ihren Rollen als Ehefrauen, Mütter und Schwiegertöchter nachkommen.

Trotz des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS), welches das Asylverfahren, Aufnahmebedingungen, die Zuständigkeit für Asylanträge und Bedingungen für die Anerkennung als »Asylberechtigte*r« regelt, bleiben Unterschiede in der Umsetzung dieses Systems in den verschiedenen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten erhalten. Die aktuelle sogenannte »Flüchtlingskrise« zeigt weitere Unterschiede zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten auf, von denen einige weitaus mehr Geflüchtete aufnehmen als andere. Trotz der Aufnahme geflüchteter Menschen setzt die Migrationspolitik der EU auf Abschreckung. Grenzkontrollen, Zäune, Visumpflicht, Sanktionen gegen Beförderungsunternehmen, Abschiebungen und ähnliche Methoden zielen darauf ab zu kontrollieren, wer in die EU einreißt und wer bleibt.

Zusätzlich zum EU-Recht haben alle Mitgliedsstaaten ihre eigenen Asylgesetze, von denen einige, wie beispielsweise in Deutschland, unlängst reformiert wurden, um von weiterer Zuwanderung abzusprechen. Interessanterweise spürt Deutschland noch immer die Auswirkungen vergangener politischer Entscheidungen – bzw. deren Fehlen – besonders in Bezug auf eine »Integration«. In den 50er und 60er Jahren rekrutierte Westdeutschland »Gastarbeiter«, die einem Arbeitskräftemangel entgegenwirken, sich aber nicht niederlassen sollten. Diese Arbeiter*innen kamen aus Italien, der Türkei, Griechenland, Spanien, Portugal, Ex-Jugoslawien, Marokko und Tunesien. Viele von ihnen holten ihre Familien nach und ließen sich permanent in Deutschland nieder. Dennoch priorisierte die Politik bis Ende der 90er Jahre einen Rückgang der Zuwanderung, anstatt auf »Integration« zu setzen. »Asylsuchende« und »Spätaussiedler«, die in den 90er Jahren nach Deutschland kamen, sollten sich an die Mehrheitsgesellschaft anpassen. Deutschland brauchte 50 Jahre um zu akzeptieren, dass es auf Zuwanderung angewiesen ist. Die Bedeutung und Folgen dieser späten Einsicht müssen noch diskutiert werden. Erst im Jahr 2007 verabschiedete die Bundesregierung Maßnahmen zur Integrationspolitik. Dieses Versäumnis hat dazu geführt, dass Migrant*innen der zweiten und dritten Generation mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit höhere Bildung und Arbeitsplätze erhalten, aber auch dazu, dass Migrant*innen noch immer diskriminiert werden, selbst wenn sie die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft besitzen. Seit einigen Jahren wird in Deutschland die Debatte »Integration« versus »Inklusion« geführt und auch das Konzept der »Willkommenskultur« kritisch hinterfragt. Schritt für Schritt hat sich die Einsicht etabliert, dass »Integration« nicht Assimilation bedeuten sollte und dass »Integration« keine einseitig lineare Entwicklung, sondern ein Prozess ist.

ZUSAMMENARBEIT UND VERNETZUNG

Teile der oben beschriebenen Asylgesetze deuten darauf hin, dass sich die Geschichte wiederholen könnte. China, Korea und Japan sind kurz davor die gleichen Fehler zu machen wie Deutschland vor einem halben Jahrhundert. Gleichzeitig gibt es Erfahrungen, die es wert sind wiederholt zu werden. Zum Beispiel kann Europa hinsichtlich einer »Integration« von Ostasien lernen. Dieser Abschnitt beschreibt, wie eine Zusammenarbeit und Vernetzung zwischen Europa und Asien dazu beitragen kann, dass dieselben Fehler nicht zweimal gemacht werden und wie man an die aktuelle »Flüchtlingskrise« besser herangehen kann.

China, Japan und Korea können aus Deutschlands Erfahrungen lernen, dass es von Vorteil sein kann, Migrant*innen in den Arbeitsmarkt zu »integrieren«, sowohl für sie selbst als auch für die »Gastgesellschaft«. Arbeiter*innen tragen zur langfristigen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes bei und sind aktive Mitglieder der Zivilgesellschaft.

Gleichzeitig können Deutschland und andere europäische Länder von Erfahrungen ostasiatischer Länder in puncto »Integration« von Migrant*innen lernen. Migrant*innen mit ständigem Aufenthalt in Korea und Japan »integrieren« sich dort scheinbar relativ problemlos, aufgrund von Gemeinsamkeiten in Aussehen und Kultur. Migrant*innen in Korea und Japan stammen hauptsächlich aus anderen asiatischen Ländern, während sie in Europa meist aus Ländern kommen, deren Kultur und Religion sich von der, der einheimischen Bevölkerung unterscheidet. Dennoch zeigen die Erfahrungen in Ostasien, dass Vertrautheit mit der Kultur des anderen, der Schlüssel zur Schaffung von Verständnis zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen von Menschen sein kann. Somit kann »Integration« kein einseitiger Prozess sein, sondern sollte auch eine »Inklusion« anvisieren. Es muss eine Situation geschaffen werden, in der »Neuankömmlinge« und die lokale Bevölkerung voneinander lernen. Dazu muss auch die »Gastgesellschaft« sich ändern und offener werden. Dies ist eine wichtige Feststellung angesichts europaweit zunehmender Ressentiments gegenüber Geflüchteten im Kontext der gegenwärtigen »Flüchtlingskrise«. Eine interkulturelle Öffnung kann dabei helfen, Barrieren abzubauen und politische Strategien zu hinterfragen, die Migrant*innen diskriminieren und ihre gleichberechtigte Teilhabe an der Gesellschaft verhindern. »Inklusion« basiert auf dem universellen Wert der Menschenwürde und unterstreicht, dass jeder Mensch, ungeachtet seiner Herkunft, Teil jeder Gesellschaft sein kann.

Eine Zusammenarbeit und Vernetzung zwischen Ostasien und Europa ist wichtig für den Austausch von Erfahrungen, Ideen und Best-Practice Methoden beim Vorgehen und der Rechtsprechung von Migration. Voneinander lernen, verhindert Fehler und ermöglicht neue Ansätze.

DEZENTRALISIERUNG DER MACHT

Wie die vorangegangenen Abschnitte zeigen, wird Migrationspolitik fast ausschließlich auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene entschieden. Nationalstaaten sträuben sich häufig dagegen, Geflüchtete aufzunehmen und zu »integrieren«, selbst wenn ein langfristiges Engagement dazu vorteilhaft für beide, das Aufnahmeland sowie die Geflüchteten, sein könnte. Eine Dezentralisierung der Macht im Bereich der Migrationspolitik wäre jedoch möglich, sowohl dadurch, nationale Gesetzgebungen auf eine globale Ebene zu bringen, als auch durch eine Verschiebung von Macht hin zur lokalen Ebene.

Europa wird mit einer hoch polarisierten Debatte über gegenwärtige Migrationsbewegungen konfrontiert, in welcher irrtümlicherweise der Begriff »Flüchtlingskrise« verwendet wird. Der passendere Begriff wäre »Führungskrise«, aufgrund der Unfähigkeit der Nationalstaaten den entstandenen Herausforderungen zu begegnen. Einerseits ist der Nationalstaat der Hauptakteur, der die meiste Macht besitzt bezüglich

Grenzschutz, dem Dubliner Abkommen¹ sowie nationaler Asyl- und Integrationsgesetze. Andererseits steht das Konzept des Nationalstaates offensichtlich im Widerspruch zu einer adäquaten Auseinandersetzung mit Migrationsbewegungen. Insbesondere das EU-Türkei-Abkommen unterstreicht die Gefahren einer Machtungleichheit zugunsten des Nationalstaates. Anstatt einer Bereitstellung von sicheren Fluchtwegen mittels Flugzeugen, führt dieses politische Abkommen zu einer Vielfalt an Menschenrechtsverletzungen und zwingt Geflüchtete wieder dazu, lebensgefährliche Wege über das Mittelmeer zu wählen, in welchem seit dem Jahr 2000 mehr als 22.000 Geflüchtete gestorben sind.² Aus diesem Widerspruch zwischen Machtbesitz und politischem Versagen ergibt sich der Bedarf an einer Machtverschiebung vom Nationalstaat zur lokalen sowie globalen Ebene.

Auf globaler Ebene können internationale Einrichtungen den Wert der globalen Solidarität deutlich glaubwürdiger vertreten als Nationalstaaten, deren Eigeninteresse im Widerspruch zu diesem Wert steht. Deshalb sollte ein Verteilungsschlüssel auf globaler Ebene festgelegt und überwacht werden, zum Beispiel, unter der Schirmherrschaft der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) und des UNHCR. Auf der Grundlage dieser Machtverschiebung könnte die »Führungskrise« durch sichere Fluchtrouten nach Europa mittels Flugzeugen gelöst und auch in anderen Weltregionen wie beispielsweise in Ostasien angewendet werden.

Auf lokaler Ebene wird Städten und der Zivilgesellschaft eine besondere Rolle zugeschrieben. Zum Beispiel haben die Bürgermeister*innen von Barcelona, Lesbos und Lampedusa ein Abkommen zur direkten Unterstützung von Geflüchteten verabschiedet, um die bürokratische Maschinerie von nationalen Verträgen zu umgehen. Nationalstaaten können sich nicht mehr hinter dem Dubliner Abkommen verstecken und sich damit aus der Verantwortung ziehen. Städte müssen diese Verantwortung übernehmen und direkte Unterstützung durch globale Finanzmittel bekommen. Wenn sich ein Stadt- oder Gemeinderat dafür entscheidet, eine bestimmte Anzahl von Geflüchteten aufzunehmen, darf es kein nationales Gesetz geben, das dies verhindert. Zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure müssen beispielsweise im Vermittlungsprozess für eine dezentrale Unterbringung stärker integriert werden. Massenunterbringungen von Geflüchteten dürfen aufgrund

der Anerkennung der universellen Menschenrechtserklärung nicht aufrechterhalten werden. Insbesondere können zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure das Verbindungsstück zwischen Geflüchteten und dem Staat darstellen, da sie in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Staat die Situation von Geflüchteten auf verschiedenste Weise verbessern und die gemeinsamen Ziele erreichen können. Außerdem können mittels der Zivilgesellschaft die Stimmen von Geflüchteten vertreten werden, welche entscheidend für die politischen Vorgehensweisen eines Staates sind. So besteht die Notwendigkeit, zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure sowie Geflüchtete auf eine wesentliche Weise in Beschlussfassungsprozesse miteinzubeziehen. Die Wechselwirkung von Städten und zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren fördert die Selbstbefähigung von Geflüchteten. Um Städte bzw. Gemeinden sowie zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure zu befähigen und ihren Einfluss zu maximieren, bedarf es mehr Machtzuschreibung und finanzielle Unterstützung.

BOTTOM-UP INTEGRATION: SELBSTBEFÄHIGUNG!

Das Umverteilen von Entscheidungsmacht zugunsten der Zivilgesellschaft und lokalen Initiativen sowie deren Unterstützung, verbessert den Prozess einer »Integration«.

Da »Integration« ein mehrschichtiger Prozess ist, werden viele verschiedene Organisationen und Ansätze benötigt, um auf die verschiedenen Bedürfnisse unterschiedlicher Migrant*innen eingehen zu können. Als wir im Rahmen von EPRIE 2016 mehrere Organisationen besuchten, die sich mit den Themenkomplex Asyl, Migration und Integration auseinandersetzen und verschiedene Aktivitäten zu einer »Integration« begleiten, ist uns bewusstgeworden, dass wir uns auch mit dem Konzept der Selbstbefähigung befassen müssen. Insbesondere da wir unser Verständnis von »Integration« im allgemeinen, aber auch mit Blick auf das diesjährige Thema von EPRIE, verbessern bzw. weiterentwickeln können. Eine »Integration« kann erfolgreich gelingen durch das Einbeziehen der »Aufnahmegesellschaft«, durch Kooperationen der verschiedenen Akteure und der Förderung von angemessenen bottom-up Ansätzen, wie z.B. der Unterstützung von selbstorganisierten Gruppen. Bislang werden diese Ansätze allerdings noch allzu oft übersehen und es besteht ein Mangel an Bewusstsein dafür, dass sie existieren.

Ein Beispiel für eine selbstorganisierte Gruppe ist »Women in Exile«, die wir während EPRIE 2016 besucht haben. Die Initiative wurde im Jahr 2002 in Brandenburg von geflüchteten Frauen für geflüchtete Frauen gegründet, mit dem Ziel, für ihre Rechte zu kämpfen. Ihren Erfahrungen nach, werden geflüchtete Frauen in doppelter Hinsicht diskriminiert. Dies passiert nicht nur aufgrund rassistischer und diskriminierender Gesetze, sondern gerade weil sie Frauen sind. Die NGO gründete im Jahr 2011 Women in Exile & Friends,

¹ Das Dubliner Abkommen legt den für die Prüfung eines Asylantrags zuständigen EU-Mitgliedsstaat fest. Meist ist dies der Mitgliedstaat der Ersteinreise, was dazu führt, dass Staaten an den EU-Außengrenzen, wie Italien und Griechenland, die meisten Anträge bearbeiten müssen.

² Siehe International Organisation for Migration (2014). »Fatal Journeys« IOM, unter <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf> 12.

um ihr Netzwerk um diejenigen zu erweitern, die selbst zwar keine Fluchterfahrungen gemacht haben, sich aber mit diesen Frauen solidarisieren wollen. Gemeinsam haben sie die Kampagne »No Lager for Women! Abolish all Lagers!« ins Leben gerufen. Hinsichtlich der politischen Rahmenbedingungen kämpfen sie für die Abschaffung aller diskriminierenden Gesetze für Asylsuchende und Migrant*innen und machen auf die Verbindung zwischen Rassismus und Sexismus aufmerksam. Im Fokus steht, geflüchteten Frauen mehr Möglichkeiten zur Selbstbestimmung sowie mehr Informationen hinsichtlich ihres Aufenthaltsstatus, ihrer Jobmöglichkeiten, ihrer Krankenversicherung etc. zu geben. Des Weiteren unterstützen sie geflüchtete Frauen darin, ihre derzeitige Lebenssituation zu verbessern und informieren gleichzeitig die Öffentlichkeit über die prekären Lebensbedingungen. »Women in Exile« konzentriert sich auf spezielle Schwierigkeiten geflüchteter Frauen, die oftmals nicht beachtet werden. Somit bietet die Organisation den Frauen eine bedarfsgerechte Unterstützung.

Es gibt viele weitere Organisationen und Initiativen, deren Ziel es ist, das Zusammenleben in einer neuen Gesellschaft besser zu gestalten. Die Selbstbefähigung zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen, die wiederum Geflüchtete und Migrant*innen stärken, ist eine weitere bottom-up Methode, die politische Strategien beeinflussen und verbessern kann. Außerdem können diese Gruppen als Mittlerinnen zwischen der Regierung, internationalen Organisationen und der Öffentlichkeit agieren. Selbstbefähigung basiert auf der Idee, dass Menschen dabei unterstützt werden können, ihre eigenen Entscheidungen zu treffen, ihre Probleme zu lösen und ihre Situation zu verbessern, indem ihnen Informationen, Qualifikationen, Ressourcen, Autorität, Chancen und Motivation geboten und sie für die Konsequenzen ihres Handelns zur Verantwortung gezogen werden. Kurz, Selbstbefähigung bedeutet die Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung von Menschen und Gemeinschaften zu steigern, um ihnen zu ermöglichen, ihre Interessen verantwortungsvoll und selbstbestimmt zu vertreten. Selbstbefähigung bezieht sich sowohl auf den Prozess der Selbstbestimmung, als auch auf die professionelle Unterstützung von Menschen, die es ihnen ermöglicht, Gefühle von Hilflosigkeit und mangelndem Einfluss zu überwinden und letztendlich ihre Ressourcen und Möglichkeiten zu erkennen und zu nutzen.

Obwohl bottom-up Initiativen wichtig sind, können sie nicht alle notwendigen Schutzangebote, besonders nicht in Notsituationen, bereitstellen. Daher sind auch top-down Initiativen notwendig. Eine solche Initiative ist beispielsweise das »Blue Dot Hubs« Programm des UNHCR und des Kinderhilfswerks der Vereinten Nationen (UNICEF). Das Programm soll den Schutz für flüchtende Kinder und Familien in Europa verstärken. Zwanzig Zentren zur Unterstützung von Kindern und Familien – genannt »Blue Dots« – werden lebensnotwendige Dienstleistungen, Spiel-, Schutz- und Beratungsräume an einem

Dreh- und Angelpunkt bereitstellen. Diese »Hubs« sollen gefährdete Familien schützen, insbesondere unbegleitete oder von ihren Familien getrennte Kinder, die von Krankheit, Traumata, Gewalt, Ausbeutung und Menschenhandel bedroht sind. Die Zentren werden in strategisch ausgewählten Standorten zu finden sein, z.B. an Grenzübergängen, Registrierungsstellen und in Städten. Darüber hinaus werden sie durch mobile Teams ergänzt. Das Angebot beinhaltet die Wiederherstellung des Kontakts mit Familienangehörigen, Familienzusammenführungen, die Schaffung kinderfreundlicher Umgebungen sowie Mutter-Kind-Räumen, (Rechts-) Beratung, psychologische Erstversorgung, Kontakt mit Sozialarbeiter*innen und Informationsstände mit WLAN.

Da selbstorganisierte Gruppen die Selbstbefähigung von Geflüchteten und Migrant*innen erhöhen, ist ihre Unterstützung ein wesentlicher Beitrag im Prozess einer »Integration«. Jedoch gibt es in diesem Prozess noch viele Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden. Wie erreichen wir Entscheidungsträger*innen an der Spitze? Wie überwinden wir starre Bürokratien? Wie steht es um die Finanzierung für jene selbstorganisierten Gruppen? Wie sensibilisieren wir eine »Gastbergesellschaft« für globale Solidarität? Die Fragen hören hier nicht auf. Eine Sache ist jedoch sicher: Wir müssen in Aktion treten für eine Veränderung und sie vorantreiben. In einer globalisierten Gesellschaft nimmt die zivilgesellschaftliche Verantwortung zu. Jede*r kann bürgerliches Engagement unterstützen und für eine tolerantere Gesellschaft eintreten.

FAZIT

Die Steuerung einer Asyl- und Migrationspolitik sowie die Umsetzung von »Integration« und »Inklusion« müssen gemeinschaftliche Bemühungen sein. Während EPRIE 2016 haben Nachwuchskräfte aus sechs Ländern ihre Ideen ausgetauscht, um neue Ansätze zu entwickeln. Wir haben viel voneinander gelernt und dieser wertvolle Austausch hat uns gezeigt, dass das »Beheben von Problemen« eine Frage von Kommunikation und Zusammenarbeit ist. Wie in diesem Memorandum beschrieben, erscheinen die Herausforderungen des Themenkomplexes Asyl, Migration und Integration als machbar und die dazu neu entwickelten Modelle stehen in Zukunft auf dem Prüfstand.

MEMORANDUM

in Japanese

覚書—多様性における結束

序 論

EPRIE2016は、非常に時節柄興味深いテーマに取り組んだ：難民、移民、統合—類似した挑戦、異なるパターン。難民がヨーロッパに入ろうとし続けるなか、本プログラムは、いみじくもポーランド、ドイツ、フランスで行われた。私たちは難民を支援する、または移住に取り組む団体や機関を訪問した。また、この分野における専門家と議論し、ヨーロッパにおける姿勢や政策を東アジアと比較した。

このテーマは私たちにとって、関連性がある、個人的なものでもあり、と感じられた。なぜなら、それは単に私たちが学習や専門家としての職業を通じて取り組んでいるからというだけではなく、参加者の多くが移住に関する個人的な経験を持ち、新しい国での統合の問題に直面していたからである。私たちの経験は個人的性質を帯びていること、テーマが複雑であること、そして私たちは6つの国から来ているという事実があったにもかかわらず、私たちは、移民の管理にかかる現状に対して、大いに類似した意見を有していた。また、それをどのように改善させるかについても、類似の考えを持っていた。

この覚書は、上記の意見のいくつかを提示したものである。まず、中国、日本、韓国、そしてヨーロッパにおける移民に対する各地域の態度をみることで、問題にかかる現状を描き出す。次に、概してこれらの地域間における協力とネットワーキングの重要性を強調する。また、協力は、権力を国家からグローバル、また地域レベルに移すことで最も達成されることを提案する。さらには、統合を成功させるためには、地域主導の重要性について深く掘り下げる。そして最後に、私たちは協力及び意見交換の継続を訴えて、この覚書を締めくくるところとした。

移民に対する地域の態度

中国、日本、韓国の移民政策は国家レベルで決定されている。欧州連合（EU）では、共通の難民庇護制度をもっている一方で、移民や統合政策については、各加盟国が独自の政策をもっている。概していえば、中国、日本、韓国、ヨーロッパのいずれの国・地域における移民政策でも、高度人材の移民を奨励し、未熟練労働者の受け入れには慎重であるという点で類似している。その他の移民形態については異なる点があり、例えば、韓国では結婚移民が積極的に奨励されているが、ヨーロッパではその傾向がみられない。さらに、ヨーロッパにおいて各国間での難民受け入れに対する意欲に差はあるものの、中国、日本、韓国は欧州に比べると難民受け入れには消極的であるといえる。

中国では、産業発展、都市化、そして東西間の労働力の不均衡のために、国内での地方から都市への移民が大量に発生している。中国政府は、ベトナム、ミャンマー、シリア、そしてアフリカの国々からの難民が中国に存在しているのに関わらず、現在に至るまで難民の定住に関する法律を制定していない。中国政府は、国連難民高等弁務官事務所（UNHCR）と協働し、また、1982年に難民の地位に関する条約に批准後に制定された「中華人民共和国外国人入出境管理法」に基づいて一時的に難民を受け入れた。それにもかかわらず、効果的な統合政策は先送りにされている。今後、中国は世界第二の経済大国として、難民危機を解決するためにより重要な役割を担うべきである。

同様に、日本でも、移民の日本社会への統合を促進させる公の政策は存在していない。しかしながら、地方自治体が統合政策を通じて移民をサポートしようとするコミュニティレベルでの試みはいくつかみられる。このような試みが地域レベルで始まったのは、中央政府の移民に対する閉鎖的な態度が未だ変わらないためである。浜松市は、移民、特に日系ブラジル人が多く住む都市であり、地方自治

体レベルで移民の社会統合を試みている都市の一例である。浜松市は、欧州評議会が発展させた多文化共生都市 (Intercultural cities)―外国人のもたらす文化的多様性は都市にとって脅威ではなくむしろ活性化の根源であるというプログラム―の国際的なネットワークの一員であると宣言している。浜松市は、その多様性の評価を利用して海外から来る観光客を魅きつけ、エスニックビジネスの情報を提供することで市場を拡大させている。さらに、浜松市は移民の就労範囲を広げて市を活性化させるために、介護や農業といった新しい分野での移民の採用マッチングを援助している¹。

韓国では、2013年に難民法が制定され、アジアで初の独立した難民保護のための法律をもつ国となった。しかしながら、韓国での難民受け入れ及び難民認定率は非常に低く、他の多くの経済協力開発機構 (OECD) 加盟国に比べてもその低さが目立つ。多くの移民労働者は、最初に4年10か月の滞在を許可された後に同じ期間の滞在許可の更新が可能な「短期労働者事業計画」の下で韓国にきている。10年程の滞在歴にも関わらず、彼らは韓国に定住することも家族を呼び寄せることもできない。さらには、多くの女性結婚移民は、東南アジア諸国から韓国に来ることが奨励されている。彼らに対する政策のほとんどは、社会への同化に焦点が当てられ、彼らが妻や母、義理の娘としての役割を果たすことを要求している。

ヨーロッパでは、庇護手続き及び受け入れ条件を規定し、難民認定手続きを進める責任を分担し、そして、誰が国際的保護を受ける資格があるかを示すというEU共通の庇護制度が存在するにもかかわらず、その実施については、加盟国間では大きな差が存在している。現在も続いているいわゆる「難民危機」は、ある国が他の国よりも相当多数の難民を受け入れているという加盟国間での差を浮き彫りにしている。このような難民の受け入れにも関わらず、ヨーロッパの移民政策は実質的には移民の抑止力となっている。国境警備、塙、ビザ政策、制裁措置、強制送還、及び同様な手段は、ヨーロッパに誰が入域し留まるのかをコントロールするためのものである。

EU法に加え、すべての加盟国は独自の移民法をもっており、いくつかの国では最近、例えばドイツのように、さらなる移民を抑えるために法律が修正された。西ドイツは、労働力不足を補うために定住を

前提としない移民に頼ってきた。興味深いことに、ドイツは過去の政策の影響、どちらかというとその欠陥、特に統合政策の影響を未だに引きずっている。ドイツは、1950年から60年代にかけて、イタリア、トルコ、ギリシャ、スペイン、ポルトガル、旧ユーゴスラビア、モロッコ、チュニジアから労働者を募った。しかし、1990年後半まで、政府の政策は移民を社会に統合させるよりもむしろ、新規参入者を減らすことを目指した。1900年代にドイツにやって来た多くの庇護者及び後期の引き揚げ者はなお、多数派の社会に同化することを求められた。ドイツは、移民に頼っている国であるという現実を受け入れるのに50年以上かかり、そしてなお、この時期を失した認識の意味と結果については議論されていない。ようやく2007年になって、政府は統合政策を打ち出した。この政策の不備は、移民の第二、第三世代が高等教育を受け専門性の高い仕事に就くことを難しくしただけでなく、ドイツ国籍をもっていたとしても「移民」に対する差別を引き起こした。数年前、ドイツでは統合 (integration) か、それとも「包摂」 (inclusion) か、そして「歓迎の文化」 (culture of welcome) に関する議論が行われた。次第に、統合とは同化を意味するものではなく、一方通行ではないという考えが広がっている。

協力とネットワーキング

上記の移民政策は、歴史は繰り返されることを示している。中国、韓国、そして日本は、ドイツが半世紀前に冒したのと同じ過ちを冒そうとしている。同時に、繰り返すに値する経験も存在する。例として、ヨーロッパは、統合に関して、東アジアの国々から教訓を学ぶことができる。本節では、ヨーロッパとアジアの間の協力とネットワーキングがどのように、同じ過ちを二度と繰り返されないための手助けとなるか、また、現在のヨーロッパにおける難民「危機」がどのようにより良く対処されるかを探求する。

中国、日本、そして韓国は、外国人労働者を統合することが労働者とホスト社会の双方にとってより有益であるという点について、ドイツの経験から学ぶことができる。統合され、永住を許可された労働者たちは、受け入れ国の長期的な経済発展に貢献し、市民社会にとって貴重な構成員となるであろう。重要なのは、ドイツ及び他のヨーロッパの国々は概して、東アジアにおける移民統合の経験から学ぶことができるということである。韓国と日本に永住を許可された移民は、外見と文化を共有しているために、容易に統合されている。韓国と日本における移民は主に他のアジア諸国からやってくる「地域内

¹

See Hamamatsu City, Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision, 2013, available at <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/kokusai/kokusai/documents/iccvision_en.pdf>. 浜松市「浜松市多文化共生都市ビジョン」2013年、<https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/kokusai/kokusai/documents/iccvision_jp.pdf>を参照。)



での移住」である一方で、ヨーロッパでは、文化や宗教が地域住民のものとは異なる「地域外からの移民」がほとんどである。それでもなお、東アジアの経験は、互いの文化に慣れ親しむことが異なる集団の人々の間で理解を作るための鍵であることを示している。ゆえに、統合は一方的なプロセスであってはならず、新しく来た者と地域住民が互いに学び合えるような包摂を目指すものでなければならない。ホスト社会も変化し、そしてより包摂的にならなければならない。これは、現在のヨーロッパにおける難民「危機」に伴う、反難民感情の高まりに照らせば、重要な発見である。文化間の開放は、障壁を減らすことに役立つとともに、差別を生み、社会への平等参加から移民を遠ざける政策や文化に対して挑戦する。また、包摂は、人間の尊厳という普遍的な価値に基づくものであり、社会の一部であることを強調するものである。

東アジアとヨーロッパ間の協力とネットワーキングは、移民の処遇と管理における経験、考え、最善の実践を交換するために重要である。過ちを防ぎ、新しいアプローチを提示するために、互いに学ぶ合うわけである。

権力の分散

上記の節では、移民政策は、ほぼ完全に国家レベルで決定されている問題であることが示された。国家は、移民の入国及び統合につい

て、長期的な取り組みによって受入れ国と移民の双方にとって利益となり得ても、しばしば気が進まないものである。しかしながら、移民分野における権力の分散化を実現させること、すなわち、国家間の協力から次のグローバルレベルでの協力へ、そして権力の地方コミュニティへの移行が、それを可能にさせられるかもしれない。

ヨーロッパでは、現在の難民・移民の動向について、それが間違っている。「移民危機」と呼ばれているが、非常に両極的な議論に直面している。国家が生じた課題に応じられずにいることから、「ガバナンス（管理）危機」という言葉の方がもっと適切である。一方において、国家は、国境管理、ダブリン協定の履行、そして国内における難民・移民法にいたっても、もっとも権力をもつ第一の責任主体である。他方において、国家という概念は、グローバルな難民・移民の流入に対する適切な解決とは明らかに矛盾する。とりわけ、EU・トルコ間の協定は、国家間の権力不均衡の危険性を裏づけている。この政治的合意は、航空機による安全な空のルートを用意する代わりに、さまざまな人権侵害を引き起こし、難民に地中海を通るというもっと危険なルートを再度選択させるよう強いており、その結果2000年以降22,000人以上もの難民が亡くなっている²。この権力の保持と政治的失敗との間の矛盾から、国家から地方へ、そしてグローバルレベルへの権力移行が必要である。

2

See International Organization for Migration, "Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, 2014, available at <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf> 12.



グローバルレベルにおいて、国際機関は、自己の利益がグローバル社会の価値と衝突する国家よりも、もっとグローバルな連帯性の価値を確実に代表できる。したがって、難民の割当ては、例えば、国際移住機関（IOM）やUNHCRのような援助の下で、グローバルレベルで決定され、そして監視されなければならない。このような権力の移行によって、難民危機の管理問題は、航空機による安全な空のルートがヨーロッパへだけでなく、アジアを含む他の国に向かっても提供することで解決できよう。

地方レベルでは、都市や市民社会に特別な役割があると考えられる。たとえば、国家間条約の官僚的な手続きを回避するために、バルセロナ市長は、レスボス島及びランペドゥーザ島と難民への直接的な救済に関する合意を採択した。国家がダブリン条約の後ろに隠れてその責任逃れをする一方で、都市はグローバルな資金支援を直接的に受けてその責任を担わなければならない。もし地方議会が、一定人数の難民を受入れると決定したならば、それを妨げるような国内法はないであろう。市民社会のアクターは、例えば、住居供給の分散の仲介への参加のように、プロセスへ含まれなければならない。市民団体アクターは、様々な方法によって難民の状況を改善するという目的を達成するために、難民と国家との間のリンクをつなげるように働く。加えて、市民団体は、国家によって作られた関連政策に対して重要な難民の声を代表することができる。例えば、市民団体は、大規模な住居は人権と両立しないことを認識しており、市民団体アクターは難民の人権の重要性について擁護し、国家に対してこれらの問題に対応するよう説得することで最終的に政策作成に影響する。したがって、市民社会アクター及び難民を決定プロセスに実質的に含める必要がある。都市及び市民社会アクターの相互作用は、難民のエンパワメントを促進させる。都市及び市民社会アクターがそ

の役割を果たし、その能力を最大限に発揮できるようにするためには、もっと権力及び金銭的支援が、それらに移行されなければならない。

ボトムアップからの統合: セルフ・エンパワメント!

市民社会や地域団体への支援と権限を移行することもまた、統合のプロセスを改善することができる。統合とは重層的なプロセスであるので、異なる移民の異なるニーズに対応するためには、多種多様な団体と多種多様なアプローチが必要とされている。

今回のプログラム中に、私たちはそれらの問題に取り組む多くの団体を訪れ、統合についてのいくつかのイベントに参加し、統合についての一般的な理解、そして今年のEPRIEのテーマへの理解を深めるためには、「セルフ・エンパワメント」という概念に取り組む必要があると感じていた。ホスト社会を教育することに加えて、様々なアクター間の協力や、例えば自己組織化された団体に権限を与えるといったような、統合に向けての適切なボトム・アップアプローチを提供することによって、統合は成し遂げられる。しかしながら、これらのアプローチはしばしば見過ごされており、またそれらが存在しているという認識も欠けている。

私たちが訪れた自己組織化された団体の一つの例として、2002年にブランデンブルグで難民の女性達によって彼らの権利のために創設された「亡命の女性」(Women in Exile)がある。彼らの経験によると、難民の女性たちは人種差別的な法律や差別的な難民法のみならず、女性であることによって二重に差別されている。この非政府組織団体(NGO)は、2011年に「亡命の女性と友だち」(Women in Exile & Friends)を結成し、難民としての生い立ちをもたずに、難民の女性たちと連帯している人々へもそのネットワークを広げた。共同して彼らは「女性難民キャンプ反対! 全ての難民キャンプを廃止せよ!」(“No Lager for Women! Abolish all Lagers!”)と題したキャンペーンを行った。実際の政策面では、難民申請者や移民に対するすべての差別的な法律の廃止、そして、人種差別と性差別(sexism)の間の連関に焦点を当てている。この団体は、難民の女性たちの現状を改善させようと、彼女たちの法的地位、職業の機会、健康相談等に関するより多くの情報を得るため、同時に難民女性の置かれている非人間的な住環境について一般の人々を教育するために、難民の女性たちをエンパワメントし、支援することに焦点を当て

ている。このNGOは、しばしば軽視されている難民女性が直面している問題を対象としており、それゆえ女性のニーズに合わせた支援を提供している。

新しい社会に適応するための状況改善に焦点を当てた、いくつかの他の団体や取り組みがある。自己組織化された団体をエンパワメントすること、言い換えれば、難民または移民をエンパワメントすることは、政策を改善し形作るもう一つのボトム・アップなアプローチの在り方である。さらには、これらの団体は、政府と政府間機関、そして一般の人々との間の仲介者としての役割を果たすことができる。エンパワメントとは、適切なアクターに対して、より多くの情報、スキル、資源、権限、機会、そして自発性を提供するとともに、彼らの行動の帰結に対して自分たちで責任をもつようにさせるという考えに基づいており、彼らの意思決定、問題解決、また状況改善に貢献するであろう。つまり、人々とコミュニティが、自分たちの責任の下で自分たちの決定した方法において、自分たちの権限に基づいて行動して、その利害を代表することを可能にするために、彼らの自立性と自己決定を促進させることを意味している。行為としてのエンパワメントとは、セルフ・エンパワメントのプロセスと、人々を専門的に支援することの両方を意味し、無力感や影響を欠くといった感覚をそれらの人々が克服し、そして自分たちの資質と機会を認識し、最終的にはそれらを活用することを可能にするものである。

ボトム・アップ型の取り組みが大切であるとはいえ、とりわけ緊急的な状況においては全ての必要な保護を提供することはできず、それゆえトップ・ダウン型のプログラムもまた必要とされている。そのようなプログラムの一つが、「ブルー・ドット・ハブ」(“Blue Dot Hubs”)という取り組みで、UNHCR及び国連児童基金(UNICEF)によって開始され、ヨーロッパを移動する子どもとその家族の保護を促進している。「ブルー・ドット」という名で知られる子どもと家族を支援する20のハブ(中核地)は、子どもたちとその家族に対して安全な居場所、不可欠なサービス、娯楽、保護、そしてカウンセリングといったものを一つの場所で提供する。ハブは移動にあたって脆弱な家族、とりわけ病気やトラウマ、暴力、搾取、そして誘拐といったリスクにある、多くの保護者がいない子どもや、家族から引き離されてしまった子どもを支援することを目的にしている。ハブは、移動式あるいはアウトリーチのチームと併せて、選択された戦略上重要な場所、国境のある出入国地点、登録場所、いくつかの戦略上重要な都市に置かれる予定である。サービスには、家族のつながりの修復、家族の再

統合、子どもにやさしい空間及び母親と乳幼児用のスペースの提供、カウンセリング、心理社会的な応急処置、法的地位に関わる相談、ソーシャル・ワーカーによるアウトリーチ、そしてWi-Fi接続のあるインフォメーション・デスクなどが含まれている。

概していえば、難民や移民のエンパワメントを高めている自己組織化された団体を支援することは、統合のプロセスにおいてきわめて重要な役割を果たす。しかしながら、依然として乗り越え、また再考すべき問題がある。どのように私たちは最上部の意思決定者に影響を及ぼすのか?どのように私たちは硬直化した官僚制に打ち勝つのか?どのように私たちは、ホスト社会の関心を高めるか?このような問題は尽きることがない。しかしながら一つだけ明らかなのは、私たちは変化を起こし、それを推進するための行動を取らねばならないということだ。このグローバル化した社会においては、市民の責任は増加しており、誰もが市民的社会参画を推進し、また寛容な社会に向けた目標に到達するために市民社会を共に推進させることができるのである。

結 論

難民及び移民のガバナンス、そして統合及び包摂の実施は、協力的な努力でなされなければならない。EPRIE2016の間、6カ国から集まった若手プロフェッショナルたちが新しいアプローチを探求するためのアイデアを交換した。私たちは互いにたくさんのことを学び合った。その貴重な意見交換は私たちに、問題の解決とはコミュニケーションとコラボレーション(協力)の問題であることを教えてくれた。このような態度からアプローチすると、難民、移民、そして統合に関する課題は処理できるものであり、将来に試されるべき新しい解決方法が芽生えてくるものである。



Photo: Rita Zobel

MEMORANDUM

in Korean

각서 - 다양성에 있어서의 결속

서론

2016년 EPRI는 '난민, 이주 그리고 통합 - 유사한 과제, 상이한 패턴'이라는 주제로 진행되었다. 다수의 난민들이 유럽에 유입되고, 이를 시도하는 상황에 맞게 EPRI 프로그램은 유럽 국가인 폴란드, 독일 그리고 프랑스에서 진행되었다. EPRI 프로그램 참가자들은 프로그램 기간 동안 난민을 돕고 이주를 관장하는 다양한 기관들을 방문하고 직접 현장에서 뛰고 있는 전문가들과 토론하면서 유럽과 동아시아의 난민과 이주에 대한 태도와 정책을 비교하는 기회를 가졌다.

프로그램의 주제가 참가자들에게 더 와 닿았던 이유는, 프로그램 참가자들의 학문과 직업적 분야이기 때문만이 아니라 참가자 본인이 이주와 새로운 사회에 통합되는 어려움을 직접적으로 경험하였기 때문이다. 또한, 모든 참가자들이 6개의 각기 다른 나라에서 다양한 경험을 하였음에도 불구하고 현재 이주 거버넌스에 대한 의견과 개선 방안에 대해 많은 유사한 의견들을 가지고 있었다.

이 글은 그 중 몇 가지 의견들을 포함하고 있다. 우선 한중일 그리고 유럽 이주민에 대한 해당 국가의 태도를 소개한 뒤, 이 지역에 협력과 네트워크의 중요성에 대해서 언급할 것이다. 다음 개별 국가적 차원이 아닌 세계적, 그리고 지역적인 차원으로 권력을 이전하는 것의 중요성을 설명한 뒤, 마지막으로 성공적인 통합을 위한 지역적 차원의 계획을 제시할 것이다.

이주민에 대한 개별 국가의 태도

한국, 중국, 일본의 이민 정책은 개별 국가적 차원에서 결정된다. EU 국가들은 공통적인 난민 시스템을 가지고 있으나 이주나 통합에 대해서는 각기 다른 정책을 가지고 있다. 한국, 중국, 일본 그리고 유럽은 전체적으로 고학력 전문직 이민은 적극적으로 추진하고 있으나, 저임금, 저학력 이민에 대해서는 소극적인 태도를 가진다는 점에서 공통점을 갖는다. 하지만 개별 국가만의 특징을 보이는 부분들이 있는데, 한국에서는 주로 농촌 지역의 불균형한 성비를 조절하기 위해 동남아 여성의 결혼 이주를 장려하고 있는 점이나, 한국,

중국, 일본에서 난민을 수용하는 비율이 유럽보다 매우 적다는 점 등을 그 예로 들 수 있다.

중국은 급격한 산업 발전으로 인해서 방대한 양의 국내 이주를 경험하고 있는데, 이로 인해 도시화가 급격히 진행됨과 동시에, 동부와 서부에 노동 불균형이 일어나고 있다. 중국 정부는 베트남, 미얀마, 시리아 그리고 여러 아프리카 국가에서 많은 난민이 유입됨에도 불구하고, 뚜렷한 난민 대책과 법을 세우지 않고 있는 상태이다. 하지만, 유엔난민기구(UNHCR)와 협력하여 일하고 있으며, 1982년에 체결된 난민 협정에 의해 제정된 법에 의거하여 한시적으로 난민들을 수용하기도 하였다. 하지만, 이외에 중국의 통합정책은 거의 존재하지 않고 있는데, 세계 경제 2위를 차지하고 있는 중국의 경제적 상황을 생각해 볼 때, 보다 적극적인 난민 수용 정책이 필요하다.

중국과 유사하게 일본에서도 국가차원에서의 이민 정책은 거의 존재하지 않는다. 하지만, 지방 정부 차원에서는 통합 정책을 통해 이주민들을 지원하려는 많은 시도들을 하고 있다. 예를 들어 하마마쓰 시에서는 라틴아메리카에서 온 교포 닛케이(Nikkei)가 많이 거주하고 있다. 이 도시는 유럽 의회에서 추진하는 이문화간 도시(Intercultural City)에 포함되는데, 이는 이주민을 잠재적인 위협으로 간주하는 것이 아니라, 도시에 생기를 불어넣는 중요한 자원으로 간주하는 도시를 말한다. 하마마쓰 시는 도시의 문화적 다양성을 강조하여 많은 관광객을 유치하고 인종과 문화에 관련된 여러 사업들을 진행하고 있다. 또한, 이주민에게 요양산업, 농업 등의 분야의 직업을 제공하여 도시를 활성화하고 있다.

한국은 2013년 아시아에서 최초로 독립적인 난민수용법을 제정하였다. 하지만, 망명 신청자 중 난민으로 받아들이는 비율은 경제협력개발기구(OECD) 국가 평균보다 매우 저조한 상황이다. 이 외에도 한국에는 매우 많은 숫자의 임시 외국인 노동자들이 거주하고 있으며, 4년 10개월 간 근로 후 성실 근로자로 지정될 시에 다시 4년 10개월 동안 합법적인 노동자로 일을 할 수 있다. 그러나 이 기간 동안

안 가족을 데리고 올 수 없으며, 고용주에게 부당한 대우를 당하는 등의 문제가 지속되고 있다. 또한 많은 수의 동남아 여성들이 한국 남성들과 결혼하여 한국으로 이주하지만 이들을 위한 정책들은 동화 정책에 치우쳐있으며, 아내, 어머니, 며느리로써의 역할을 강요 받고 있는 상황이다.

유럽에서는 EU에서 망명 절차와 조건들을 관장하는 시스템을 지정하고 있으나, 현재 진행되고 있는 이른바 난민 위기를 통해 알 수 있듯이 각 국가마다 수용하는 난민 수가 매우 큰 차이를 보이는 등, 국가마다 난민 정책을 시행하는 데 큰 차이점을 보인다. 또한, 난민 수용 외에 EU의 이주 정책은 국경 검문, 철책, 비자 정책, 반입물 제재, 강제 추방 등 EU를 출입하는 사람들을 통제하는 데에 초점을 맞추고 있는 실정이다.

독일과 같이 EU법 외에도 고유의 이민법을 제정하고 있는 국가들에서도 이민정책이 매우 소극적인 방향으로 변화하고 있다. 놀랍게도 독일은 여전히 통합에 관해서는 과거의 정책에 머물러 있는 태도를 보인다. 과거 서독은 부족한 노동력을 충당하기 위해 이탈리아, 터키, 그리스, 스페인, 포르투갈, 구 유고슬라비아, 모로코 그리고 튀니지 등의 국가에서 정착을 허용하지 않는 조건으로 많은 이주민을 고용하였으나 이는 지켜지지 않았고, 많은 이주민들은 가족을 데려와 독일에 영구적으로 정착하게 되었다. 하지만 1990년 말까지 정부는 이들을 사회에 통합하려는 노력보다는 이주민 유입을 억제하는 정책을 펼쳤으며, 독일에 온 망명 신청자와 난민들을 다수 사회에 동화시키려는 정책을 실시하였다. 결국, 독일은 이주민들을 받아들인 지 50년이 넘어서 2007년에야 비로소 이주민을 통합하는 정책을 실시하게 되었으나, 늦은 인지로 인한 많은 부작용을 겪고 있다. 예를 들어, 이민 2세대, 3세대들의 교육 수준은 여전히 낮은 수준을 보이며 많은 이주민들이 독일 시민권을 가지고 있음에도 불구하고, 여전히 차별을 겪고 있다. 또한, 몇 년 전 통합(Integration)과 포용(Inclusion)사이에 논쟁이 있었고, “환영의 문화(Culture of Welcome)”에 대해서도 논란이 진행 중이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 이주민의 통합은 일방적인 동화를 의미하는 것이 아니라는 것을 점차 인지하고, 실현해나가고 있는 상황이다.

협력과 네트워킹

앞서 다룬 이민정책 부분 중에 역사는 반복된다는 사실이 암시되었다. 한국, 중국, 일본은 반세기 전에 독일이 했던 같은 실수를 범하려고 있다. 이와 동시에, 실수가 반복되어도 가치가 있는 역사의 경험도 있다. 예를 들면, 유럽은 동아시아 국가들의 통합정책에서 그 교훈을 얻을 수 있다. 이 섹션에서는 유럽과 아시아 간의 협력과 네트워

크를 통해 똑 같은 실수를 두 번이나 저지르지 않도록 방지하고 현재의 유럽난민위기를 보다 효율적으로 접근하는 탐구를 할 것이다.

한국, 중국, 일본은 외국인 노동자들의 융합정책이 노동자와 독일 주류사회 간의 상호이익에 부합함을 독일의 경험으로부터 배울 수 있다. 독일사회에 융화되고 영주하도록 허락된 외국 노동자들은 독일 주류사회의 장기적 경제발전에 이바지할 것이며 독일 시민사회에 중요한 일원이 될 것이다. 주목할 만한 점은 독일을 비롯한 유럽 국가들은 일반적으로 이민자 통합에 관한 동아시아 국가들의 경험으로부터 그 교훈을 얻을 수 있다. 한국이나 일본에서 영주권이 허용되고 상대국가에 융화된 이민자들은 비슷한 외모와 문화로 인해 쉽게 융합이 이루어졌다. 한국과 일본의 이민자들은 “내부지역 이민”으로 아시아 국가 출신들이 주를 이루는 반면, 유럽은 문화나 종교가 현지국가와는 다른 “외부지역 이민”들로 이루어지고 있다. 동아시아 경험으로 미루어볼 때, 서로 다른 문화에 대한 친밀감이 다른 인종집단과의 상호 이해를 갖는 비결임이 확실하다. 그러므로, 통합 정책은 일방적인 정책이 아니고 포용에 목표를 뒀야 한다. 예를 들면, 새로운 방문자와 현지인의 상황에서 서로 배울 수 있어야 한다. 주류 사회는 바뀌어야 하고 더 포용해야 한다. 이것은 증가하고 있는 반 난민 감정을 동반한 현재 난민 위기를 비추어 볼 때 중요한 발견이다. 다른 문화 간의 개통은 장벽을 줄이고 차별을 만들고 이민자의 동등한 사회 참여를 막는 정책과 문화에 이의를 제기할 수 있다. 포용은 인간의 존엄성의 보편적 가치에 기초하며 사회의 일원임을 강조한다

이민의 처우와 관리에서 나오는 의견과 실천은 동아시아와 유럽간의 협력과 네트워킹의 교류에 있어서 중요한 체험이다. 서로에게서 교훈을 배우면, 실수를 방지하고 새로운 접근을 제시할 수 있다.

권력의 분산

위의 부분에서 보이는 듯이, 이민 정책은 거의 독점적으로 국가단위로 정해진다. 장기간 이민이 정착국가 및 이민자 모두에게 이익이 될지라도, 국가는 종종 이민자를 받아들이거나 통합시키기 주저한다. 하지만, 나라간의 협력에서 글로벌 단위의 협력으로, 그리고 권력을 지방단체로 이동시키는 것을 통해 이민분야에서 권력을 분산시키면 이민자를 받아들이거나 통합시킬 수 있을지도 모른다.

유럽은 소위 “이민 위기(Migration Crisis)”라고 잘못 불리어 지는 현재 난민/이민의 이동에 대해 매우 극단적인 논쟁에 마주하고 있다. 국가의 무능력함이 이러한 사태를 불러 일으켰기 때문에 좀 더 적



당한 단어는 “통치 위기(Governance Crisis)”가 맞다. 한편으로는, 경 보호, 더블린 협약(Dublin Regulation)¹의 실행, 국가 난민 및 통합 법에 있어서 국가는 가장 큰 권력을 가지고 있으며, 우선으로 책임을 져야 할 주체이다. 한편, 국가의 개념은 글로벌 난민/이민의 유입에 대처하는 것과 충돌된다. 특히, EU-터키 협약은 국가를 지지하여 권력의 불균형의 위험요소를 강조한다. 비행기로 안전한 경로를 제공하는 대신에, 이 정치적 협약이 여러 인권침해를 낳고, 난민들이 지중해를 통해 더욱 더 위험한 경로를 선택하게 한다. 이 위험한 경로를 선택하여 목숨을 잃은 난민들은 2000년도 이래 22,000명 이상이다². 권력의 소유와 정치적 실패의 모순을 벗어나, 국가의 권력을 지방 및 글로벌 단위로 이동시킬 필요가 있다.

글로벌단위에서는, 국제기관이 국제적 연대의 가치와 충돌하는 국익을 중시하는 국가보다 국제적인 연대의 가치를 더욱 더 확실히 나타내야 한다. 그러므로, 국제이민기구(IOM) 및 UNHCR 지원을 받는 것과 같이, 난민의 할달량은 국제적인 단위에서 정해지고, 감시되어야 한다. 이러한 권력 이동을 기본으로 하여, 통치 위기는 유럽뿐만 아니라 아시아를 포함한 다른 지역에서의 비행기를 통한 안전한 경로를 제공하는 것을 통해 해결될 수 있다.

1

더블린 협약(Dublin Regulation)은 EU 멤버 국가가 피난민 신청서를 검토하는 것에 책임을 들고 있다는 것을 지칭한다. 대부분의 경우, 이탈리아와 그리스와 같은 EU 밖의 국가와의 국경의 상태에 있어서 많은 의무를 가지고 있는 “처음으로 입국”하는 멤버 국가를 지칭한다.

2

국제이민기구 “죽음을 초래하는 여행 (Fatal Journeys, IOM 2014)”을 다음 링크에서 볼 수 있다. <<https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys-countingtheuncounted.pdf>> 12.

지역사회 수준에서는 도시와 시민사회에 특정한 역할이 부여된다. 예를 들면, 바르셀로나, 레스보스 섬, 그리고 람페두사 섬은 국가조약의 관료적이고 기계적인 면을 보완하기 위해 지역사회에서 난민들에게 직접 구호활동을 할 수 있는 조약을 채택하였다. 국가들이 더블린 협약을 이유로 자신들의 책임을 줄이려는 노력을 할 때, 지역사회는 기존에 국가의 역할로 규명되었던 책임을 가져와, 직접 해외 기금으로부터 지원을 받으려고 노력해야 한다. 지방의회에서 난민 중 특정인원을 수용하기로 결정했다면, 국가의 어떠한 법도 그 결정을 저지할 수 없다. 시민사회 활동가들은 권력이 분산된 난민 수용의 조정과정과 같은 상황에서 통합되어야 한다. 시민사회는 정부에 난민의 상황을 개선하기 위한 여러 안을 제시함과 동시에 난민들과 직접소통을 하는 난민 개개인과 정부의 사이에서 연결고리 역할을 한다. 또한, 시민사회는 국가가 정책을 만드는 과정에서 중요한 난민들의 목소리를 대변할 수 있다. 예를 들면, 시민사회가 난민의 대량 수용이 그들의 인권을 보호하지 못한다는 것을 알아차리면, 난민인권의 중요성에 대해 대중에게 알리고 정부를 설득하여 결과적으로 정책결정과정에 영향을 미친다. 그러므로, 포괄적인 방법으로 시민사회와 난민을 결정과정에 개입시킬 필요가 있다. 지역사회와 시민사회의 소통은 난민들의 지위를 향상시킨다. 이를 가능케 하기 위해서는 지역사회와 시민사회로 권력과 재정이 분산되어 이들의 역할과 역량을 극대화해야 한다.

하향식 통합: 자기 역량강화!

지원과 권력을 시민사회 및 지역단체로 이동시키는 것도 통합 과정을 향상시킬 수 있다. 통합은 여러 과정으로 행해지기 때문에, 다른

이민자들의 여러 수요에 대응하기 위해 여러 다른 단체들의 참여와 여러 방법을 이용해야 한다. 프로그램 기간 중 이러한 주제를 다루는 많은 단체를 방문하고 통합에 관한 몇몇의 이벤트에 참석했을 때, 우리는 이번 해 EPRIE 주제인 통합을 더욱 더 이해하기 위해 ‘자기 역량강화’의 개념에 고심할 필요성이 있다고 느꼈다. 정착 사회 대상으로 교육하는 외에도 많은 관계자간의 협력 및 자기 조직화된 단체를역량강화와 같은 통합을 향한 적절한하향식 방법을 제공하는 것을 통해, 통합 할 수 있다. 그러나, 이러한 방법들은 종종 간과

되고, 잘 알려지지 않고 있다.

우리가 방문한 자기 조직화된 단체의 하나의 예시로서는, 2002년 독일 브란덴부르크에서 난민 여성이 그들의 권리를 위해 창립된 “Women in Exile”라고 불리는 여성 난민 단체이다. 그들의 경험을 토대로 보았을 때, 여성 난민은 인종차별적인 법과 난민법 뿐만 아니라 여성으로서 이중으로 차별을 받았다. 이 비정부기구(NGO)는 2011년도에 ‘난민캠프에 있는 여성: 친구들(Women in Exile Camp; Friends)’이라는 이름으로 설립되어, 난민 배경의 지위가 없는 사람들을 위해 난민 여성과 결속된 네트워크로 확대시켰다. 그들은 “여성 난민 캠프 반대! 모든 난민 캠프를 폐지하라! (No Lager for Women! Abolish all Lagers!)”라는 캠페인을 하였다. 구체적인 정책을 위해, 그들은 난민 및 이주민을 향한 모든 법적 차별 폐지 및 인종과 성적 차별간의 상호연결에 집중하고 있다. 그들은 여성 난민의 현재 상황을 향상시키고 그들의 비인도적인 생활 상태에 대해 대중들에게 알리기위해, 주법적지위, 직업 선택, 보건 등에 관한 더 많은 정보를 취득하도록 난민 여성의 역량강화 및 지원에 집중하고 있다. 이 NGO는 난민 여성이 직면하고 있는 구체적인 어려움에 대응하도록 목표로 하며, 이러한 여성들의 수요에 맞춘 지원을 제공하고 있다.

새로운 사회에 적응하기 위한 조건을 향상시키는 데에 집중하는 다른 몇몇의 단체들도 있다. 자기 조직화된 단체를 강화시키는 것, 결국 난민 또는 이민자에게 권한을 부여하는 것은 또 다른 하향식 접근으로서 정책을 향상시키고 구체화시킨다. 더 나아가, 이러한 단체는 정부, 정부간 단체 및 대중들간의 중재자 역할을 할 수 있다. 권한 부여 자체는 적합한 관계자들에게 더 많은 정보, 능력, 자원, 권한, 기회 및 동기부여를 제공하고, 그들의 행동의 결과에 대해 책임감을 가지는 것을 기초로 하여, 문제를 해결하고 상황을 개선하기 위한 그들의 의사결정을 하는데 있어서 기여할 것이다. 간략하게 말하자면, 자신들의 자치권을 행사하는 책임있고 자기 결정 방법으로 자신들의 관심을 표현하게끔 하는 시민 및 커뮤니티의 자치권 및 자기 결정을 의미한다. 행동으로서의 권한 부여는 자기 권한

부여 과정 및 힘과 영향력 부족을 극복하고 최종적으로 자원 및 기회를 인식하고 쓸 수 있도록 다른사람들의 전문적인 지원을 뜻한다. 하향식 주도가 중요하지만, 특히 긴급 상황에서 모든 필요한 보호를 제공할 수 없으므로 상향식 주도도 필요로 한다. 그 중의 하나로서 유럽을 가로지르는 이동에 있어서 아이들 및 가족을 위한 보호를 위해, UNHCR과 유엔아동기금(UNICEF)이 만든 “블루 닷 허브(Blue Dot Hubs)”라고하는 계획이 있다. “블루 닷(Blue Dots)”이라고 불리는 20 곳의 아이들 및 가족 지원 중심지는 아이들과 가족들을 안전한 장소, 필수적인 서비스, 놀이, 보호 및 상담 서비스를 한 곳에서 모두 제공 할 것이다. 이 중심지는 이동, 특히 질병, 트라우마, 폭력, 착취 및 밀매에 노출된 동반자가 없거나 떨어진 아이들 및 취약한 가족을 지원하는 것을 목표로 하고 있다. 이 중심지는 유동적이고 봉사활동 팀을 통해, 엄선된 전략적인 장소, 입출국 장소, 등록 장소 및 전략적인 도시에 위치 될 것이다. 이 서비스는 가족간 연계 복원, 가족 재통합, 아이 친화적인 장소 및 엄마 및 아기들을 위한 장소 제공, 상담, 심리적 응급 처치, 법적 상담, 복지사 및 와이파이가 있는 정보 데스크 제공이 포함이 된다.

종합적으로, 난민 및 이민자의 역량강화를 향상시키는 자기 조직화된 단체 통합과정에서 필수적인 역할을 하고 있다. 하지만, 극복하고 다시 고려해야 할 어려운 점들이 많이 있다. 높은 지위에 있는 의사결정자와 어떻게 소통하는가? 융통성 없는 관료제를 어떻게 극복하는가? 자기 조직화된 단체를 위한 자금을 어떻게 모으는가? 주류사회에서 어떻게 문제의 인식을 높이는가? 이러한 의문들은 멈추지 않는다. 하지만, 틀림없는 것은 이러한 문제를 바꾸고 촉진하기 위해 행동을 취해야 하는 것이다. 글로벌 사회에서 시민들의 책임감은 증가되고, 모든 사람들은 시민참여를 촉진할 수 있고, 관대한 사회를 만들기 위해 목표를 성취하도록 시민사회를 장려할 수 있다는 점이다.

결론

피난민 및 이민자들의 정부, 그리고 통합 및 포함의 실행은 공동의 노력으로 이루어져야 한다. EPRIE 2016년도 프로그램 동안, 6개국으로부터 젊은 전문가들이 새로운 방법을 발전시키기 위한 의견을 교환했다. 서로로부터 더욱 더 많이 배우고, 이 가치있는 교류는 우리에게 문제해결은 의사소통과 협력에 달려있다고 가르쳐 주었다. 이러한 방식으로 망명, 이민 및 통합에 있어서의 문제는 감당할 수 있어 보이고, 새로운 양식은 미래에서 시험 될 것이다.

MEMORANDUM

in Polish

MEMORANDUM- JEDNOŚĆ W RÓŻNORODNOŚCI

WSTĘP

Program EPRIE 2016 podjął niezwykle aktualny temat: azyl, migracje i integracja migrantów- podobne wyzwania, różne wzorce. Program został przeprowadzony w trzech krajach europejskich: Polsce, Niemczech oraz Francji, gdzie jako uczestnicy odwiedziliśmy organizacje i instytucje zaangażowane w pomaganie uchodźcom i zarządzanie migracjami. Mielismy okazję podjąć dyskusje z ekspertami w tej dziedzinie oraz porównać nastroje i politykę państw europejskich oraz Azji Wschodniej.

Temat tegorocznego EPRIE był niezwykle personalny dla wielu z nas. Nie tylko ze względu na zaangażowanie w życiu zawodowym lub karierze naukowej, ale także z powodu osobistych doświadczeń wielu uczestników z kwestiami migracji i integracji w nowym państwie. Jednak pomimo osobistego wymiaru, złożoności tematu oraz tego, że pochodzimy z sześciu zupełnie różnych państw- w większości mieliśmy bardzo podobne opinie i odczucia na temat aktualnego stanu zarządzania migracjami oraz podobne pomysły na jego poprawę.

To memorandum przedstawia niektóre z naszych idei. Po pierwsze, opisuje obecną sytuację, poprzez wyszczególnienie regionalnych podejść do migracji w Chinach, Japonii, Korei Południowej i państwach europejskich. Następnie, podkreśla wagę współpracy i budowania sieci kontaktów (networking) pomiędzy tymi regionami oraz wysuwa tezę, że kooperacja ta jest najefektywniejsza po przesunięciu aktywności z poziomu narodowego do poziomów globalnego oraz lokalnego. W kolejnej części, memorandum w sposób bardziej szczegółowy rozważa istotę lokalnych inicjatyw dla osiągnięcia pełniejszej integracji. Zakończone jest wezwaniem do kooperacji i kontynuacji wymiany idei.

LOKALNE POSTAWY WOBEC MIGRANTÓW

Polityka migracyjna w Chinach, Japonii oraz Korei Południowej jest tworzona na poziomie państwowym. Unia Europejska (UE) posiada wspólny system azylu, jednak państwa członkowskie mają własne polityki dotyczące kwestii takich jak migracja czy integracja. Podobieństwo pomiędzy Chinami, Japonią, Koreą Południową i Europą polega na tym, że wszystkie cztery regiony zachęcają migrację wysoko wykwalifikowanej siły roboczej. Różnice natomiast dotyczą nastrojów



Photo: Rita Zobel

względem nisko wykwalifikowanej siły roboczej. W stosunku do innych form migracji obserwujemy kolejne rozbieżności. Na przykład zjawisko “migracji w celu zawierania małżeństw” (marriage migration) jest aktywnie popierane w Korei Południowej, niepochwalane zaś w Europie. Chiny, Japonia oraz Korea Południowa są natomiast generalnie bardziej niechętnie niż Europa do przyjmowania uchodźców, chociaż należy również zauważyć, że stosunek państw europejskich do tej kwestii jest niejednorodny w różnych krajach.

Chiny doświadczają masowej wewnętrznej migracji z terenów wiejskich do miast ze względu na rozwój przemysłu, wzrastający poziom urbanizacji i nierówności w możliwościach zatrudnienia pomiędzy wschodem a zachodem kraju. Rząd chiński nie zaproponował do tej pory odpowiedniej polityki dotyczącej osiedlania uchodźców, pomimo obecności w kraju wielu uchodźców z Wietnamu, Birmy, Syrii oraz różnych krajów afrykańskich. Rząd Chin podjął współpracę z Wysokim Komisarzem Narodów Zjednoczonych ds. Uchodźców (UNHCR) i tymczasowo zaakceptował uchodźców na podstawie ‘Exit- Entry Admission Law’, które zostało wprowadzone po podpisaniu Konwencji nt. Statusu Uchodźców w 1982 roku. Pomimo tego, tworzenie efektywnej polityki integracyjnej wciąż jest w toku. Jako druga największa gospodarka światowa, Chiny powinny odgrywać większą rolę w rozwiązaniu “kryzysu uchodźczego”.

Podobnie w Japonii nie ma oficjalnej polityki migracyjnej, która zachęcałaby migrantów do integracji ze społeczeństwem japońskim. Jednak, na poziomie administracji lokalnej, są podejmowane próby

wspierania integracji migrantów poprzez różne działania polityczne. Miasto Hamamatsu, posiadające jedną z największych populacji migrantów w kraju, szczególnie z tak zwanej diaspory Nikkei (pochodzącej z Ameryki Łacińskiej), jest przykładem sukcesu lokalnych inicjatyw. Miasto jest członkiem globalnej sieci Intercultural Cities, programu stworzonego przez Radę Europy, w ramach którego budowany jest wizerunek różnorodności kulturowej jako szansy a nie zagrożenia. Hamamatsu używa swojej reputacji jako miasta multikulturowego by rozwijać turystykę oraz ekonomię, poprzez nawiązywanie międzynarodowych kontaktów rynkowych i dostarczanie potencjalnym przedsiębiorcom informacji na temat etyki biznesu. Dodatkowo, władze miasta są zaangażowane w łączenie przedsiębiorców szukających pracowników o konkretnych kwalifikacjach z migrantami, którzy są w posiadaniu danych umiejętności (szczególnie w zakresie opieki pielęgniarstwa i rolnictwa).

Korea Południowa uchwaliła w 2013 roku The Refugee Act i została w ten sposób pierwszym krajem azjatyckim posiadającym niezależne prawo chroniące uchodźców. Jednak, procent zaakceptowanych azylantów pozostaje niski, dużo niższy niż w innych krajach należących do Organizacji Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju (OECD). Wielu migrantów zarobkowych przybywa do Korei Południowej w ramach tymczasowych programów zarobkowych, które umożliwiają im pozostanie w Korei przez okres czterech lat i dziesięciu miesięcy z możliwością jednokrotnego odnowienia kontraktu na taki sam okres. Niestety, pomimo życia w Korei Południowej przez okres prawie dziesięciu lat, nie mają oni prawa stałego osiedlenia lub przywiezienia do kraju swoich rodzin. Ponadto, wiele kobiet z krajów Azji Południowo-Wschodniej jest zachęcana do przyjazdu do Korei Południowej w ramach "migracji w celu zawierania małżeństw". Polityka prowadzona wobec tych kobiet jest oparta na asymilacji do społeczeństwa przyjmującego i stawia wysokie wymagania dotyczące poprawnego wypełniania roli żony, matki oraz synowej.

Pomimo Wspólnego Europejskiego Systemu Azylowego (CEAS) w ramach UE, regulującego procedury azylowe i warunki przyjęcia, lokującego odpowiedzialność za rozpatrywanie wniosków o azyl a także wyjaśniającego kto kwalifikuje się do objęcia międzynarodową ochroną, różnice w implementacji zasad pozostają ogromne pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi. Wciąż toczący się tak zwany "kryzys uchodźczy" bezustannie uwypukla różnice pomiędzy państwami, choćby na poziomie liczby uchodźców którą państwa są skłonne przyjąć. Jednak nawet jeśli państwa przyjmują uchodźców, generalnie politykę UE w tej dziedzinie można opisać jako politykę odstraszania. Surowe patrole na granicach, płoty, restrykcyjna polityka wizowa, kary dla przewoźników, deportacja i podobne narzędzia mają na celu ścisłą kontrolę nad tym kto wjeżdża i kto pozostaje na terytorium Unii Europejskiej.

Ponadto, obok prawa UE, wszystkie kraje członkowskie mają swoje własne legislacje dotyczące imigracji. W niektórych z nich, na przykład w Niemczech, wprowadzone zostały ostatnio poprawki mające na celu zahamowanie dalszej migracji do kraju. Interesujący jest fakt, że Niemcy wciąż pozostają pod wpływem efektów poprzednich polityki w tej dziedzinie, a raczej braku takowej, szczególnie w nawiązaniu do zagadnienia integracji migrantów. W Niemczech Zachodnich długo polegano na migracji bez praw do stałego osiedlenia jako źródle siły roboczej, której brakowało po drugiej wojnie światowej. Niemcy zatrudniały pracowników z Włoch, Turcji, Grecji, Hiszpanii, Portugalii, państw byłej Jugosławii, Maroko i Tunezji w latach 50. i 60. Wielu z tych pracowników sprowadziło swoje rodziny i pozostało w Niemczech na stałe. Jednak, do końca lat 90., polityka rządu skupiała się głównie na redukcji liczby migrantów niż na ich integracji. Wielu azylantów i repatriantów przybyło do Niemiec w latach 90. I również od nich oczekiwano całkowitej asymilacji do społeczeństwa przyjmującego. Niemcy potrzebowały ponad 50 lat aby zrozumieć, że są krajem zależnym od imigracji i konieczna jest dyskusja nad znaczeniem i konsekwencjami tego zjawiska. Dopiero w roku 2007 rząd rozpoczął pracę nad polityką integracyjną. To zaniedbanie doprowadziło między innymi do obniżenia prawdopodobieństwa osiągnięcia wyższego wykształcenia i zatrudnienia przez drugą i trzecią generację migrantów a także do wciąż widocznej dyskryminacji przeciw "migrantom" nawet jeśli oficjalnie są oni obywatelami Niemiec. Kilka lat temu była prowadzona w Niemczech debata na temat różnic między integracją a inkluzją a także na temat "kultury powitania". Idea integracji, która nie oznacza asymilacji i nie działa tylko w jednym kierunku, powoli nabiera większego znaczenia.

WSPÓŁPRACA I BUDOWANIE SIECI (NETWORKING)

Omówione powyżej fragmenty polityki państw sugerują, że historia lubi się powtarzać- Chiny, Korea Południowa i Japonia są na drodze do popełnienia tych samych błędów co Niemcy pół wieku temu. Możemy jednak przytoczyć też pozytywne doświadczenia, które wzbogacą podejścia obu regionów. W tej części postaramy się przedstawić jak współpraca i tworzenie sieci kontaktów pomiędzy Europą i Azją może pozwolić uniknąć popełnienia tych samych błędów a także pomóc zbudować inne, lepsze podejście do "kryzysu uchodźczego" w Europie.

Chiny, Japonia i Korea Południowa mogą nauczyć się z niemieckiego doświadczenia, że integracja obcokrajowych pracowników jest korzystniejsza zarówno dla samych pracowników jak i społeczeństwa przyjmującego. Pracownicy, którzy są zintegrowani i mają pozwolenie na stały pobyt w kraju zatrudnienia przyczyniają się do długoterminowego wzrostu ekonomicznego kraju przyjmującego i stają się wartościowymi członkami społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Niemcy i inne kraje europejskie mogą natomiast zaczerpnąć z doświadczeń azjatyckich w

zakresie integracji imigrantów. Migranci, którzy otrzymują zezwolenie na stały pobyt w Korei i Japonii, integrują się łatwo, ze względu na podobieństwo w wyglądzie i kulturze. Są to migranci głównie z innych krajów azjatyckich, w związku z “wewnętrzną migracją regionalną” (internal regional migration), podczas gdy w Europie mamy do czynienia z “zewnętrzną migracją regionalną” (external regional migration), a więc dotyczącą migrantów, których kultura i religia są różne od wartości społeczeństwa przyjmującego. Niemniej jednak, doświadczenie krajów azjatyckich pokazuje, że znajomość swoich nawzajem kultur jest kluczem do zbudowania porozumienia pomiędzy różnymi grupami. Dlatego też integracja nie może być jednostronnym procesem, ale musi być skierowana na inkluzję, na wzajemne uczenie się od siebie. Społeczeństwo przyjmujące musi w tym celu zmienić się, stać się bardziej otwarte i inluzywne. Jest to niezwykle istotne zalecenie, szczególnie w świetle rosnącego sentymentu anty-uchodźczego związanego z obecnym kryzysem. Międzykulturowa otwartość pozwoli znieść bariery i wpłynąć na politykę i kulturę prodyskryminacyjną, uniemożliwiającą migrantom równy udział w życiu społeczeństwa. Inkluzja opiera się na uniwersalnej wartości jaką jest ludzka godność i podkreśla istotę bycia częścią społeczeństwa.

Współpraca i budowanie sieci (networking) pomiędzy krajami Azji Wschodniej i Europą są niezwykle istotne dla wymiany doświadczeń, idei oraz dobrych praktyk odnośnie zarządzania migracjami. Wzajemne uczenie się od siebie powstrzymuje przed popełnianiem tych samych błędów a także umożliwia wprowadzanie nowych podejść do tematu.

DECENTRALIZACJA WŁADZY

Jak wskazują powyższe refleksje, polityka migracyjna jest niemal całkowicie kreowana na poziomie państwa narodowego. Państwa są jednak często niechętnie do przyjmowania i integracji migrantów, nawet jeśli w dłuższej perspektywie mogłoby to być zyskowne dla obu stron. Dobrym rozwiązaniem jest decentralizacja władzy - przeniesienie współpracy pomiędzy państwami na wyższy (globalny) poziom a także przesunięcie inicjatywy do społeczności lokalnych.

Europa aktualnie mierzy się z silnie spolaryzowaną debatą na temat obecnych trendów migracyjnych, które są nieopatrnie nazywane “kryzysem migracyjnym”. Najbardziej odpowiednim terminem dla tego zjawiska wydaje się jednak “kryzys zarządzania- ze względu na niezdolność państw narodowych do radzenia sobie z jego konsekwencjami. Z jednej strony państwo jest pierwszym i ponoszącym największą odpowiedzialność aktorem, który posiada władzę nad ochroną granic,

implementacją konwencji dublińskiej¹ oraz kreowaniem legislacji azyłowej na poziomie narodowym i międzynarodowym. Z drugiej strony, taki concept państwa narodowego uniemożliwia implemetację skutecznych rozwiązań dotyczących obecnej migracji. W szczególności, umowa pomiędzy UE a Turcją, uwypukla niebezpieczeństwo zachwiania równowagi władzy na rzecz państwa narodowego. Zamiast zapewniania bezpiecznej drogi tranzytu samolotem, ta polityczna umowa prowadzi do różnych naruszeń praw człowieka i ponownie zmusza uchodźców do wyboru bardziej niebezpiecznej drogi, przez Morze Śródziemne, gdzie od roku 2000 zginęło ponad 22,000 osób.² Właśnie z powodu tego konfliktu pomiędzy posiadaniem władzy a polityczną porażką, występuje silna potrzeba przesunięcia władzy z poziomu narodowego do poziomów lokalnego i globalnego.

Na poziomie globalnym, instytucje międzynarodowe reprezentują globalne wartości bardziej wiarygodnie niż państwa narodowe, których własne interesy często wchodzą w konflikt z tymi wartościami. Z tego powodu, alokacja uchodźców powinna być definiowana i monitorowana na poziomie globalnym, na przykład pod auspicjami takich organizacji jak Międzynarodowa Organizacja do Spraw Migracji (IOM) czy UNHCR. Dzięki takiemu przesunięciu władzy, kryzys zarządzania może zostać rozwiązany poprzez zapewnienie bezpiecznych dróg tranzytu samolotem, nie tylko do Europy ale także do innych regionów, w tym Azji.

Na poziomie lokalnym, szczególną rolę odgrywają miasta i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Na przykład prezydenci miast Barcelony, Lesbos i Lampedusy wprowadzili zasadę bezpośredniej pomocy dla uchodźców w celu ominięcia biurokracji wynikającej z postanowień narodowych. Podczas gdy państwa narodowe chowają się za regulacjami z Dublinu i usiłują uciec przed odpowiedzialnością, miasta muszą przejąć tę rolę i zdobywać wsparcie bezpośrednio z funduszy międzynarodowych. Jeśli lokalna administracja zdecyduje o zapewnieniu miejsc zamieszkania dla danej liczby uchodźców, może się okazać, że nie ma żadnego prawa narodowego, które by to uniemożliwiało. Aktorzy społeczeństwa obywatelskiego muszą działać wspólnie, na przykład w procesie mediacji na rzecz osiągnięcia zdecentralizowanego systemu zapewniania miejsc zamieszkania. Odgrywają oni rolę łącznika pomiędzy uchodźcami a państwem, ponieważ wchodzą w

¹ *Konwencja Dublińska wyznacza państwa członkowskie UE odpowiedzialne za oceny wniosku o azyl. Najczęściej będzie to państwo członkowskie »pierwszego wjazdu«, nakładając większe obowiązki na państwa na zewnętrznych granicach UE, takich jak Włochy i Grecja.*

² *Międzynarodowa Organizacja do Spraw Migracji – IOM, “Fatal Journeys (IOM 2014)”, <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf> 12.*

ASYLUM MIGRATION INTEGRATION

similar challenges, different patterns





Photo: Lim Suna

interakcje z państwem w celu osiągnięcia celu, jakim jest poprawa sytuacji uchodźców. Dodatkowo, społeczeństwo obywatelskie może reprezentować głos uchodźców, co jest kluczowe dla kreowania odpowiedniej polityki na poziomie państwowym. Na przykład, kiedy aktorzy społeczeństwa obywatelskiego uznają, że masowa akomodacja uchodźców jest w sprzeczności z prawami człowieka i zaczynają opowiadać się za zmianami są w stanie przekonać decydentów na poziomie państwowym do zmiany stanowiska i końcowo do zmiany w polityce. Dlatego też niezwykle istotne jest by włączyć aktorów społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i samych uchodźców w process podejmowania decyzji a także zrobić to w sposób zdecydowany. Interakcje pomiędzy miastami a społeczeństwem obywatelskim wzmacniają pozycję uchodźców i zachęcają do samodzielnych działań. Zatem w celu umożliwienia miastom oraz wyżej wspomnianym aktorom efektywnego sprawowania swoich ról i zwiększania własnych możliwości więcej władzy i wsparcia finansowego powinno zostać przesunięte w ich kierunku.

ODDOLNA INTEGRACJA : EMPOWERMENT (UMACNIANIE WIARY W SIEBIE)

Przesunięcie wsparcia i władzy do społeczeństwa i lokalnych organizacji zdecydowanie poprawia także proces integracji. Ponieważ integracja jest procesem wielowarstwowym, zaangażowanie różnych organizacji i różnorodne sposoby jej realizacji są niezbędne aby skutecznie odpowiedzieć na różne potrzeby rozmaitych migrantów.

W trakcie programu EPRIE, kiedy to mieliśmy okazję odwiedzić wiele organizacji zajmujących się tematem migracji a także wziąć udział w wielu wydarzeniach na temat integracji migrantów, zdaliśmy sobie sprawę, że istotne jest głębsze zbadanie konceptu empowerment (umacniania wiary w siebie, poczucia własnej wartości, motywowanie do samodzielności), tak aby zapewnić odpowiednie rozumienie pojęcia integracja oraz pozostałych tematów tegorocznego EPRIE. Oprócz edukowania społeczeństwa przyjmującego, integracja może zostać osiągnięta także poprzez kooperację pomiędzy różnymi aktorami oraz przez promocję odpowiednich ruchów oddolnych, na przykład

zachęcanie do tworzenia i wzmacnianie pozycji samoorganizujących się grup. Niestety takie podejście jest często zaniedbywane a informacje na temat istnienia takich grup- niekompletne.

Jednym z przykładów samorganizowanej grupy, którą odwiedziliśmy jest organizacja "Women in Exile". Jest to inicjatywa rozpoczęta w 2002 roku w Brandenburgii przez kobiety- uchodźców, które postanowiły walczyć o swoje prawa. Powodem były doświadczenia, które wskazywały, że kobiety jako uchodźcy są podwójnie dyskryminowane- nie tylko przez krzywdzące prawo azylowe odnoszące się do wszystkich ogółem ale także jako kobiety same w sobie. W 2011 roku organizacja została rozszerzona o "Women in Exile & Friends", co pozwoliło włączyć w działania kobiety bez historii uchodźczej, solidaryzujące się z kobietami- uchodźcami. Wspólnie poprowadziły one kampanię "No Lager for Women! Abolish all Lagers!" ("Stop obozom dla kobiet! Zlikwidować wszystkie obozy!"). W sensie politycznym organizacja lobbuje likwidację legislacji dyskryminującej azylantów i migrantów ogółem oraz zajmuje się powiązaniami między rasizmem i seksizmem. "Women in Exile" skupia się na wzmacnianiu pozycji kobiet- uchodźców oraz pomocy w zakresie zdobywania informacji na temat ich legalnego statusu, możliwości podjęcia działalności zarobkowej czy opieki zdrowotnej. Wszystko to w celu poprawy warunków ich życia a także w celu wyedukowania społeczeństwa na temat nieludzkich warunków w jakich muszą żyć kobiety- uchodźcy. Organizacja skupia swoje działania wokół konkretnych trudności, jakimi muszą stawić czoła kobiety. Trudności, które często są pomijane w dyskursie.

Istnieje wiele innych organizacji i inicjatyw które skupiają swoje działania na poprawie warunków integracji migrantów w nowym społeczeństwie. Wzmacnianie pozycji samoorganizujących się grup, które następnie pomagają usamodzielniać się migrantom czy uchodźcom, jest przykładem podejścia oddolnego, które wpływa na zmiany starej i kreowanie nowej polityki w dziedzinie migracji. Grupy te mogą również pełnić rolę mediatora pomiędzy rządem, organizacjami międzyrządowymi a społeczeństwem. Sama idea empowerment zakłada, że dostarczanie większej ilości informacji, umiejętności, zasobów, władzy, możliwości i motywacji do odpowiednich aktorów a także czynienie ich odpowiedzialnymi za rezultaty własnych działań, przyczyni się do pomagania im, zachęci do podejmowania samodzielnych decyzji, rozwiązywania problemów i poprawy całokształtu sytuacji. W skrócie, empowerment oznacza zwiększanie autonomii i determinacji pojedynczych osób oraz grup w celu zachęcenia do samodzielnego reprezentowania swoich interesów w odpowiedzialny sposób. Pojęcie to odnosi się zarówno do procesu self-empowerment (usamodzielniania) jak i do profesjonalnej pomocy przez osoby z zewnątrz, umożliwiającej pokonanie poczucia bezsilności i braku wpływu jak i rozpoznanie oraz ostatecznie użycie swoich zasobów i szans.

Pomimo tego, że inicjatywy oddolne są niezwykle ważne, nie są w stanie zapewnić całkowitej, niezbędnej ochrony, szczególnie w sytuacjach specjalnych oraz krytycznych. Dlatego właśnie należy również podkreślić rolę programów odgórnych. Jednym z takich programów jest inicjatywa "Blue Dot Hubs", zaproponowana przez UNHCR oraz UNICEF w celu zwiększenia ochrony dzieci i rodzin przemieszczających się po Europie. Dwadzieścia Centrów Wsparcia dla Dzieci i Rodzin, znanych pod nazwą "Blue Dots" ma zapewnić bezpieczną przestrzeń dla dzieci i ich rodzin, niezbędne wsparcie i usługi, miejsce do zabawy, ochronę przed zagrożeniami i porady prawne w jednym miejscu. Centra mają za zadanie wspierać rodziny narażone na niebezpieczeństwo, szczególnie dzieci przemieszczające się bez rodziców, będące szczególnie narażonymi na choroby, trauma, przemoc, wykorzystywanie i przemyt. Centra mają być zlokalizowane w wybranych strategicznych miejscach, takich jak punkty kontrolne na granicy, miejsca rejestracji oraz niektóre ośrodki miejskie. Usługi oferowane przez centra to na przykład jednoczenie rodzin w jednym miejscu, dostarczanie przyjaznej dzieciom przestrzeni a także przestrzeni odpowiedniej dla matek z niemowlętami, porady prawne, pomoc psychologiczna, dostęp do pracowników pomocy społecznej oraz punkt informacyjny z dostępem do internetu.

Podsumowując, wspieranie samoorganizujących się grup, które następnie wzmacniają pozycję uchodźców i migrantów odgrywa kluczową rolę w procesie integracji. Wciąż jednak istnieje wiele trudności, które trzeba przemyśleć i pokonać. W jaki sposób komunikujemy się z decydentami na górze? W jaki sposób pokonujemy rygorystyczną biurokrację? Jak wspieramy samorganizujące się grupy finansowo? Czy zwiększamy świadomość społeczeństw przyjmujących? To nie jedyne pytania, jakie należy zadać. Jedną rzeczą jednak jest pewna: należy podjąć działania w celu zmiany obecnej sytuacji. W społeczeństwie globalnym, w którym żyjemy, odpowiedzialność obywatelska rośnie i każdy z nas może wykazywać zaangażowane postawy i zachęcać społeczeństwo do wspólnego budowania postaw tolerancji.

WNIOSKI

Zarządzanie migracją i azylem a także implementacja integracji i inkluzji musi być wspólnym wysiłkiem. Podczas programu EPRIE 2016, młodzi eksperci i badacze tematu z sześciu krajów spotkali się by wymienić idee i rozwinąć nowe podejścia do problemu. Nauczyliśmy się od siebie nawzajem bardzo dużo i to wartościowe doświadczenie pokazało nam, że podstawą rozwiązania każdego problemu jest komunikacja i współpraca. Takie podejście do wyzwań stawianych przez kwestię azylu, migracji i integracji czyni je możliwymi do rozwiązania i pozwala optymistycznie myśleć o przyszłości.

**KOREA FORUM IS AVAILABLE
AT THESE LOCATIONS IN
BERLIN, GERMANY**

oh*21

Oranienstr. 21
10999 Berlin - Kreuzberg

Chatwins - Bücher rund ums Reisen

Goltzstraße 40,
10871 Berlin - Schöneberg

Haus der Kulturen der Welt - Buchladen

John-Forste-Allee 10
10557 Berlin - Mitte

Korea Verband

Rostocker Str. 33
10553 Berlin - Moabit

Korean Book Service

Helmut Hetzer Internetbuchhandlung
www.koreanbook.de

Since 1991 KOREA FORUM is one of the few publications in the German-speaking countries, which is especially concerned with Korea and East Asia. It illuminates a wide spectrum of topics from the Korean Peninsula including politics, international relations and society, in addition to history, art and literature. The magazine serves readers that are interested in the development of the Korean states in a global setting.

The KOREA FORUM can be purchased for €15 for each double issue, excluding shipping. Members of the KOREA VERBAND and subscribers receive the magazine with free delivery.

KOREA FORUM SPECIAL IS
AVAILABLE ON WWW.EPRIE.NET

KOREA FORUM SPECIAL published since 2013, consolidates our understanding of relevant themes presented at seminars and conferences like the *Exchange Program for Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe* – EPRIE.



Korea Forum 2016
Unerhörtes sichtbar machen
Doppelheft EUR 15



Korea Forum 2015
38 ° und kein Ende in Sicht
Doppelheft EUR 15



Korea Forum 2014
Löcher im Eisernen Vorhang
Doppelheft EUR 15



Korea Forum 2013
Fokus: 50 Jahre Migration aus
Südkorea nach Deutschland
Doppelheft € 15



Korea Forum 2012
Fokus: Migration als Kurzzeit-
migration oder Bleiberecht
Doppelheft € 15



Korea Forum 2011
Fokus: Pflicht und Verweigerung
- Militär in Südkorea
Doppelheft € 15

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Korea Forum
c/o Korea-Verband e.V.
Rostocker Str. 33
10553 Berlin / Germany

Tel: +49 (0)30 3980 5984
Fax: +49 (0)30 3980 5986
redaktion@koreaverband.de

PUBLISHER

Korea Kommunikations- und
Forschungszentrum, KOREA VERBAND

www.koreaverband.de

The KOREA VERBAND is a registered association
(Vereinsregister AG Charlottenburg
VR 26710 B.)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Han Nataly Jung-Hwa – V.i.S.d.P.

MANAGING EDITORS

Alexandra Bauer
Yann Prell
Mathias Räther
Dr. Rita Zobel

LAYOUT AND TYPESETTING

Choe Dong-Ha

*ENGLISH PROOFREADING
AND TRANSLATIONS*

Suzanne von Engelhardt

PROOFREADING

Mathias Räther
Dr. Rita Zobel

PHOTOS

When photographer is not mentioned,
the photos are taken by Choe Dong-Ha

PRINTING

Druckerei Conrad GmbH, Berlin

*KOREA FORUM
SPECIAL - EPRIE IV,
AUTUMN 2016,
PERIODICAL NO*

ISSN 0944-8373
available: www.eprie.net/publication

*MAGAZINE SUBSCRIPTIONS,
INDIVIDUAL ORDERS,
PREVIOUS EDITIONS:*

abo@koreaverband.de

ABOUT EPRIE

EPRIE is a dialogue intensive seminar program
held annually on 10-12 days in Europe and East
Asia alternately. It includes political talks, visits
to institutions, round trips...

EPRIE aims to promote and improve contact
between people of neighboring states, whose
relations have been troubled in history.
It intends to develop personal contacts, to build
a long lasting network, to stimulate and foster
the development of further cooperation.

EPRIE was founded in 2012 by the two
organizers Han Nataly Jung-Hwa and Rita
Zobel. It is mainly supported by Robert Bosch
Stiftung and the Japan office of Friedrich-Ebert
Foundation.

ABOUT KOREA VERBAND

The KOREA VERBAND is a politically
independent forum providing information and
promoting cooperation among people who are
interested in the history, culture, and politics of

Korea. This platform will appeal to all
individuals who wish to engage with or find out
about current developments on the Korean
peninsula.

The KOREA VERBAND seeks and promotes
collaboration on national and international
levels with other non-governmental
organizations and initiatives as well as experts
on Korea in the arenas of science, journalism,
politics, labor unions, churches, environment,
women's rights, arts and culture.

The KOREA VERBAND was founded in 1990
and is a member of the foundation Stiftung
Asienhaus. Since 2008 the Korea Verband has
been based in Berlin.

AUTHOR INFORMATION

The articles in KOREA FORUM SPECIAL
represent the opinions of the authors. These
opinions do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Editorial Office or those of the
Publisher. We have made all efforts to respect
the copyrights and rights of use of all
material from third parties. Should any errors
have occurred in specific instances, please
contact the Editorial Office.

Reprints and any other form of secondary
usage requires the prior consent of the
Publisher. As a rule, we welcome further
dissemination. Please contact us with your
request.

In East Asia the surname precedes the first name.
In our publication we respect this convention.

MEMORANDUM – UNITY IN DIVERSITY

EPRIE 2016 engaged with a particularly topical issue: asylum, migration and integration - similar challenges, different patterns. With refugees continuing to try to enter Europe, the program was appropriately held in Poland, Germany and France where we visited organizations and institutions involved in helping refugees and governing migration, discussed with experts in the field, and compared attitudes and policies with those in East Asia.

The topic felt relevant and personal to us, not merely because we engage with it in our studies or professional lives, but because many of the participants had personal experiences of migration and the challenges of integrating into a new country. In spite of the personal nature of our experiences, the complexity of the topic and the fact that we come from six different countries, we had largely similar opinions about the current state of migration governance, as well as similar ideas about how to improve it.

This memorandum lays out some of those ideas. First, it describes the current state of affairs by detailing regional attitudes towards migrants in China, Japan, Korea and Europe. Next, it highlights the importance of cooperation and networking between those regions in general before moving on to suggesting that cooperation is best achieved through shifting power away from the nation-state, both to a global and a local level. Finally, the memorandum delves deeper into the special importance of local initiatives for successful integration. We conclude with a call for cooperation and a continuing exchange of ideas.

REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS

Immigration policies in China, Japan and Korea are decided at the nation-state level. The European Union (EU) has a common asylum system, however EU member states have their own policies on issues such as migration and integration. Generally speaking, the immigration policies of China, Japan, Korea and Europe are similar in that all four regions encourage migration of the highly skilled and are wary of low-skilled migrants. Regarding other forms of migration, there are some differences, for example, marriage migration is actively encouraged in Korea but discouraged in Europe. Further, China, Japan and Korea are more reluctant than Europe to take in refugees, however it should be noted that the willingness to do so varies between European countries.

China is experiencing mass internal rural-urban migration due to industrial development, increasing urbanization and labor imbalances between east and west. Generally speaking, the Chinese government has not acted to legislate for refugee settlement until now, despite the presence of many refugees in China from Vietnam, Myanmar, Syria and various African countries. The Chinese government has worked together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and temporarily accepted refugees according to the »Exit-Entry Administration Law« that it enacted after signing the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982. Despite this, an effective integration policy is still pending in China. As the second-largest global economy, China must play a more important role in solving refugee crises in the future.

Similarly, in Japan, there is no official immigration policy to encourage migrants to integrate into Japanese society. However, at the community level, there have been many attempts by local governments to support migrants through integration policies. Hamamatsu City, which has one of the largest populations of migrants, particularly Latin American Nikkei, is an example of such a local-level attempt. The city declared itself part of a global network...

Organizer



25 Jahre
KOREA VERBAND

Supported by

Robert Bosch Stiftung

Further Support

